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A man may be admirable in many ways but a jerk in others.
Margaret Atwood, Cat’s Eye

In March 1977, a man was arrested in Los Angeles and charged with 
drugging and sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl. The man pled 
not guilty to these charges, but eventually pled guilty to  engaging in 
“unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor” in a plea bargain. But 
then, apparently because he believed the judge in charge of the case 
would renege on the plea bargain, the man fled the USA. Based on 
this information, it does not seem that this person merits admiration.
However, the man in question is the acclaimed film director 
 Roman Polanski. He is widely regarded to be one of the world’s 
greatest film directors. His film Chinatown has been judged to be 
the best film of all time (Pulver 2010), and he has received more than 
80 international film awards. Audiences, actors, and critics admire 
his substantial contributions to cinema. For example, the actor 
Christoph Waltz said, “[Polanski] knows exactly what he wants and 
I admire that in a director. I admire Roman Polanski from A to Z” 
(Otto 2011).
This case highlights an ethical puzzle: Polanski has acted wrongly, 
yet he has also made many excellent contributions to the arts.1 In 
light of his wrongdoing, should you still honour and admire him? 
Or should you instead blame and shun him? What exactly should 
your response to Polanski be?
Polanski’s case is not unique. The #metoo movement has high-
lighted many other cases like Polanski’s: cases of actors, producers, 
and musicians who have both acted immorally and created great 
art. In 2017, the comedian Louis CK acknowledged that he acted 
wrongly by masturbating in front of junior colleagues. In 2018, the 
actor and comedian Bill Cosby was convicted of three counts of ag-
gravated sexual assault against Andrea Constand. In 2019, the singer 
R. Kelly was arrested and charged with various crimes, including 
“kidnapping, forced labor, child sexual exploitation and child por-




In 2020, the producer Harvey Weinstein was  sentenced to 20 years 
for a first-degree criminal sex act and three years for third-degree 
rape (Aratani and Pilkington 2020).
While there are many recent cases that have grabbed attention, 
this is not a recent phenomenon. The history of art features many 
artists who have done terrible things alongside creating excellent 
work. Richard Wagner was noted anti-Semite (Lee 1999). Pablo 
Picasso was a misogynist (Lee 2017). Paul Gauguin abused his wife 
(Hill 2001), abandoned his family to live in Tahiti, and then had 
three marriages to teenage girls, infecting each of them with syph-
ilis (Bedworth 2018). We think that most people will have admired 
an artist – such as a musician, painter, actor, or a director – who 
has also done something immoral. So, even if you find yourself 
 disagreeing with our judgements about a particular person being 
admirable or being immoral, we are sure that you will be able find 
a personal example to work with.
This phenomenon is not restricted to the arts. There are many ex-
amples of politicians, athletes, and intellectuals who have achieved 
great things and yet are (or were) immoral. For example, Winston 
Churchill is widely honoured and admired in the UK for playing an 
important role in helping to bring about victory for the Allied pow-
ers in the Second World War. In 2002, Churchill was voted “The 
Greatest Briton of All Time” in a British television poll (BBC News 
2002). Likewise, Charles Krauthammer (1999), writing at the end 
of the twentieth century in The Washington Post, claimed Chur-
chill was the “Person of the Century”. However, Ross Greer (2019), 
a Member of the Scottish Parliament, says that Churchill was “a 
white supremacist mass murderer”. Not only did Churchill hold 
many reprehensible views on race (Attar 2010: 9), he is also thought 
to have played a pivotal role in bringing about the 1943  Bengali 
famine which killed an estimated 1.5–3 million people (Mukerjee 
2010: 131). The esteemed medical scientist Hans Asperger, who 
was once considered a hero by many people with autism, has been 
found to have been complicit in Nazi eugenicist policies (Sheffer 
2018). The philosopher Martin Heidegger is responsible for signifi-
cant works in the area of phenomenology. Not only has Heidegger 
been found to have held anti-Semitic views, but some have also ar-
gued that a nti-Semitism is in fact a feature of his work (Oltermann 
2014). And the widely honoured and admired footballer Cristiano 
 Ronaldo has accepted a fine for tax evasion (Binnie 2019).
We therefore have a general ethical puzzle: what should the re-
sponse be to those who have done both excellent things and immoral 
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things? Should you honour and admire? Should you blame and shun 
them? Given that they have achieved great things, there are reasons 
to admire them. But given that they are also immoral, there are also 
reasons to blame and shun them. What, then, should you do? There 
is no obvious winner in this competition of reasons. This problem 
is especially pressing because, despite some efforts to change our 
practices of honouring and admiring inspired by the #metoo move-
ment, we still have a culture in which people are regularly honoured 
and admired for their contributions to art, politics, science, phi-
losophy, and sports without regard for the fact they have also done 
immoral things. For example, Polanski has received many awards 
and honours. Churchill has been honoured on British money, in 
statues, and in films about his life. All manner of immoral people – 
such as slave traders, colonialists, and the like – are depicted in stat-
ues around the world. And more informally, we honour immoral 
intellectuals by citing and using their work. Are these instances of 
honour and admiration unfitting or inappropriate? Should these 
statues be pulled down and these honours revoked?
The first two chapters of this book investigate the nature of 
honour and admiration in order to provide a guide to figuring out 
whether you have an instance of this ethical puzzle. In Chapter 1, 
we outline what we take honouring to be, what we take the connec-
tion between honouring and admiration to be, and what we take 
admiration to be. Among other things, we argue that honouring 
typically picks out its target as someone we ought to admire, and 
that admiration is fitting for those who have done something excel-
lent. You might wonder whether a person’s immorality precludes 
them also being admirable. If an immoral person cannot also be 
admirable, then there seems to be a simple answer to the ethical 
puzzle: the immoral should not be admired because they are not 
admirable. In Chapter 2, we take up this question. While we outline 
ways a person’s immorality can affect their admirability, we argue 
that a person can be both immoral and admirable. So, you cannot 
simply avoid the puzzle at the heart of this book by holding that the 
admirability is incompatible with immorality. The ethical puzzle 
that we seek to respond to arises precisely because a person can 
be both admirable and immoral. Sometimes there are reasons to 
honour and admire a person and reasons to blame and shun that 
person.
While we think there is no immediately obvious correct response 
to this question, popular discussion about these questions highlights 
two general ways of responding to this puzzle. The first is that we 
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should do nothing and maintain the status quo of honouring and ad-
miring the immoral in the ways we already do. These people are ad-
mirable, so we should continue honouring and admiring them. This 
approach suggests that our honour and admiration practices are fine 
as they are and, hence, we have no need to change anything about 
who and how we honour and admire. This approach might seem 
especially objectionable in light of the #metoo movement, as many 
of its proponents called for those accused to cease being honoured. 
The second approach, which might seem inspired by the #metoo 
movement, is that we should abandon admiration of these immoral 
figures. These people have done terrible things, so they should not 
be honoured and admired. This approach suggests we have broken 
honour and admiration practices and that those who behave immor-
ally should never be honoured and admired. This approach might 
seem like a form of so-called cancel culture. While our discussion 
does have implications for the debates about #metoo and cancel 
 culture, the focus of the book will not be on these topics. There are 
two reasons. First, it does not seem that supporting the #metoo 
movement commits you to abandoning admiration in all or most 
cases. Second, it is not always clear what “cancelling” amounts to. 
Even so, sometimes what we count as “abandoning  admiration” may 
qualify as “cancelling”. If so, then our argument can be  understood 
as this: cancelling is not a good general policy, but it is sometimes 
appropriate to cancel. We return to these wider cultural questions at 
the end of the book. Our focus until then is on the ethical puzzle of 
how to respond to admirable yet immoral people.
Once you have a clear instance of this puzzle, you have to turn 
to the ethics of admiration to figure out how you should respond to 
them. In Chapter 3, we outline a number of reasons against honour-
ing and admiring the immoral. And in Chapter 4, we outline a num-
ber of reasons in favour of honouring and admiring the immoral. 
While the main focus of both of these chapters is on identifying 
factors that affect the appropriateness of honouring and admiring 
the immoral, both chapters reveal along the way that the do-nothing 
and the abandoning-admiration approaches are both unacceptable 
as general policies. Because both chapters argue that the only gen-
eral reasons for and against honouring and admiring the immoral 
are defeasible ones (i.e. reasons that can be defeated or overridden 
by other reasons), these reasons cannot justify the above two  general 
policies. This leaves open that sometimes it is appropriate to either 
do nothing and continue honouring and admiring an immoral per-
son or abandon admiration and cease honouring and admiring an 
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immoral person. Of course, sometimes neither approach will be an 
appropriate response to an immoral person.
In Chapter 5, we outline three other approaches when doing 
nothing and abandoning are off the table. Before outlining these 
approaches, we suggest that doing nothing and abandoning cannot 
constitute adequate general policies because they both manifest the 
vice of globalism – that is, they encourage or manifest the tendency 
to reduce a person to a particular feature, such as their admirable 
or immoral features. The further approaches, then, aim to avoid 
encouraging or manifesting this vice. The first two approaches 
we consider involve focused admiration. The first holds that we 
should aim to focus our honour and admiration on an immoral 
person’s admirable traits and achievements (rather than letting ad-
miration spread to all of the person’s traits). The second holds we 
should aim to focus our honour and admiration only on the per-
son’s achievements. In other words, we should separate the achieve-
ment from the person and just focus on the achievement. The third 
holds that we should embrace the ambiguity that immoral yet ad-
mirable  people force us into. Just as we suggest that focused ad-
miration becomes an option once doing nothing and abandoning 
 admiration are off the table, we suggest that achievement-focused 
admiration  becomes an option once it is no longer acceptable to 
focus on the immoral p erson at all. Ambiguity, then, is in effect 
a kind of l ast-ditch  option: we have strong reasons to honour and 
admire an immoral person (in some way) and yet we cannot eas-
ily avoid the moral  dangers with doing so; we should instead try 
to mitigate those dangers by using our honour and admiration as 
a kind of educational experience about human nature, excellence, 
and immorality.
****
Our aim in this book is to provide the reader with a guide for re-
sponding to this important and complex ethical issue. We believe 
that philosophy works best when it provides people with a guide for 
helping them think through difficult issues rather than attempting 
to provide definitive answers to those questions. This kind of ap-
proach is summarized by Kwame Anthony Appiah:
Philosophers contribute to public discussions of moral and po-
litical life, I believe, not by telling you what to think but by 
providing an assortment of concepts and theories you can use 
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to decide what to think for yourself. […] I’m hoping to start 
conversations not to end them.
(2018: xiii)
Like Appiah, our aim is to provide resources to help the reader 
think these ethical issues through for themselves and to start con-
versations rather than to end them. We therefore do not aim to pro-
vide a definitive solution to the ethical puzzle of how we should 
respond to admirable yet immoral people. While we do not argue 
directly for this approach, we hope that this book serves as a kind 
of argument in its favour. Whether or not we are successful in any 
of our aims is something we leave for you, the reader, to judge.
Note
 1 For ease of reference, we will sometimes refer to people who have acted 
wrongly or immorally as being “immoral”. We do not mean that such 
people are thoroughly immoral. Rather, we just mean that they have 
done something immoral or have an immoral trait. Likewise, when 
we say someone has done something excellent in art, sport, politics, 
science, philosophy, or elsewhere, we will say that they are excellent 
artists, athletes, politicians, scientists, philosophers, even though we 
do not necessarily mean they are thoroughly excellent in these areas.
What is it to honour? What is the connection between honouring 
and admiration? What is admiration? This chapter provides an 
 answer to each of these questions. We argue that while honouring 
has several emotional bases, it functions to pick out its target as 
someone others ought to admire. Whether honouring is fitting, 
then, depends on whether admiration is fitting. We then outline 
some basic features of admiration. In particular, we claim it  assesses 
its target as extraordinarily excellent, it can take on multiple objects 
(e.g. we can admire people, traits of people, nature, or o bjects), and 
that admiration need not involve a desire to emulate the target but 
can simply be a desire to promote the admired values in the object 
of admiration. It ends by arguing that we can  morally evaluate feel-
ings of admiration and we can perhaps even have d uties to admire 
or not to admire.
1 The Nature of Honouring
We honour people in various ways: by giving them an award, by 
putting their face on a coin, by creating a statue of them and install-
ing it in a prominent place, or by giving that person an important 
and prominent role (such as hosting a prestigious award cere-
mony). We may also honour a person by enjoying their work and 
by recommending their work to others (both in conversation and 
in academic research). Each honours a person because the object, 
process, role, or activity draw positive attention to that person. Due 
to space and attention constraints, the fact we could have drawn 
positive  attention to someone else suggests that there is something 
special about the person towards whom we have drawn positive 
 attention. Thus, in honouring that person, we send the message that 
the  person is worth honouring.
1 Honour and Admiration
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There are different emotional bases for honouring. We might create 
a statue of a great political leader out of gratitude for that leader. For 
example, in the congressional record of the US Senate of a  discussion 
of a statue of Winston Churchill that was placed in Washington D.C. 
outside the British Embassy it was said that the statue was “erected 
in eternal gratitude to Winston Churchill” for his role in defeating 
the Nazis during the Second World War (Brown Harris 1965: 2190). 
We might also honour someone out of respect and admiration for 
them. For example, when the Hollywood Foreign Press Association 
gave Oprah Winfrey a lifetime achievement award, HFPA President 
Meher Tatna called Winfrey “one of the most respected and admired 
figures today” (Bahiana 2017).
What does it mean to say an award or a statue or a role expresses 
an emotion? Given that such things lack emotions themselves – for 
example, a statue does not feel gratitude – it initially appears to be 
a convenient way of saying, for example, that the award-giver feels 
the emotion and they are giving the award as a way to show that 
they feel admiration for the awardee. There are two problems with 
this understanding. First, honours are often given by groups (such 
as a committee or nation), and, even if members of the group feel 
the relevant emotions, it need not be the case that the group as a 
whole feels those emotions. We may hold that groups simply cannot 
have emotions. Or we may hold that what emotions the group has 
isn’t determined by what emotions most people in the group have.1 
Second, both individuals and groups can honour a person without 
feeling gratitude, respect, or admiration. For example, a scholar 
might cite another scholar out of duty without feeling respect, grat-
itude, or admiration.
However, when we honour a person, this does something. While 
honours can sometimes express gratitude, respect, and a dmiration 
of the person or group doing the honouring, we think that ho nours 
(given without qualification) will typically pick out its target as 
 worthy of admiration – that is, as being admirable, as someone 
 others have reason to or ought to admire. We think this is true 
regardless of what the honourers (those giving the honour) think 
or feel. As we have said, honouring takes up valuable resources, 
such as space and attention. Because it takes up such resources (as 
well as material resources), it communicates something about the 
person being honoured. It communicates that they are worthy of 
taking up our space and attention, of taking up these valuable and 
limited resources. And if they are worthy of this, then they must 
be someone for whom these are fitting reactions. Even if you just 
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build a statue out of gratitude or just cite a person out of respect, 
you are still saying that this honour is a fitting response to this 
 person. Statues make this particularly clear: when a person is put 
on a pedestal, they are elevated above others and so marked out in 
a positive way. If others want to receive such gratitude and respect 
and perhaps even adulation and adoration, then they should try to 
be like the person by also doing something great. In other words, 
in honouring a person it is usually being communicated that this 
person is admirable and that others therefore have reason to ad-
mire the person being honoured. (We say ‘usually’ because there 
may be ways to communicate that although someone is being hon-
oured, they should not be admired. We return to this point later 
in the book.) While honouring often communicates more than just 
whether someone ought to be admired (e.g. it may also communi-
cate that respect or gratitude are fitting responses), we will focus on 
just this particular meaning of honouring in what follows. Given 
that honours pick someone out as admirable – and can be said to 
express admiration in doing so – when a person is honoured this 
can be understood as saying that the honoured person is a fitting 
target of admiration.
2 Fittingness
Fittingness is a technical term used by philosophers to identify a 
relation between an emotion and the world. On the dominant view 
of fittingness, an emotion fits its targets if and only if it accurately 
represents the world (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000).2 Suppose you 
feel fear. Your feelings of fear are fitting if and only if they are re-
sponding to something that is actually fearsome. If you felt fear 
upon seeing a dangerous bear, you would not be mistaken for doing 
so. However, if you felt fear because you mistook a bush for a bear, 
then you would be mistaken for doing so, as bushes are normally 
not dangerous. The idea is that our emotions have an implicit evalu-
ation of a feature of the world, and this evaluation can be correct or 
incorrect depending on what the world is actually like. An emotion 
that has a correct evaluation, such as your fear of the bear, is fitting. 
An emotion that has an incorrect evaluation, such as your fear of 
the bush, is unfitting.
But just because an emotion is fitting does not mean that it is 
all-things-considered appropriate to feel that emotion (D’Arms 
and Jacobson 2000: 71–72). Fittingness is just one among many 
reasons that we might have for feeling an emotion. When an 
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emotion is all-things-considered appropriate, the so-called balance 
of  reasons speaks in favour of feeling this emotion. That is, given all 
the  reasons there might be for and against feeling an emotion at a 
 particular time, the reasons to feel the emotion win out. To see how 
fittingness and all-things-considered appropriateness come apart, 
 consider the bear example again.
As we said, it is fitting to feel fear about the bear because the 
bear is a threat to your safety. By feeling fear about the bear, you 
are accurately evaluating the bear as a threat to your safety. While 
such a feeling may represent the world accurately – the bear is in-
deed a threat to your safety – feeling fear might cause you to startle 
the bear and lead to it attacking you. So even though fear is fitting, 
there is a prudential reason not to feel fear. This prudential reason 
(that it is better for you if you do not feel fear in this situation) plau-
sibly overrides the fittingness reason to feel fear. So, feeling fear 
is not all-things-considered appropriate in this situation. Because 
the reason that fittingness gives to feel an emotion can be defeated 
by other reasons, fittingness only provides a defeasible or pro tanto 
reason to feel an emotion. In other words, fittingness is not suffi-
cient for all-things-considered appropriateness.
Let us now apply these points about fittingness and all-things- 
considered appropriateness to admiration and honour. A person may 
be admirable – and so admiration for them is fitting – and yet it is not 
all-things-considered appropriate to admire them. So even though a 
person is admirable, the strength of the reasons to admire them can 
be overridden or defeated by reasons against admiring them. Perhaps 
your hero would feel very sad if you admired them; if so, then you 
plausibly have decisive reason not to admire them. The same is true 
with honouring, even though honouring is not itself an emotion but 
rather an activity. We can distinguish between a person being a fit-
ting target of honour and it being all-things- considered appropriate 
to honour a person. Someone might think you were mocking them if 
you honoured them. If so, then you  plausibly have decisive reasons 
not to honour them even though it is fitting to honour them. So, just 
because a person is a fitting target of an honour does not mean that 
you ought to honour them. There are further reasons – including 
moral, epistemic, and prudential r easons – that come into play in de-
termining whether anyone should actually honour them.
Note also that just because an emotion is all-things-considered in-
appropriate in a particular situation we need not have a duty not to 
feel it. For instance, it may be all-things-considered inappropriate to 
feel fear when confronted with a bear, but, if you cannot suppress 
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your fear, then it is plausible that you do not have a duty not to feel 
fear. After all, it is common to think we cannot have a duty or require-
ment to act in a particular way if we lack the power to act that way.3 
Likewise, it seems we cannot have a duty to feel or not to feel a par-
ticular feeling if we lack control over our feelings. It remains, though, 
that it is all-things-considered inappropriate. The balance of reasons 
may speak against feeling fear, even though your fear accurately rep-
resents a feature of the world, and you cannot help but feel fear in 
this particular situation. The same may be true when an emotion is 
all-things-considered appropriate: we may lack a duty to feel because 
we cannot bring about what it is all-things-considered appropriate to 
feel. Of course, when you have reasons for and against something, you 
may at some point get a duty to do or not do that thing.
Importantly, whether honour or admiration is fitting does 
not depend on whether it is public or private. Fittingness is just 
about getting the world right. It does not tell you what you ought 
to do, all-things-considered. But, as we will see later in more 
 detail, whether honour and admiration are all-things-considered 
 appropriate will often affect how you ought to honour and admire. 
Sometimes private admiration will be appropriate when public 
 admiration is not, for example.
3 The Nature of Admiration
Whether admiration is fitting depends on what kind of evaluation 
is part of admiring and what the object of admiration is. After 
 answering these questions about the nature of admiration, we look 
at a further component of admiration – namely, its action tenden-
cies. Note two things.
First, we will not endorse any particular theory of emotions in 
this book. Instead, we will focus on an account of the admiration 
itself and on the aspects that are most relevant for our purposes.4 
Second, there are other aspects to admiration’s nature that we will 
raise in later chapters as they become relevant. We provide this 
 basic account here so that you have an initial understanding of the 
emotion we are investigating.
3.1 Evaluation
Admiration involves a positive evaluation of its object. For  example, 
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev writes that admiration involves “a highly positive 
evaluation of someone” (2000: 56). Likewise, William Lyons says 
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that admiration involves “an evaluation of [its] object which can 
be classed as a pro-evaluation or approval” (1980: 90). It is hard 
to challenge this claim about admiration. It does not seem that a 
feeling that lacked some sort of positive evaluation could plausibly 
count as admiration.
However, a positive evaluation is not distinctive of admiration. 
Adoration, respect, and gratitude also involve a positive evaluation. 
Admiration must therefore involve more than just a positive evalu-
ation. Many claim that admiration also involves a kind of wonder 
(Smith [1759] 2007: I.i.4.3; Darwin [1872] 1998: 269; Schindler et al. 
2013). Sophie Grace Chappell claims that admiration is “the ‘Wow!’ – 
response” (2019: 12). While Adam Smith says that admiration is 
 “Approbation heightened by wonder and surprise” (1759/2007: I.i.4.3).
There may be other aspects to admiration’s evaluative compo-
nent. One suggestion is that admiring something involves viewing 
it as possessing value that is rare (Forrester 1982: 102). Another is 
that admiration involves a judgement of the object’s superiority in 
relation to the subject (Schindler et al. 2013: 89; Chappell 2019: 15; 
Kauppinen 2019). Admiration has also been claimed to involve the 
judgement that the object being admired is extraordinary or even 
miraculous (Chappell 2019: 15). Drawing several of these sugges-
tions together, our view is that admiration evaluates its target as 
being excellent and worthy of positive wonder.5 So, admiration is 
fitting when these evaluations are correct. What, then, is the target 
of admiration?
3.2 Intentional Object
Unlike moods, emotions are about something. For example, we 
 dislike someone, we are upset that our team didn’t win, we enjoyed 
the film, and so on. The thing that emotions are about is their inten-
tional object. But many emotions are about more than one thing – 
that is, they seemingly have multiple intentional objects. For 
 example, we feel indignant at someone for doing something. In other 
words, while our indignation is targeted at a particular person, it 
is targeted at them because of something that they have done. We 
can distinguish two intentional objects for indignation – namely, a 
particular object and a formal object (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018; 
Kauppinen 2019). With indignation, the particular object is the 
 person – that is, the particular person who has done something to 
be a fitting target of our indignation, while the formal object is what 
they have done to be a fitting target of our indignation. Indignation 
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thus has a dual intentional object – one is the person towards whom 
we feel indignation and the other is the reason we have for f eeling 
indignation towards them. It is an emotion’s formal object that 
 determines whether the emotion is fitting. If you felt indignation at 
a person who had not wronged you, you would be feeling unfitting 
indignation: it would inaccurately represent the person as having 
wronged you.
With respect to admiration, there is disagreement about which 
particular and formal objects it can have. There is widespread 
agreement that we can admire particular people – that is, that a 
person can be the particular object of admiration. However, Antti 
Kaupinnen (2019) claims that only people can be admired. Others 
instead hold that not only people can be fitting targets of admi-
ration. Emily Brady (2013: 44) holds that we can admire natural 
events. Amanda Cawston (2019) claims we can admire animals. 
Chappell (2019: 13) claims that we can also admire qualities, rela-
tions, comic timing, positions, virtues, and actions, among other 
things. And Vanessa Wills (2019) argues that we can admire social 
groups such as the Paris Commune. While the ethical puzzle at the 
heart of this book involves person-focused admiration, we will also 
discuss object-focused admiration – such as admiration for a paint-
ing or for a scientific achievement. So, we assume pluralism about 
admiration’s particular object.6
There is also disagreement about the formal objects that 
 admiration can have. While many hold that admiration can be 
 fitting because of a person’s character traits, attitudes, actions, 
and achievements, some hold that admiration involves a global 
 evaluation – for example, it involves holding that a person is (in some 
way) a purely admirable person and so lacks any non- admirable 
qualities. We discuss and reject this view in the next chapter. For 
the moment, we will assume pluralism about admiration’s formal 
object too. On this view, a person is a fitting target of admiration 
only if they have acted excellently in some way, created an excellent 
object, or if they possess some excellent trait. An object is a fitting 
target of admiration only if it is excellent in some way.
3.3 Action Tendencies
An important part of experiencing an emotion is how that emotion 
motivates you to act – that is, what action tendencies that emotion 
has. When it comes to evaluating that emotion – in particular, in as-
sessing what reasons you have against feeling an emotion – we need 
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to know what action tendencies it has. While you might be making 
no factual error in feeling an emotion, you might make a moral 
error in doing so because it is going to motivate you to act in a par-
ticular way. What, then, are the action tendencies of admiration?
One popular view is that admiration motivates you to emulate 
the person you admire. For example, Linda Zagzebski (2017: 43) 
claims that admiring someone “gives rise to the motive to emulate 
the admired person in the way she is admired”. Similarly, Mark 
Schroeder (2010: 42) claims that admiration “is the kind of state to 
motivate you to emulate the people you admire, insofar as you are 
able”. It is important to make clear what the claim that admiration 
involves emulation amounts to. According to Zagzebski (2017), ad-
miration typically gives rise to a defeasible desire to emulate the 
person we admire in the way that they are admired. If you admire 
a person for their courage, then this will give rise to a desire to 
become courageous yourself. The desire to emulate is therefore a 
desire to possess for yourself the features you admire in the other 
person. Zagzebski stresses that admiration is only likely to give rise 
to a desire to emulate when emulation is possible.7,8
Another view is that admiration involves a desire to promote the 
admired values in the object of admiration (Archer 2019). A virtue 
of this view is that it accommodates not only cases in which admi-
ration leads to a desire to emulate but also other common instances 
of admiration that do not lead to such a desire. For example, John 
Skorupski claims that he can “admire the ease and grace of an ath-
lete or violinist, the dedication of a scientist, the vision and courage 
of a politician, without desiring to emulate them” (2010: 288). This 
seems true. You can admire a footballer for their skills without de-
siring to gain those skills. Indeed, admiration may also have other 
action tendencies, such as applause (Smith 1759/2007 Ch.4 Section 
1), enhancing the reputation and praising the object of admiration 
(Algoe and Haidt 2009), and deference to the admired (Velleman 
2009: 42). This view can explain why people sometimes have desires 
to emulate, praise, or applaud the target of admiration. These are 
different ways that people can promote the admired values in the 
object of admiration.
4 Responsibility and Moral Evaluation
It is essential to our view that it is possible to have moral reasons 
against feeling admiration – that is, it is appropriate to subject 
our feelings of admiration to a particular kind of moral evaluation. 
Honour and Admiration 15
We also want our view to be compatible with people sometimes 
having a duty not to admire. If people cannot have duties not to 
admire, then we cannot say this. Some might be sceptical of both 
claims for a similar reason – namely, that we seem to lack control 
over our emotions.
Immanuel Kant (1996: 161) provides the following argument 
along these lines against the possibility of a duty to love: “Love is 
a matter of feeling, not of willing, and I cannot love because I will 
to, still less because I ought to (I cannot be constrained to love); 
so a duty to love is an absurdity”. Similarly, Richard Taylor (1970: 
252) claims that “Love and compassion are passions, not actions, 
are therefore subject to no terms of duties or moral obligations”. 
These points can be adapted to become arguments against duties 
to admire or not to admire. Because admiration is also a matter 
of feeling or passion, it might also be thought to be something we 
cannot have a duty to feel. Similarly, it might be thought that love 
and admiration cannot even be morally evaluated because they are 
feelings we do not control.
Even if these lines of argument were sound, it would not under-
mine all our later claims – for example, that you sometimes have 
moral reasons (and sometimes even a duty) not to publicly admire 
or honour the immoral. Even if you accept that you cannot control 
your feelings of admiration, it is clear that you can control your 
expressions of admiration. People do this with other emotions. 
For example, a person feels angry at their teacher’s questionable 
methods, but yet they can avoid showing any outward signs of an-
ger. A person may feel very sad and yet appear very happy. There 
is no good reason that people cannot exhibit such control with 
 admiration too. It is also clear that when people honour is under 
their control. It sometimes involves expressions of admiration and 
sometimes may not. Either way, these things can be controlled.
This line of argument is not sound, however, as there are 
 different ways you can control your feelings.9 First, you can have 
 developmental control – that is, you can develop yourself so that 
you respond to the same stimuli with different emotions. Psycholo-
gists call this response modulation. Some people go to anger man-
agement classes in order to stop getting so angry at certain things. 
You can also come to care and appreciate your friends and family 
more by paying them greater attention, by reciprocating the kind 
things they have done for you, and so on. This kind of control is 
indirect because you do not change your emotions and attitudes 
immediately, but rather through a process of developing your 
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character. Second, you can give yourself reasons to have or not to 
have an emotion. Psychologists call this attentional deployment. 
For  example, a boxer might imagine someone they hate in order 
to get sufficiently angry to fight their opponent. Third, you can re-
flect on the reasons why you are feeling a certain emotion, and this 
may give you reason to stop feeling the emotion. Psychologists call 
this cognitive reappraisal. Consider the mother-in-law who feels 
 contempt for her daughter-in-law until she reflects on the reasons 
why she feels this way (Murdoch 1970: 17–18). On discovering that 
her contempt is rooted in jealousy, the mother-in-law reflects on 
this and begins to see the daughter-in-law in a different light and 
eventually comes to like her. In this case, the mother-in-law’s re-
flection influences her emotional response to the daughter-in-law. 
Fourth, you can place yourself in situations or avoid situations that 
are likely to bring about the desired emotion. Psychologists call 
this situation management. For example, a couple who want to feel 
more in love might spend a romantic weekend together. Because 
you can have these various forms of control over your emotions, it 
makes sense to say that you can have duties to feel or not feel par-
ticular emotions.
Perhaps more importantly, even if you cannot have duties to feel 
or not to feel, you can still morally evaluate how you feel. You can 
still judge that your excitement at someone else’s misfortune is mor-
ally bad even if you cannot control that feeling. You can judge that 
any actions that stem from unconscious biases, and those biases 
themselves, are morally bad. You can evaluate any character trait, 
including ones you have not exercised much, if any, control over 
having. Even if you do not have control over these things, they are 
still expressive of who you are. These evaluations still tell you about 
what kind of person you are, whether you are good, bad, or mixed. 
You might not have a duty to do anything to curtail your immoral 
excitement or your morally bad biases. But because they can still 
be evaluated as morally bad, you arguably still have moral reason 
to try to curtail them. Many things in life generate reasons but not 
duties. Still, we think that sometimes these reasons might generate 
duties.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the basics of honouring and  admiring. 
We first argued that the function of honouring is to pick out some-
one as admirable. This allows that those who honour need not feel 
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admiration for the object of an honour. Because honouring picks 
someone out as admirable, whether a particular honour is fitting 
depends on whether admiration is fitting. After explaining the 
concept of fittingness, we then gave an initial account of admira-
tion. Finally, we argued that you can have duties to feel and not to 
feel and, even if you do not have such duties, your feelings can be 
 morally evaluated and you can have moral reasons against feeling 
a particular way.
Notes
 1 For various understandings of what group collective emotions are, see 
Gilbert (2002), Pettigrove and Parsons (2012), von Scheve and Ismer 
(2013), Stockdale (2013), and Archer and Matheson (2019c).
 2 There are other views. Macnamara (2020), for example, identifies four 
types of fittingness. Fittingness is also used in different ways across 
different debates – for an overview, see Howard (2018). We set aside 
these other views in what follows.
 3 This claim – that “ought implies can” – has received c onsiderable 
 scrutiny. For a small sample of the literature on this topic, see S innot- 
Armstrong (1984), Yaffe (1999), and Vranas (2018).
 4 In doing so, we follow the kind of approach taken by Deonna et al. 
(2012: 10). While they focus on seven dimensions of shame – namely, 
phenomenology, intentional object, evaluative component, the devel-
opmental path of acquisition, typical eliciting situations, manifesta-
tion, and associated action tendencies – we focus on a narrower set 
given our different purposes.
 5 This claim is compatible with leading accounts of the emotions. For 
example, judgementalists (e.g. Nussbaum 2001) could say that the eval-
uation involved in admiration is a belief or judgement. Perceptualists 
(e.g. Tappolet 2016) could understand the evaluation as a perception. 
Sentimentalists (e.g. D’Arms and Jacobson 2003) could either say that 
admiration is a natural emotion and so a positive feeling, or they could 
say it is a cognitive sharpening of a positive natural emotion. Attitudi-
nalists (e.g. Deonna and Teroni 2015) could understand the evaluation 
as an attitude that the object of admiration is admirable. Note, though, 
that we will normally talk about our emotions representing the world. 
We take it that this way of talking can be translated into one’s preferred 
view of the emotions.
 6 See Archer (2019) for a defence of pluralism.
 7 This leads Zagzebski (2017: 35–40) to restrict her claim to admiration 
for acquired excellences rather than natural talents. We will not exam-
ine this part of her view here.
 8 The emulation view is supported by a number of psychological studies. 
See Algoe and Haidt (2009), Aquino et al. (2011), Cox (2010), Freeman 
et al. (2009), Immordino-Yang and Sylvan (2010), Landis et al. (2009), 
Schnall et al. (2010), Thrash and Elliot (2004), and van de Ven et al. 
(2019). It is worth noting that not all of the psychological evidence 
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speaks in favour of the emulation view. A study by Van de Ven et al. 
(2011) cast doubt on this connection, finding no statistically significant 
connection between admiration and a desire to emulate. Instead, they 
found that what they call benign envy was more likely to lead to such 
a desire. However, in later work, van de Ven (van de Ven 2017; van de 
Ven et al. 2019) did find a connection between admiration and a desire 
to emulate and conceded that the balance of evidence speaks in favour 
of this connection (van de Ven 2017: 197).
 9 Some of these points are drawn from Liao (2006: 4). Some are drawn 
from the extensive psychological literature on the topic of emotion 
 regulation, a term that refers to the ways in which people manage their 
emotions. See Gross (2015) for a helpful survey of this literature. See 
Archer and Mills (2019) and Liebow and Glazer (forthcoming) for 
 philosophical work that engages with this literature.
Can someone be admirable despite being immoral? In other 
words, can the immoral be fitting targets of admiration? This 
question is of crucial importance for our project of providing 
an ethical guide to admiring the immoral. If the immoral can 
never be fitting targets of admiration, then the ethical question of 
whether or not we should honour and admire them will be virtu-
ally redundant.1
To show that this ethical question is not redundant, we will ar-
gue in Section 1 that the immoral can be admirable. We will argue 
for this by undermining arguments for admiration being a glo-
balist emotion. On this view, admiration evaluates (i.e. takes as 
its formal object) the whole person. However, we will argue that 
people can be complex, have both good and bad traits, and still 
be admirable.
But how exactly can the immoral be admirable? Can they be 
admirable for being immoral? Or are they just admirable despite 
being immoral? In Section 2, we will investigate the admirable 
immorality debate to identify ways that the immoral can be admi-
rable. We argue that the immoral may be admirable despite being 
immoral but are never admirable for their immorality. But just be-
cause the immoral can be admirable despite being immoral, this 
does not mean that immorality never affects admirability. In Sec-
tions 3–5, we outline three ways a person’s immorality can affect 
whether they are a fitting target of admiration. The first involves 
their immorality giving us evidence that they did not do some-
thing admirable in the first place. The second involves a  person’s 
immorality affecting the (aesthetic) value of their work. The 
third involves their later immorality undermining their  earlier 
admirability.
2 Admirability and 
Immorality
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1 Globalism
1.1 Globalism about Admiration
Globalist emotions take the “whole person” as both the particular 
and formal object. Shame is often invoked as a paradigm example. 
For example, Bernard Williams writes that, “in the experience of 
shame, one’s whole being seems diminished or lessened. In my expe-
rience of shame, the other sees all of me and all through me” (1993: 
89; our emphasis). And Martha Nussbaum writes that “Whereas 
shame focuses on defect or imperfection, and thus on some aspect 
of the very being of the person who feels it, guilt focuses on an action 
(or a wish to act), but need not extend to the entirety of the agent, 
seeing the agent as utterly inadequate” (2004: 207; our emphasis). 
The “whole person” in these contexts is understood psychologically 
such that it includes all of the person’s beliefs, desires, values, traits, 
cares, and commitments.
A globalist view of admiration holds that whether a person is a 
fitting target of admiration depends on an evaluation of the whole 
person. On this view, when you admire a person, you can only 
 fittingly admire them for being an admirable person. The formal 
object of your admiration is the person and not some feature of 
the admired person (such as their artistic talent or moral virtue).2 
If someone’s immorality means that an overall positive evaluation 
of the person is not possible, then, according to a globalist view of 
admiration, they cannot be a fitting target of admiration. On some 
conceptions of globalism (e.g. Bell 2011), this does not rule out the 
possibility that someone may be both admirable and immoral. You 
might still be able to have an overall positive evaluation of a person 
even though they are immoral, because their admirable traits and 
actions might outweigh or be more important than their immoral 
traits and actions. However, it does mean that you must always take 
someone’s immorality into account when evaluating whether they 
are a fitting target of admiration. On stronger views of globalism, 
admirability is incompatible with immorality.3 The ethical puzzle 
at the heart of this book would then be easily resolved: you must 
simply work out whether or not a person is admirable overall in 
order to know whether or not you should honour and admire them.
While there are different accounts of the relevant global e valuation 
(e.g. Doris 2003; Bell 2011), we will not investigate the differences be-
tween these accounts here (though these accounts will be relevant to 
our discussion in Chapter 5). Rather, we will argue that there is no 
good reason to think that admiration is globalist in the first place. 
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As we alluded to in the previous chapter, our admiration practices 
do not offer support for globalism about admiration. While people 
are sometimes admired for the kind of person they are in general 
(e.g. they are admired for all their attitudes), people are also ad-
mired for what they do (e.g. a person is admirable for being patient 
with their child), for the kind of person they are at specific times 
(e.g. we admire a person for simply being disposed to be patient 
with children). Rather than rest our case against admiration being 
 globalist on these examples, we will instead argue against globalism 
by undercutting the two best reasons for thinking that admiration is 
globalist. These reasons are based on two arguments that have been 
given in favour of other emotions being globalist.
1.2 The Permeation Argument
Michelle Mason claims that “contempt permeates one’s interactions 
with the person who is its object in a way that resentment typically 
does not” (2003: 249). Mason’s point is that when we have contempt 
for someone, this colours all of our interactions with them. Suppose 
you feel contempt for your slobby roommate. According to Mason, 
feeling contempt for your roommate will lead to this description of 
them becoming salient in all of your interactions with them. This is 
not the case with resentment, according to Mason. You can appar-
ently resent the fact that a colleague’s ambition led them to use under-
handed tactics to get a promotion over you without letting that colour 
all of your interactions with them. Because contempt permeates and 
so implies a global evaluation of the person, contempt is globalist.
A similar argument could be made for admiration being a 
 globalist emotion. Suppose you find out your short-tempered 
 colleague gives up a significant amount of their spare time helping 
sick children. This may well lead to you feel admiration for them. It 
is a familiar experience that feelings of admiration such as this one 
can cast a positive light on the other aspects of the person being ad-
mired. You may begin to find their temper less objectionable, more 
an idiosyncrasy than a character flaw. You may start to wonder if 
their lack of patience for timewasters is somehow connected to their 
commitment to dedicating their spare time to those in need. This 
may be a form of the halo effect, the unconscious process through 
which seeing a person in a positive light leads us to continue to 
see them in that light. This results in a positive judgement about a 
person’s abilities in one area leading to more positive judgements of 
that person in other, unrelated areas (Gräf and Unkelbach 2016). 
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It seems clear that admiration for one aspect of a person can spread 
to our evaluation of other aspects.
However, there is a big gap between saying that admiration has 
a tendency to spread and saying that it typically permeates all of 
our interactions with that person. Admiration does often spread 
from one aspect of a person to another, and this may on occasion 
 permeate all of your interactions with that person. However, it is 
also the case that you can admire someone without that admira-
tion permeating all of your interactions with that person. You may 
admire a friend’s talent as a chef, but this may make no difference 
to how you view them when you are playing chess together. While 
there are cases of admiration permeating, these do not show that 
admiration typically permeates. Rather than having a permeating 
quality, admiration more plausibly has a spreading tendency: we 
 admire one aspect of a person but sometimes end up admiring – or 
even just looking favourably upon – other aspects of them. Your ad-
miration for your chef friend might make you more understanding 
of their grumpiness without making you see them as a better chess 
player. A tendency to spread is not the same as a permeating qual-
ity, because permeation suggests it spreads across all interactions.
Moreover, the fact that admiration spreads from one part of a 
person to another does not tell us that it takes the whole person as 
its formal object. Paradigm non-globalist emotions also have the 
tendency to spread. For example, if you feel resentment t owards 
someone who makes a derogatory comment about you, then you 
may start seeing other parts of their character in a new light. 
 Similarly, if you feel guilty for letting down a friend, this may lead 
you to consider many different aspects of yourself in a new light. 
In both cases, though, this does not show that these emotions are 
globalist. The permeation argument therefore fails to establish that 
admiration is a globalist emotion.
1.3 The Action Tendencies Argument
One reason given for shame being a globalist emotion is that this is 
implied by its tendency to get us to hide ourselves or to reconstruct 
ourselves. Williams says that shame involves “not just the desire 
to hide, or to hide my face, but the desire to disappear, not to be 
there” (1993: 89) and that it also involves “attempts to reconstruct 
or improve oneself” (1993: 90). Because we seemingly react to our 
whole self being implicated when we feel shame, we apparently have 
reason to think that shame is a globalist emotion.
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Do admiration’s action tendencies speak in favour of it being 
globalist? As we discussed in Chapter 1, admiration is often asso-
ciated with the action tendency of emulation (Zagzebski 2017). If 
admiration is globalist, then the whole person typically ought to be 
emulated. This might sometimes happen when we admire a person: 
we might find ourselves striving to emulate them and everything 
they do. For example, a graduate student who admires their super-
visor might find themselves emulating not only their supervisor’s 
philosophical style but also their way of speaking and dressing. But 
even if we assume that emulation is the action tendency of admira-
tion (rather than the promotion of admired values), emulation of 
the whole person is not typical of admiration. First, recall Linda 
Zagzebski’s words, “admiration for the admired person moves us 
to emulate the admired person in the respect in which the person is 
admired” (2017: 33; our emphasis). Second, as we discussed, Zag-
zebski’s claim is supported by a range of psychological studies. 
Third, we think it is clear from our experiences of admiration that 
we do not typically try to emulate everything about the person we 
admire. In short, admiration’s action tendencies actually give us 
reason to think that admiration is not globalist.
If admiration were a globalist emotion, then immorality would 
always be relevant to our assessment of a person’s admirability. We 
would then have an easy solution to the ethical puzzle: assess the per-
son and that will give us the fitting response to them and a guide to 
how to respond them. However, there is no good reason to think that 
admiration is a globalist emotion. It is therefore possible for a person 
to be immoral and admirable. Even though this is possible, it will be 
important to be clear on the ways that the immoral can be admirable 
and whether immorality can ever affect a person’s admirability. In 
the next section, we will outline different ways an immoral person 
can be admirable and what the relationship between their admirabil-
ity and their immorality can be. In the following three sections, we 
will consider ways that immorality can affect admirability.
2 Admirable Immorality
Can a person be admirable for being immoral – that is, can they 
be admirable in virtue of their immorality? Or are they just admi-
rable despite their immorality? If the former is true, then people 
can be admirable for acting wrongly, possessing moral vices, and 
the like. If the latter is true, then people are not admirable for 
 acting wrongly and possessing moral vices but acting wrongly and 
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possessing moral vices need not preclude them being admirable; 
people may even be admirable for traits and actions closely related 
to their immoral ones.
Let us begin by considering some of the various ways in which 
people can be admirable. Someone may be morally admirable for 
displaying exemplary integrity. Alternatively, they might also be 
aesthetically admirable if they have created a magnificent artwork. 
Someone might be epistemically or intellectually admirable if they 
have achieved great things in philosophy, science, or mathemat-
ics. Just because we are admirable in one normative domain does 
not mean we are admirable in all normative domains. A person 
could be morally admirable, but not aesthetically admirable. For 
 example, a moral hero might create bad art. And someone could be 
aesthetically admirable but not morally or intellectually admirable. 
For example, a great artist could do morally terrible things or have 
wacky views based on bad reasoning and insufficient evidence.
These different ways in which someone may be admirable high-
light a feature of admiration we identified in Chapter 1: admiration 
is directed both to a particular person and to a property that is being 
attributed to that person. If you admire Polanski for his talent as a 
filmmaker, then your admiration is targeted both at Polanski and also 
to the property ‘talented filmmaker’ that you are ascribing to him. 
Polanski is the particular object of your admiration: he is the thing in 
the world towards which you are directing your admiration. Polanski’s 
being a talented filmmaker is the formal object: it is this property or 
feature of Polanski that makes him a fitting target of admiration.
While it is possible for a person to be admirable in all these ways 
– that is, morally, aesthetically, and intellectually admirable – it is 
more common for someone to be admirable in only one of these 
ways. Indeed, it is even more common that a person is admirable 
in relation to a quite specific formal object – for example, being a 
talented scientist. Someone may be incredibly talented as a scientist 
but have very little artistic talent. This person would be a fitting tar-
get of admiration in relation to the formal object ‘talented scientist’ 
but not in relation to the formal object ‘talented artist’. Determin-
ing whether admiration is fitting involves working out whether the 
person who is admired possesses the property in question and that 
this property at least merits positive evaluation.
We can now see the first way in which a person can be both ad-
mirable and immoral: they may be a fitting target of admiration 
in virtue of non-moral formal objects despite being immoral. Less 
technically, they may be admirable for aesthetic, intellectual, or 
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athletic traits and achievements, even if they are immoral. This 
seems a plausible way to view an artist like Polanski. He is admi-
rable in virtue of his aesthetic talents and achievements but not in 
virtue of his moral failures. In this case, the source of a person’s 
admirability is different from what makes them immoral.
According to an influential line of argument, there can be a much 
closer connection between a person’s admirability and their immoral-
ity. According to this view, the trait or action that makes one immoral 
may also be what makes one admirable. To support his claim that we 
have reasons to be grateful that we do not live in a world full of mor-
ally perfect people, Williams (1981) uses the (perhaps not historically 
accurate) example of the artist Paul Gauguin, who abandoned his 
family to go to Tahiti, where, according to Williams, he produced his 
best works of art. Williams (1981: 23) claims that Gauguin’s treatment 
of his family is immoral but that “we have deep and persistent reasons 
to be grateful” that we live in a world in which such immorality exists. 
Michael Slote (1983) builds on Williams’ discussion to argue that this 
kind of case demonstrates “admirable immorality”.
By this Slote does not mean to defend the strong thesis that a trait 
or action can be admirable in virtue of being immoral. Rather, Slote 
is claiming that the same trait or action can be both admirable for 
non-moral reasons and immoral. To see the difference between these 
two views, consider again the case of Gauguin. On the strong ver-
sion of the admirable immorality claim, Gauguin could be admirable 
for his immoral behaviour – for example, for abandoning his family. 
Slote claims (rightly, in our view) that this is implausible. On the mod-
erate version of the admirable immorality view that Slote endorses, 
the same trait or action can ground a person’s immorality and their 
admirability, but the person is not admirable for the trait or action as 
an immoral trait or action. For example, Slote (1983: 80) claims that 
we can admire Gauguin’s single-minded pursuit of artistic excellence 
while at the same time judging that this trait causes him to act immor-
ally. In this case, although we are not admiring the immorality itself, 
the traits we admire are inseparable from the immoral behaviour. 
Slote argues that this shows that morality is not overriding – that is, 
that moral reasons do not always trump non-moral reasons. Our in-
terest is not in the overridingness thesis,4 but rather Slote’s account of 
how a person can be admirable despite being immoral.
So far we have considered two ways a person can be admirable 
for non-moral reasons despite being immoral. A third way a person 
can be admirable despite being immoral involves a person who is 
morally admirable despite being immoral. Examples of this kind 
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of admirable immorality arise when we consider cases of conflict 
within morality, such as the following example:
A father may deliberately mislead police about his son’s where-
abouts, even knowing that the son has committed a serious crime 
and even while acknowledging the validity of the local system of 
criminal justice. He may feel he mustn’t let the police find his 
son, but must, instead, do everything in his power to help him 
get to a place of safety, even though he is also willing to admit 
that there can be no moral justification for what he is doing.
(Slote 1983: 86)
While Slote (1983: 88) sees this as a case of a conflict between moral 
and non-moral concerns, another way of interpreting this case is to 
see it as a conflict between two different moral demands: the demand 
to protect one’s child and the demand to respect a reasonable law 
that requires that those who have committed serious crimes be pun-
ished. We might instead think it highlights that the ethics of care 
and the ethics of justice come into conflict (Curzer 2002: 229). Care 
for one’s child speaks in favour of protecting the son while a respect 
for justice speaks against it. Or we might understand this as involv-
ing what Troy Jollimore (2006) calls morally admirable immorality: 
the behaviour is both morally wrong and admirable from the moral 
point of view.5 If we think that in this case the father has a duty to re-
port the son to the police but that it would also be morally admirable 
for the father to get his son to safety instead, then we should accept 
that morally admirable  immorality is possible.
There are other kinds of cases that fall into this third category 
of admirable immorality. This includes the so-called dirty hands 
case in which a person who has good moral reasons does something 
morally wrong, such as torturing someone to stop a bomb going off 
(Curzer 2002).6 We do not think that many, if any, cases of admira-
ble yet immoral people that we consider in this book will fall into 
this third category. We discuss these different ways of people being 
admirable despite being immoral so that it is clear what we think 
the claim that the immoral may also be admirable amounts to.
But what about the strong admirable immorality view? Perhaps 
people are sometimes admirable because they are immoral. That is, 
perhaps people are sometimes admirable in virtue of their immo-
rality. This has not been true in any of the cases we have discussed 
so far. Even the father in Slote’s example is not admirable in virtue 
of acting immorally: if he had not been doing something good for 
his son, he would not be admirable for his actions. The father does 
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something that is both excellent and immoral: the father’s action 
is excellent (and so admirable) under one description and immoral 
under another.
Could a person be admirable and immoral for a trait or action 
 under the same description? This might seem possible because it is 
common for people to admire criminals and other immoral people 
for what they have done. For example, Bonnie Parker and Clyde 
 Barrow who, together with other members of the Barrow Gang, _
conducted a high-profile series of bank robberies and murders in the 
United States between 1932 and 1934. Bonnie and Clyde gained a 
great deal of newspaper coverage and popularity. Jeff Guinn (2009: 
3–4) describes them as “colourful young rebels” who “came to epit-
omise the edgy daydreams of the economically and socially down-
trodden” and were “considered the epitome of scandalous glamour”.
An initial point is that these cases can be interpreted in different 
ways. Perhaps people actually have a form of horrified fascination 
that has nothing to do with admiration. Or we might think that 
people admired Bonnie and Clyde’s glamour despite their criminal 
deeds such that this is just one of three forms of admirable immo-
rality we have identified above. Another possibility is that people 
admire Bonnie and Clyde for their criminality, but they do not 
judge their criminality to be immoral. This still leaves the possibil-
ity that some people admire them precisely because they judge their 
actions to be immoral.
Even if some people have a positive evaluation of immorality 
that means they admire some people in virtue of their immoral-
ity, we think that such admiration is unfitting. Consider a point 
from  Marcia Baron (1986). If Gauguin’s commitment to his art 
showed no bounds at all, such that he was willing to kill to obtain 
art supplies or murder his own children in the process of creating 
an artwork, then his commitment to his art would no longer be 
admirable. Some people might still admire this Gauguin, but we 
think those people would be mistaken to do so. Indeed, we think 
it is often the case that people are fascinated with immoral figures 
such as Bonnie and Clyde for features other than their immorality. 
Part of the puzzle that this book is trying to answer stems from 
the fact that sometimes admiration for immoral people is fitting. 
While it is implausible that the immoral are ever fitting targets of 
admiration in virtue of their immorality, they can be admirable for 
traits and actions that are intimately related to their immorality. 
For example, we might fittingly admire Bonnie and Clyde’s daring 
in engaging in their crime spree. But this does not mean they are 
admirable for engaging in their crime spree.
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In short, while people can be admirable despite being immoral, and 
you might even admire them for traits or actions that are immoral 
under a different description (i.e. traits and actions that are closely 
connected to immorality), it is not fitting to admire people for their 
immorality. But while the immoral can also be admirable, it does not 
follow that immorality never affects admirability. In the rest of this 
chapter, we outline three ways that immorality can  affect admirability.
3 Immorality as Evidence
Sometimes a person’s immorality reveals to us that they have not 
done anything worthy of admiration. Consider the following exam-
ple. The British entertainer and DJ, Sir Jimmy Savile, was widely 
honoured and admired for his public persona and philanthropy 
during his lifetime. After he died in 2011, police investigations re-
vealed that he was one of the UK’s worst sexual predators. Beyond 
his hundreds of victims (ranging from the very young to the very 
old), he used his charity work in various hospitals as cover for his 
heinous actions: he found many of his victims through this appar-
ent philanthropic work. While Savile appeared admirable during his 
lifetime, he was not in fact admirable. The behaviour that seemed 
to be admirable was performed in the service of appalling acts of 
abuse. He was not actually a fitting target of any of the honours or 
any of the admiration that he often received. Indeed, many of his 
honours were revoked once the allegations came to light.
This suggests that a person’s immorality can effectively cancel 
out their admirability. Savile would have been admirable for his 
charity work if it did not have the purpose of facilitating his hei-
nous acts of abuse. In Savile’s case, we mistakenly believed he was 
admirable for his charity work because we did not realize that work 
was a cover for his predatory behaviour. Savile’s case reveals an 
epistemic connection between admirability and immorality: a per-
son’s immorality may reveal that they were not in fact admirable all 
along. In this case, it tells us about the true nature of their actions. 
Savile’s acts were not really charitable acts. So, immorality can 
sometimes be evidence that a person is not admirable.
4 Immoral Art
While this book concerns more than just immoral artists, it is worth 
mentioning a potential way that an artist’s immorality can affect 
their admirability. A longstanding debate in aesthetics concerns 
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whether immoral artworks are less aesthetically valuable – that is, less 
excellent – because they have immoral features. More recently, certain 
philosophers have argued that immorality in an artist’s life can affect 
the aesthetic value of their work (e.g. Gaut 2007; Bartel 2019).
On Berys Gaut’s (2007) ethicism an artwork can be immoral if it 
endorses immoral attitudes. If an artwork is immoral, then it may 
(but importantly need not) lose aesthetic value. Endorsement  requires 
more than mere depiction. We often enjoy art in which immorality is 
depicted, but in which the art itself does not endorse that immorality. 
In some art, though, it seems that the immoral attitudes are endorsed. 
The Nazi propaganda film The Triumph of the Will is often raised as an 
example of immoral art (e.g. Jacobson 1997). If an artwork endorses 
an immoral attitude held by the artist, then (according to ethicism) an 
artist’s immorality can affect the aesthetic value of the work.
Christopher Bartel (2019) expands Gaut’s ethicism. Bartel argues 
that sometimes artworks that contain no trace of an artist’s immo-
rality can still lose aesthetic value because of the artist’s immoral-
ity. His main example is the work of Bill Cosby. Because Cosby’s 
performance traded on an insincere depiction of his actual char-
acter, Cosby’s work loses value as a result of the revelations that he 
sexually assaulted Andrea Constand (among other accusations of 
similar behaviour). Bartel argues that because we sometimes take 
artworks to be more aesthetically valuable because of an artist’s 
life, we should also take artworks to be less aesthetically valuable 
because of an artist’s life.
Bernard Wills and Jason Holt (2017) agree that sometimes an 
 artist’s immorality can affect the aesthetic value of their work. 
However, they hold that it is only in rare and exceptional cases that 
it does so. These are cases where an artist has lived what they depict 
in their work. They write:
People who live their art are inviting judgments on their 
 character and their art together, as they make no separation be-
tween the two. That Sade actually attempted the sadistic deeds 
described at such length in Justine and 120 Days of Sodom kills 
his books for many people, for they then become not fantasy 
but an implicit apology for his own brutishness.
(Wills and Holt 2017)
They argue that these kinds of artworks manifest a “cold calculat-
ing aspect”, and this is why the artist’s immorality is relevant to its 
aesthetic value. The aesthetic value of works that simply manifest 
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“ordinary vices of passion” is not affected by the artist’s immoral-
ity. Importantly, because they endorse autonomism (the view that 
aesthetic value is independent from moral value) with exceptions, 
they do not agree with Gaut and Bartel that mere endorsement of 
immoral attitudes in an artwork affects its aesthetic value.
Another view is that immorality in artworks can increase its 
 aesthetic value. Daniel Jacobson (1997) argues that sometimes 
 immorality in artwork increases aesthetic value, though he also holds 
that sometimes artworks gain aesthetic value because they endorse 
moral attitudes. It is unclear whether Jacobson would agree that an 
artist’s real-life morality or immorality could affect the aesthetic 
value of their work. Still, we might extend his anti- theoretical view of 
aesthetic value such that an artist’s real-life i mmorality could increase 
an artwork’s aesthetic value. For example, the comedian Louis CK’s 
masturbation jokes might be even funnier because they are connected 
to his real-life wrong of masturbating in front of junior colleagues.
If Jacobson (1997) holds that immoral artworks are aesthetically 
valuable in virtue of their immorality, then he is making a stron-
ger claim than any of those involved in the admirable immoral-
ity  debate – a point that Smuts (2013) and Paris (2018) both make. 
However, it is unclear that Jacobson is best understood as making 
this point. He claims at one point that certain immoral artworks 
provide a unique opportunity to understand the workings and 
 allure of immorality, as well as avoiding dogmatism and offering 
an opportunity to see how others think (Jacobson 1997: 193). But 
this explanation for the aesthetic value of immoral artworks seems 
to imply they are valuable in virtue of their insight into immorality. 
This is importantly different from being valuable for their immo-
rality. Of course, we perhaps cannot get that insight without the 
artwork being immoral, but the object of admiration is importantly 
different on our reading. We admire the insight, not the immoral-
ity itself. So, even on this view it is not an artist’s immorality that 
increases aesthetic value, but rather a different feature of the work.
This is only a brief and simplified survey of a longstanding 
 debate. We raise it not to settle it, but rather to note that there it 
is an open question whether an artist’s immorality can decrease 
the value of their work. If immorality can decrease aesthetic value, 
then an artist could become less admirable because of their immo-
rality. Indeed, it may well be that a person’s immorality can under-
mine the value of their achievements in other areas. For example, 
an intellectual work might have less value because it is intimately 
connected to its creator’s immorality.
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5 Admirability over Time
Sometimes our heroes change. In certain kinds of cases, our heroes 
can stop being admirable (Archer and Matheson 2020). Consider 
Aung San Suu Kyi. She was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 
“for her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights” 
(the  Nobel Peace Prize 1991). More recently, however, she has faced 
moral scrutiny for not speaking out against war crimes (includ-
ing genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass rape) perpetrated by her 
country’s military against the Rohingya people. We think that Suu 
Kyi has ceased being admirable. This does not mean she never was 
admirable. Rather, it means that her later actions have undermined 
her continued admirability. We could still think back to her earlier 
self and fittingly feel admiration at the kind of person she was (just 
as you could admire painting before it is ruined in a botched res-
toration), but she is not now a fitting target of admiration for her 
earlier traits and achievements.
We accept that there may be other ways to interpret this case (e.g. 
she has become a different person, or she was never really admira-
ble in the first place). However, we think that cases in which people 
can change in the way we have described are possible. In this case, 
the person’s later immorality in some sense defeats her earlier ad-
mirability. We discuss this case and other cases like this in more de-
tail elsewhere, and we defend the view that admiration for actions 
is connected to ideals (Archer and Matheson 2020). The important 
point for our present discussion is that someone’s later immorality 
can prevent them from remaining admirable for some earlier action. 
We think that this holds not just for moral behaviour. An artist, ath-
lete, or intellectual could also in some cases cease being admirable. 
Importantly, the later behaviour that defeats admirability for earlier 
actions must be connected to the earlier actions. So, it is not just any 
later immorality will defeat admirability for earlier actions.7
6 Conclusion
We have reached the end of the first part of our guide into the eth-
ical puzzle surrounding admirable yet immoral people. Our focus 
has been on the question of whether the immoral can be admirable, 
and we have argued that they can be. Even though there are ways 
immorality can undermine admirability, it remains the case that a 
person can be both immoral and admirable. When you are faced 
with what you think is an instance of this ethical puzzle – a person 
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you admire who is also immoral – you must ask yourself whether 
the person is in fact both admirable and immoral. It might be that 
their immorality undermines their admirability, so you need to 
check that this is not the case. If so, then the puzzle is easily re-
solved: the person is not a fitting target of admiration, and so you 
should not honour and admire them.8 If it is not the case, you can 
also ask yourself what the formal object of your admiration is. If 
you are admiring the person for their immorality, then we think 
your admiration is unfitting and you have another easy answer for 
what you should do. But recall an earlier point from Chapter 1: just 
because a person is a fitting target of admiration, it does not follow 
that you ought to admire them, because fittingness reasons can be 
defeated. So, even once you have established that a person is a fit-
ting target of admiration, you still have questions to ask yourself. 
These are questions about the ethics of honour and admiration.
Notes
 1 But not completely redundant, as there may be cases where we have in-
strumental reasons to admire the immoral even though they are not fitting 
targets of admiration. In such cases, the ethical issues would be about 
whether admiration is all-things-considered appropriate would remain.
 2 Kauppinen (2019) defends what he calls a globalist view about admira-
tion, but it is not globalist in the sense we have in mind. He holds that an 
emotion is globalist if it only takes the person as its particular object. 
This is therefore rather a person-only view of admiration. He holds a 
person’s other traits are not relevant to whether admiration is fitting, 
but rather whether admiration is all-things-considered appropriate. 
On his view, then, a person may be admirable despite being immoral. 
However, the person’s immorality might make it all-things-considered 
inappropriate to admire them.
 3 Bell (2011) attributes this kind of view to Doris (2003).
 4 Though see Archer (2014) for one of the author’s views on overridingness.
 5 Jollimore (2006) argues that there is room for cases of morally admira-
ble immorality within several plausible moral theories.
 6 This kind of case is in tension with the empirical evidence that suggests 
that torture is not an effective way of obtaining information (see, for 
example, Costanzo and Gerrity 2009).
 7 For more on responsibility over time, see Matheson (2014, 2019a, 
2019b) and Khoury and Matheson (2018).
 8 In most cases anyway. It is possible for there to be reasons to honour 
and admire those who are not admirable. Suppose something really 
terrible will happen if you do not honour Jimmy Savile with a statue. 
Plausibly you should build a statue of Savile to avoid the really t errible 
thing happening. We take it that these are non-typical cases, and 
so typically you should not honour and admire people who are not 
admirable.
A person can still be admirable even though they are immoral. 
Should you honour and admire them? Remember that fittingness is 
not sufficient for all-things-considered appropriateness, so the fact 
a person is admirable does not yet tell you whether you should hon-
our and admire them. While you might not make a factual error in 
honouring and admiring the immoral, you might still make a moral 
one. To answer this question, then, you have to turn to the ethics 
of honour and admiration. In this chapter, we outline three general 
moral reasons against honouring and admiring the immoral. First, 
that it empowers the wrongdoer in various ways. Second, that it 
harms the victims. Third, that it perpetuates harmful ideologies 
and wrongdoing. We end by discussing how these reasons can vary 
in strength depending on the specifics of certain cases, and on who 
is doing the honouring and admiring, among other factors.
1 Empowering Perpetrators
The first reason against honouring and admiring the immoral is that 
it can empower them in various ways. First, it can contribute to their 
financial power. This is quite simply the power to pay for things. 
Second, it can give them epistemic power – that is, it can give them 
power over what people believe and over who can exert influence on 
people’s beliefs (Archer et al. 2020).1 Third, it can give them moral 
power – that is, power to influence people’s moral judgements. We 
are most interested in the ability to influence people’s judgements 
about whether what a person is doing is tolerable or acceptable, or 
even justifiable or excusable. Fourth, it can give affective power to 
the immoral – that is, it can give them power over what people feel 
and over who can exert influence on people’s emotions.
Note that these different forms of power may overlap and inter-
connect. Affective power may increase a person’s financial power, 
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epistemic power, and moral power. Likewise, moral power may in-
crease a person’s affective power, financial power, and epistemic 
power. We will identify a factor that supports each form of power. 
These factors will be important for our discussion in Section 4. In 
this section, we will focus on showing how one factor supports a 
particular form of power but note that the identified factors may 
also support other forms of power just as each form of power can 
support another. These factors may even be reasons against hon-
ouring and admiring in their own right, but we will focus on how 
they support these more general reasons.
1.1 Financial Power
One distinctive way you contribute to the financial power of the 
immoral when you honour and admire them is simply by drawing 
positive attention to them. Often having greater positive attention 
gives a person more opportunities. The person who gets hired is 
sometimes the person others have heard good things about. If an 
immoral person gets more work, then they will usually get more 
money and so more financial power. According to one study, be-
ing nominated for a best picture or best leading actor nomination 
for The Oscars increases weekly box office revenue by 200 percent 
(Deuchert et al. 2005: 164). The positive attention gained through 
such nominations is clearly quite profitable. By honouring and ad-
miring a person, you may contribute to their financial power.
1.2 Epistemic Power
While there are many factors that contribute to epistemic power, 
one important factor is how epistemically credible you find them 
(Archer et al. 2020). Consider how many fans of Michael Jackson 
still deny the allegations against him despite significant evidence 
of his guilt. One explanation is that Jackson’s fans might find him 
more epistemically credible than they ought to. Indeed, the direc-
tor of Leaving Neverland, which documented his alleged abuse of 
two young boys, is reported to have said, “One can only compare 
[Jackson’s fans] to religious fanatics” (Coscarelli 2019). Because of 
this, they are more likely to believe his denials of guilt while he was 
alive (and denials of guilt on his behalf after his death) than other 
people’s accusations against him.
When you honour and admire a person, you are drawing positive 
attention to them. You are elevating them above others and as well 
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as picking them out as people others ought to admire, you also pick 
them out as people others ought to listen to. One reason for this 
is that honour and admiration for them can spread in the percep-
tion of others. Because you draw positive attention to the person, 
it might seem you are picking them out as being overall admirable. 
If they are overall admirable, they may seem like someone people 
ought to listen to. When you give epistemic power to the immoral, 
you are giving people who have acted wrongly the power to influ-
ence not only what you believe but also who can influence your be-
liefs. This is bad in itself, but it also has harmful consequences. As 
we argue in Section 2.3, it can lead to problems when a person is 
accused of wrongdoing. In these cases, the word of the accused may 
be given more credibility than that of their accuser.
1.3 Moral Power
One way the immoral get moral power is through condonation of 
their wrongful behaviour. When you condone a piece of behaviour, 
you are communicating that while you do not think the behaviour 
is morally good, you are willing to accept or tolerate it (Hughes 
and Warmke 2017).2 Suppose a friend mistreats you and you then 
condone their behaviour. You are not saying the friend’s behaviour 
is good, but you are saying that you will not hold it against them. A 
problem with condoning wrongdoing is that it can sometimes legit-
imate that kind of behaviour – that is, it can make the wrongdoer 
believe that they can get away with acting this way. If you do not 
express to your friend that they have wronged you, they might think 
that their behaviour was acceptable. This is not only prudentially 
worrisome (they might not worry about being rude to you again in 
the future) but also morally problematic (they might come to think 
they can get away with rude behaviour in general). Expressing some 
moral disapproval is therefore necessary to avoid legitimating such 
behaviour.
One way honouring and admiring an immoral person condones 
their immoral behaviour is through emotional prioritization. If you 
choose to honour or admire an immoral person, you are choosing 
to pick them out as people others ought to admire rather than as 
people others ought to be indignant about. Given that these activ-
ities and emotions are all fitting – because a person can be both 
admirable and immoral – you are thereby communicating that this 
is the correct way to prioritize these attitudes and emotions. This 
can be communicated in different ways.
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One way is through the meaning you intend your act to convey.  
Suppose a man interrupts a woman and intends this interruption 
to express his sexist values. His act thereby has a sexist intentional 
meaning. If you intend an honour to condone a person’s wrong, 
then the honour has this intended meaning.
When we condone immoral behaviour, it is often (perhaps even 
usually) not done so explicitly. A less explicit form of condonation 
stems from the attitudinal meaning of your acts of honouring or ex-
pressions of admiration for the immoral.4 Acts express attitudes be-
yond those the person intends their act to express. Suppose a man 
interrupts a woman. The man may not intend this interruption to 
express sexist values. But it may express these values nevertheless, 
perhaps by conveying that he does not value the woman’s contri-
butions enough to let her finish her sentences. Similarly, when you 
honour and admire an immoral person you may communicate that 
you think that the person’s immoral behaviour is acceptable or tol-
erable, even if you do not intend to convey this.
Actions also have a public meaning. This is the meaning that oth-
ers can justifiably attribute to your acts given the context in which 
you perform them. The man who interrupts the woman may not 
have any sexist values, but he may interrupt her in a context in 
which it is reasonable or justifiable to understand his interruptions 
as revealing sexist attitudes or intentions – for example, in a busi-
ness meeting in a company with a patriarchal working culture.
3
When you honour or admire the immoral this can have an adverse 
public meaning even if it does not in fact express any bad intentions 
or attitudes. Public meaning sometimes, but not always, stems from 
the structural and institutional context in which the action takes 
place. According to Sophie Hennekam and Dawn Bennett (2017), 
sexual harassment is a particular problem in the film industry due 
to its competitive nature, the culture within the industry, the in-
dustry’s gendered power relations, and the importance of informal 
networks for career advancement. In such a context, choosing to 
honour and admire rather than condemn and blame a person who 
is also a rapist can reasonably be interpreted as condoning this 
behaviour. This sends the message that such behaviour can be ig-
nored when the person performing it is sufficiently gifted. So, even 
if you neither intend to condone nor have attitudes that will express 
condonation, honouring and admiring an immoral person can still 
condone through being justifiably understood as condonation in 
the context in which they are honoured and admired.
While condonation often occurs through intended and attitudi-
nal meaning, even when wrongful behaviour is condoned through 
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public meaning alone, the immoral may gain the moral power to 
have their behaviour accepted or tolerated. Public meaning may 
then have the effect of making such behaviour seem justifiable or 
excusable. The fact that the immoral continue to be honoured and 
admired may make others justifiably believe that others think that 
the behaviour of the immoral is justifiable or excusable.
So far, we have looked at how public forms of honour and ad-
miration can provide the target with moral power. However, ad-
miring someone privately may do so as well. People often develop 
strong attachments to the public figures they admire (Thomson 
2006). This can create a tension when the public figure acts im-
morally (Bhattacharjee et al. 2013). On the one hand, the admirer 
is attached to this figure and does not want to abandon their ad-
miration. On the other hand, people are also generally attached 
to viewing themselves as morally decent, and admiring someone 
who has acted immorally may threaten this self-image. To resolve 
this tension, Bhattacharjee et al. (2013: 1169) suggest that admir-
ers may revise their moral judgement so that they no longer view 
the act as morally wrong – a process known as moral rational-
ization.5 In a series of studies, they found results consistent with 
this hypothesis.6 So, even private admiration for someone who 
has acted immorally may give that person moral power, as it may 
lead the admirer to condone actions they would otherwise view 
as wrong.
1.4 Affective Power
One way the immoral may get affective power is through support. 
Andre Grahle (2019) proposes that in admiring people you support 
them in three ways. First, you give them epistemic support. You 
either give a person reason to believe that they are admirable or 
you reinforce their existing belief that they are admirable. Second, 
you give them innervative support. Sometimes you might still judge 
that a person is admirable but no longer admire them. When you 
see someone else admire the person, this can reinvigorate your ad-
miration for them. Third, you give them normative support. This 
means that you give the admired person further reason to continue 
in their “admirable-making project” (Grahle 2019: 160). In Grahle’s 
view, these reasons are petitionary – that is, the admirer expresses 
a desire that the admired person continue to possess their admi-
rable properties. While Grahle focuses on reasons admirers give 
the admired, your admiration might also give reasons to others to 
admire those you admire. In other words, you can give epistemic, 
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innervative, and normative support to others such that they come 
to admire those you admire.
While Grahle focuses on the positive aspects of support, it also 
has negative aspects. After all, the immoral can also be admirable. 
The problem with such support for immoral people stems from ad-
miration’s spreading feature. As we have discussed, when a person 
is admired for certain actions or traits, admirers often find them-
selves admiring, or at least looking positively upon, other parts of 
the person. For example, you admire a friend’s patience with their 
child and then come to look more favourably upon their tardi-
ness. Such spreading does not just occur for you, the admirer. It 
can also happen for the admired. When you admire a person for 
one thing, they may also come to see themselves as admirable for 
other things. For example, the friend you admire for being patient 
with their child might also come to see their tardiness as being ad-
mirable without your coming to admire their tardiness. Of course, 
if your admiration spreads from its initial ground, then this will 
serve to encourage the admired person’s perception of the grounds 
of their admirability to spread too. And if other people’s admira-
tion spreads, then both your spreading and the admired person’s 
spreading will receive further reinforcement.
The explanation for the spreading of admiration is that you start 
to connect other parts of the person, other sides of their charac-
ter, and different ways they behave to their admirable properties. 
You might come to see these other parts as responsible for, or a 
necessary by-product of, what makes them admirable. In this way, 
you may look more favourably upon these other things or then also 
consider these other things to be admirable because of their rela-
tion to what you initially hold makes the person admirable. Con-
sider again the friend who is always late because they are so patient 
with their child. They miss the start of meetings because they do 
not want to rush through interactions with their child. Because you 
admire them for being patient with their child, you come to think 
that their tardiness is a necessary by-product of such patience and 
because you desire them to keep being patient with their child, it is 
likely you will at least look more favourably upon their tardiness.
Another way to put this is that admiration spreads when you per-
ceive other parts of the admired person as connected to their admirable- 
making project. Importantly, it does not matter what things are ac-
tually responsible or what things are really necessary by-products. 
Rather, it matters more what you take to be the responsible or nec-
essary by-products. Because you think your friend has to be late 
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all the time to continue being patient with their child, you see their 
tardiness in a more favourable light. It may well be that your friend 
can in fact continue being patient with their child and yet still make 
it on time to meet you. You can therefore give both the immoral 
person direct support for their immorality and give them indirect 
support by giving others reasons to admire them.
Affective power can be gained as a result of such support because 
it involves admiration spreading. When your admiration spreads, you 
may come to look more favourably upon these other parts of the per-
son. Spreading is not necessarily bad. The fact the graduate student, 
from the example presented in Chapter 1, comes to dress like their 
supervisor might mean the student dresses better. However, you may 
find yourself feeling sympathy for those you admire and the struggles 
they have gone through. As such, you may give the admired person 
affective power over you. Even if your admiration does not spread, it 
might spread for others that you encourage to admire an immoral per-
son. You may still, then, be giving the admired person affective power.
2 Harming Victims
The second general reason against honouring and admiring the im-
moral is that it leads to harms for the victims.7 Beyond empowering 
perpetrators, there are at least three further ways victims may be 
harmed: disrespect, silencing, and complicity.
2.1 Disrespect
When the immoral are honoured and admired, a common com-
plaint is that this disrespects their victims. For example, French ac-
tor Adèle Haenel said that awarding Roman Polanski a César award 
in 2020 was “spitting in the face of all victims. It means that raping 
isn’t that bad” (Rosen 2020). This claim is often made with respect 
to statues of immoral figures, such as statues of confederate gen-
erals in the USA and colonialists in the UK and South Africa. For 
example, Johannes Schulz (2019) argues that statues degrade certain 
groups when they express a disrespectful ideology that is connected 
to ongoing or historical oppression of that group. And Ten-Herng 
Lai (2020) claims that statues commit derogatory pedestaling by im-
plicitly ranking the victims of the honoured person as lesser than the 
honoured person. Honour and admiration for the immoral, then, 
may disrespect not only the victims of the honoured and admired 
immoral figure but also the victims of similar wrongdoers.
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One possible understanding of what makes honouring and ad-
miring an immoral person disrespectful is that such honouring and 
admiring involves an inappropriate emotional prioritization. It is 
disrespectful to honour and admire the immoral because it can be 
justifiably understood in certain contexts that you are saying that 
it is more important to honour and admire them than it is to blame 
and condemn them.
Another possible understanding of the disrespect claim is that it 
involves a failure to recognize the rights the victims have, the duties 
you have towards victims, or at least the moral reasons you have to 
modify your behaviour in light of the wrongs they have suffered. 
Schulz (2019) fleshes out the disrespect claim in terms of Stephen 
Darwall’s notion of recognition respect. According to Darwall 
(1977: 40), to have recognition respect for something “is just to re-
gard it as something to be reckoned with (in the appropriate way) 
and to act accordingly”. When you are respectful in this way to a 
person, what you find acceptable to do is restricted such that you do 
not undermine the person’s rights or affect the person’s well-being 
without justification.
In order to avoid disrespecting victims of the immoral in this 
way, you must consider their desires and wishes. One way to do this 
is to ask them what they think about the perpetrator being hon-
oured and admired. You show recognition respect for the fact that a 
person has been a victim of a crime if you check with them whether 
it is okay to invite the perpetrator to the same party as the victim. If 
you ask the victim and they are okay with the perpetrator coming 
to the party, then it may be permissible to invite them to the party 
without disrespecting the victim. Of course, this is not always go-
ing to be possible because some victims are dead and some victims 
might disagree with one another. And in some cases, victims might 
feel pressured into their choices. But even if you can, with some due 
diligence, avoid disrespecting the victims in Darwall’s sense, you 
might still disrespect the victims of other similar crimes through 
inappropriate emotional prioritization, because you might still ex-
press a disrespectful prioritization of fitting emotions.
2.2 Silencing
Some wrongdoers might threaten their victims so that the victims 
do not speak out about the wrongs they have suffered. This can be 
done explicitly such that victims are given the expectation that they 
will not be believed if they do speak out. Whether or not they would 
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actually be believed is another matter. What matters is what the 
victim expects to happen so that they do not think it is worth speak-
ing out. In other words, the wrongdoer does not try to silence the 
victim directly but aims for the victim to silence themselves. This is 
what Kristie Dotson (2011) calls “testimonial smothering” – that is, 
a kind of self-silencing that people engage in when they expect that 
they will not be believed by a particular audience.
Such silencing not only occurs through the actions of the perpe-
trator; it may also happen as a side effect of honouring and admir-
ing the immoral. Victims will (often justifiably) come to expect that 
people will not believe them because they were wronged by those 
that others honour and admire. Consider Louis CK’s 2017 admis-
sion, which was subsequently published in The New York Times:
I also took advantage of the fact that I was widely admired in 
my and their community, which disabled them from sharing 
their story and brought hardship to them when they tried be-
cause people who look up to me didn’t want to hear it.
Louis CK is suggesting it was because he was admired that his ac-
cusers were not believed. This is in line with an earlier point we 
made: those you honour and admire often come to be seen to have 
greater credibility than they merit, which gives them a kind of epis-
temic power. There is harm to the victim purely in the fact that they 
may not be believed – what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls a testi-
monial injustice. While Fricker focuses on cases where a person’s 
testimony is deemed to lack credibility because of their identity 
(e.g. being a child, being a woman, being a black person), we think 
honouring and admiring an immoral person can lead to those who 
challenge the immoral person’s assertions to be seen as less credi-
ble in comparison.8 Honouring and admiring elevates the immoral 
and in doing so contributes to inflating their credibility. By inflating 
their credibility, you in turn deflate the credibility of those who ac-
cuse them of wrongdoing – at least with respect to their testimony 
against the celebrity. This constitutes an indirect testimonial injus-
tice for the victims.
But even if it is the case that victims would be believed if they 
spoke about how they were wronged, the fact that immoral peo-
ple are typically honoured and admired without qualification may 
lead the victim to form the impression (correctly or incorrectly) 
that others see the immoral person as globally admirable. Such 
an impression generates the expectation that others will reject the 
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victim’s testimony because it conflicts with the image the victim be-
lieves others have of the immoral person. Given this expectation, it 
makes sense that victims do not speak out. They will find it safer to 
smother their own testimony – to silence themselves – because they 
fear that they will not be believed.
There is another reason why victims might silence themselves. 
In commenting upon a retrospective on Polanski’s work that oc-
curred in France in October 2017, Marlène Schiappa, the French 
Minister for Equality between Men and Women, highlighted that 
this honour was “contributing to the culture of rape by relativizing 
sexual aggression according to the celebrity of the perpetrator”.9 
Schiappa’s words crystallize a problem with condoning the acts of 
immoral artists: while people may say their acts are wrong, they do 
not respond to those acts as wrongs. As we have argued, this sends 
a bad message: people will be honoured even if they have done hei-
nous things. This may also lead to a kind of hermeneutical injus-
tice, which contributes to another kind of self-silencing.
The classic kind of hermeneutical injustice involves a person not 
having the conceptual resources to understand what wrong a par-
ticular harm constitutes. Miranda Fricker argues that prior to the 
coining of the term “sexual harassment” women struggled to un-
derstand the wrong they often suffered (Fricker 2007: 149–152). In 
this case, women lacked the conceptual resources to understand 
the injustice they faced. Katharine Jenkins (2017) argues that there 
is another kind of hermeneutical injustice. Sometimes people do 
not understand the injustice they face, even though they possess the 
relevant conceptual resources. For instance, many victims of rape 
do not consider themselves to be victims of rape (Burrowes 2013).10
To illuminate this type of hermeneutical injustice, Jenkins, fol-
lowing Haslanger (2012), notes that our “operative” concepts can 
sometimes differ from our “manifest” concepts. The latter is the 
formal definition of something, whereas the former is the practical 
use of that concept (which can differ from context to context). For 
example, being late to school might mean arriving after 8.50 (by de-
cree of the headmaster). But if no teachers mark their pupils as late 
unless they arrive after 9.00, then in practice being late means ar-
riving after 9.00. Here the operative concept of being late (arriving 
after 9.00) differs from the manifest concept of being late (arriving 
after 8.50). Importantly, what the concept is taken to mean depends 
on how the concept is used rather than what its formal definition 
is. The lateness case shows that it is not always harmful for an op-
erative concept to stray from its manifest concept. However, there 
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are also harmful cases. In particular, those victims of rape who do 
not consider themselves victims of rape seem to be working with an 
operative concept that harmfully strays from the manifest concept, 
leaving them unable to understand the way in which they have been 
wronged (Jenkins 2017: 196). Lacking awareness of the kind of in-
justice one faces makes it practically impossible to speak out about 
it. This adds further harm to the initial wrong (Jenkins 2017: 198).
Condoning sexual assault by honouring and admiring those who 
commit it contributes to maintaining these background herme-
neutical injustices by perpetuating rape myths and cultural myths 
related to rape myths. For instance, it might make victims think 
they have not been raped. It might do so because they have been 
assaulted by a “great” person and support (and be supported by) 
what we will call great person myths. As we will discuss, one form 
of this myth involves the idea that great people cannot also be 
 immoral. We may support this myth by not responding to wrongs 
as wrongs. Such responses might support the great person myth be-
cause victims have been assaulted by someone who does not seem 
like a perpetrator of rape, and so also support what we will call 
perpetrator myths. Victims might be unable to conceptualize their 
experience properly and so it is even harder for them to speak out 
about them. Even if they can conceptualize it properly, others may 
not. For example, others may not see some instances of sexual as-
sault and sexual harassment involving great people or without the 
typical perpetrator as wrong. Such hermeneutical deficiencies may 
further contribute to the empowerment of perpetrators.
Such hermeneutical injustices do not just occur with sexual 
 assault. They may also occur with respect to crimes related to 
 anti-Semitism, sectarianism, racism, and the various forms of 
 racial, national, and ethnic supremacism. If you honour and  admire 
people who either endorse these ideologies or aspects of these 
 ideologies, you may also condone (or appear to condone) those 
ideologies. This may contribute to distorting people’s  operative 
concepts of what is right and wrong as well as people’s operative 
concepts of sexism, racism, and so on. Consequently, it may distort 
what exactly is wrong with sexism, racism, and so on. So even if 
people know that these ideologies and belief systems are mistaken 
and morally wrong, they may not take them to be wrong in practice. 
This may then lead people to struggle to take seriously other peo-
ple’s claims about sexism and racism. That honouring and admiring 
the immoral may contribute to this kind of hermeneutical injustice 
gives you some reason against honouring and admiring them. This 
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meaning drift can also lead to another form of self- silencing on the 
behalf of victims.
Recall that Marlène Schiappa said that honouring Polanski was 
encouraging rape culture because there was something odd about 
telling people to speak up about sexual assault but then celebrating 
sexual predators. Because people’s condonation of such wrongdoing 
encourages the idea that it is not in fact wrong, this also encourages 
a set of expectations. In particular, even when victims think they 
will be believed, they may come to expect (again often justifiably) 
that people will not care. This is a reasonable response to the fact 
that their assailant’s behaviour has been condoned and supported, 
as well as to the fact they may have been disrespected through their 
assailant being honoured and admired. Once the idea that a great 
person’s talents are more important than the crimes they have 
 committed seems widely endorsed, the victim is likely to form the 
expectation that people will be indifferent to their suffering.
One particularly powerful way that this expectation can be 
 supported is through the practice of admiration bombing – that is, 
reminding someone of a person’s admirable qualities in an implicit 
or explicit effort to dismiss the accusations made against them. 
For example, in response to the controversy about Polanski being 
honoured with a retrospective, the French Minister for Culture 
dismissed the “ancient charges” against Polanski while reminding 
people that he is a “brilliant director” (Zaretsky 2017).
Another example of this occurred when New York Univer-
sity professor Avital Ronell was accused of sexually harassing, 
 sexual assaulting, and stalking a student. A number of prominent 
 academics – including the feminist scholar Judith Butler – signed 
an open letter in her defence. Of particular relevance is that the 
 letter emphasized the signatories “enduring admiration” for Ronell. 
Moreover, they write,
We testify to the grace, the keen wit, and the intellectual com-
mitment of Professor Ronell and ask that she be accorded 
the dignity rightly deserved by someone of her international 
standing and reputation. If she were to be terminated or re-
lieved of her duties, the injustice would be widely recognized 
and opposed.11
These things might well all be true of Ronell, while the accusations 
against her could nevertheless be true. Indeed, NYU determined 
that she had sexually harassed a student (Flaherty 2018).
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And in 2004, Jacques Derrida also wrote a letter in defence of 
Dragan Kujundzic, a professor at University of California at Irvine 
(UCI) who had been accused of sexual harassment. Of particular 
relevance, Derrida wrote that:
I know Dragan better and longer than anyone at Irvine. For 
more than twenty years, I have followed and admired his work, 
his intelligence, his rigor, and his integrity, his strict sense of 
ethical, intellectual, and academic responsibility. (In particu-
lar, I know him to be absolutely incapable of using or abus-
ing his power with students, abuse being implied, in the strict 
sense, by the concept of “sexual harassment”).12
Derrida bombards us with details about the accused’s admirable qual-
ities as a defence against accusations of sexual harassment. Again, one 
can be both admirable and immoral, so highlighting these qualities is 
completely irrelevant. It is not surprising that so many people smother 
their own testimony when this kind of practice is prevalent.
2.3 Complicity
Another way you can harm victims is through honour and admira-
tion making you complicit in the wrongs of those you honour and 
admire. Suppose your friend commits a crime and you let them plan 
the crime at your house. You do not actually commit the crime, 
but given your assistance, you are complicit in the crime because 
you contributed to the crime coming about. You might think that 
when you honour or admire an immoral person that you cannot be 
complicit because you have not helped them commit the relevant 
crimes. For example, you have not arranged for an artist to sexually 
harass a fan. But, with respect to athletes, artists, and intellectuals, 
we do often give them money. We pay for their films, music, books, 
and to see them in person. We give them the means to have the 
power and opportunity to engage in particular types of immorality. 
In this way, we are complicit in their immorality.
Of course, this is not a reason against honouring and admiring 
the immoral in general. Rather, it is a reason against giving them 
your money. While this arguably counts as a form of honouring 
as money is scarce resource, it is adaptable into a reason against 
honouring and admiring them in general. Notice that often what 
gives the immoral the power and opportunity to act wrongly is 
their fame. One thing that can influence their fame is their financial 
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power. Another factor is how honoured and admired the person is 
(which, as discussed in Section 1, may affect how much financial 
power they have). The more honoured and admired a person is the 
more famous they typically are. Not only do honours and admi-
ration often make a person more famous, but they also often con-
tribute towards a person having various sorts of power identified 
in Section 1. It is in part because they have various kinds of power 
that people can continue to act immorally and often get away with 
it. By honouring and admiring an immoral person, you contribute 
to their fame and power, which gives them opportunities to act im-
morally. In this way, we are complicit in their immorality.
You might object that the individual contributions towards a per-
son’s power and fame that you make by honouring and admiring 
them are so small that your contributions do not really make a dif-
ference and so you are not really complicit. This objection allows 
that significant instances of public honouring and admiration may 
make a difference. So, giving an Oscar to a predatory filmmaker, a 
retrospective to a sexist painter, and a lifetime achievement award 
to an anti-Semitic intellectual are potentially ways to be complicit 
in another’s immorality. Moreover, due to their epistemic power, a 
famous person who openly admires a genocidal tyrant might also 
be complicit in the tyrant’s immorality. However, individuals with 
everyday social status just cannot have the same kind of effect. Or 
so the objection goes.
It is true that institutions, such as The Academy, and other major 
honourers and admirers seem like clear cases of those who should 
be concerned about being complicit in the wrongs of the immoral. 
However, even if individuals may have less to worry about here be-
cause they are likely to be less complicit than institutions, this does 
not mean they have no reason to worry. Individuals may still have 
to be concerned about honouring and admiring the immoral based 
on what other people are doing. To compare, leaving your lights on 
or having baths every day might be fine if you are the only per-
son doing it. However, the permissibility of doing so depends on 
what other people are doing. If everyone is using excessive water 
or electricity, then it will lead to a harmful outcome that should 
be avoided. Because we live in an interconnected world, what we 
have moral reason to do or not do sometimes depends on what 
other people are doing. While the debate about collective action 
problems remains and we make no attempt to solve it, we think 
it is reasonable for you to take into consideration that you might 
be complicit with the wrongs of the immoral to some extent if you 
honour and admire them.13
Reasons against Honouring and Admiring 47
3 Perpetuating Wrongdoing
The third general reason against honouring and admiring the im-
moral is that it perpetuates wrongdoing. There are at least two ways 
it can do so: emulation and ideology.
3.1 Emulation
When you honour or admire a person, this also functions to iden-
tify them as an exemplar – that is, as someone to be emulated. In 
Polanski’s case, his honour of being appointed as president of the 
César awards identifies him as an exemplar. Because this is an hon-
our for aesthetic achievement it is reasonable to think that Polanski 
is only being identified as an aesthetic exemplar. Given this, it might 
seem that such an honour is unproblematic because it is only pass-
ing judgement on his aesthetic abilities and not his moral behaviour. 
Likewise, if a person expresses admiration for Hans Asperger in an 
article detailing the reasons why they think he was a great doctor 
and medical scientist, the person might simply take themselves to 
be identifying him as an intellectual exemplar. Again, this might 
seem unproblematic because they may only take themselves to be 
passing judgement on Asperger’s epistemic abilities and achieve-
ments and not his moral behaviour. Perhaps the most vivid form 
of exemplar identification involves those immoral figures who are 
depicted in statues. Such people are literally put on a pedestal, and 
it is hard to deny that when this happens they are being identified as 
exemplars. Again, though, you might think the statue just honours 
their achievements and not their immorality.
However, given admiration’s spreading tendency, when you ad-
mire one feature of a person, this sometimes leads you admiring 
(or looking more favourably upon) other features of the person as 
well. For example, a teenager’s admiration for their favourite foot-
baller’s sporting abilities may lead them to admire their political 
views. Once admiration spreads to these features this may then lead 
to a desire to emulate these aspects of the person as well. We may 
identify these as part of the person’s admirable-making project and 
then try to emulate those aspects. Given that we pick the immoral 
out as people we ought to admire when we honour or admire them, 
we have reason to worry about honouring and admiring them, as 
this may lead people to emulate the immoral in other ways.
We are not suggesting that anyone is going to commit sexual as-
sault as a direct result of admiring Polanski’s artistic talent. Or that 
anyone is going to contribute to mass murder as a direct result of 
admiring Asperger’s intellectual abilities. But emulating exemplars 
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need not involve straightforward imitation. As Kristján Kristjáns-
son (2006: 41) argues, the proper role of exemplars is to “help you 
arrive at an articulate conception of what you value and want to 
strive towards”. Emulation should therefore be seen as a process by 
which one attempts to achieve these values. Even if it does not lead 
anyone to imitate them, identifying an immoral person as an exem-
plar can be bad because it encourages people to pursue or uphold 
problematic ideals. In the case of Polanski, those ideals may include 
great person myths, which may justify or excuse wrongdoing if it 
is done in the service of artistic greatness. The fact that honouring 
and admiring the immoral can lead to such emulation gives us an-
other moral reason not to honour and admire the immoral.
3.2 Ideology
It is often said that honouring and admiring the immoral perpet-
uates morally reprehensible ideologies (e.g. Burch-Brown 2017; 
Schulz 2019). For example, honouring Polanski has been claimed 
to perpetuate rape culture (e.g. Schiappa’s comments cited in 
 Zaretsky 2017), and honouring Confederate generals with statues 
in the USA has been claimed to perpetuate white supremacism (e.g. 
Lopez 2017; Schulz 2019; Rossi 2020).
According to Sally Haslanger, “ideology functions to stabilize 
or perpetuate unjust power and domination, and does so through 
some form of masking or illusion” (2017a: 150). In other words, ide-
ologies are always bad because they mislead us about the nature 
of reality and value. Following Stuart Hall (1996), Joanna Burch-
Brown (2017: 65, fn.16) points out that one need not conceive of an 
ideology in normatively negative terms as Haslanger does – that 
is, an ideology need not be bad. On this normatively neutral un-
derstanding, ideology is the set of tools and resources that we use 
to understand social reality and to give us guidance on how to act. 
According to Haslanger (2017b), these tools and resources include 
aspects of our psychologies that lead to beliefs and judgements, 
such as schemas, which are ways we process and categorize peo-
ple, objects, and events. These tools and resources also include so-
cial meanings, symbols, and practices. Central to this conception 
of ideology is the idea that there are looping effects between these 
internal and external aspects of ideology. We have the schemas we 
have in part because of the social meanings, symbols, and practices 
we have. And we have the latter in part because of the schemas we 
have. It is because of this looping effect that a particular resource, 
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tool, or practice can seem to be correct, reliable, or a “given”. In 
particular, your conception of your social reality might seem ob-
vious to you, but it may also be the result of an implicit ideology. 
Whether you can avoid ideology in some form or whether ideologies 
are always bad is an open question. Even so, we think it is clear that 
ideology is something we should at least be wary of contributing to, 
as there are clear cases of ideologies that perpetuate wrongdoing.
How do honouring and admiring practices support harmful 
ideologies? Burch-Brown (2017) argues that statues of people – 
 particularly those involved in grave injustices such as the transat-
lantic slave trade – can support harmful ideologies (such as racism 
and white supremacism)14 by (i) honouring those who endorsed 
such ideologies (or aspects of such ideologies), (ii) expressing a 
particular identity, and (iii) sending a signal about who has power 
and authority in the community. Statues can do so in part because 
of their typical placement. For example, they are often placed in 
prominent places where they draw lots of attention. Because a deci-
sion has been made to place this statue in such an attention-focused 
space, it can communicate quite a strong message about the values 
and ideals of the community.
Relatedly, statues can support harmful ideologies through what 
Ten-Herng Lai (2020) calls derogatory pedestaling. According to 
Lai, by declaring an immoral person as honourable through creat-
ing (and maintaining) a statue of them, the statue indirectly ranks 
the honoured person’s victims as inferior. This is because the hon-
our only makes sense against a background belief that those op-
pressed by the target of the honour are inferior and of lesser moral 
worth than other people. Honouring a slave trader, for example, 
only makes sense if we do not value those whose lives were ruined 
by the slave trade. Moreover, when these honours are given by a 
national or local government, they may claim to speak in the name 
of the state’s citizens or a local region’s population. These should 
be understood as instances of political speech that are capable of 
functioning as a form of expressive harm. By communicating that a 
group of people are inferior this reinforces the idea that this group 
of people really are inferior. So, a statue can in effect be an exter-
nal resource in a harmful ideology. It is supported by particular 
internal tools and resources (such as schema) and in turn helps to 
support those internal tools and resources.
Support for harmful ideologies need not just occur through stat-
ues. You might support these ideologies, to some extent, whenever 
you honour and admire an immoral person. For example, when you 
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honour and admire someone, you pick them out as an exemplar, 
as someone who ought to be admired, and, in doing so, you may 
suggest that they are worthy of being emulated. As we said earlier, 
such emulation need not be literal. For example, you might not try 
to sail ships from Africa to the Americas with slaves. But you might 
try to emulate the values of the person you honour and admire or 
the person you see others honouring and admiring. By honouring 
and admiring someone you are often putting them on a pedestal, 
and in doing so you may appear to suggest that these are at least 
tolerable values. In addition, you may appear to be disrespecting 
the victims of the person as well as the victims of similar crimes. In 
at least these ways, honouring and admiring the immoral supports 
harmful ideologies. Indeed, it may well result from such ideologies 
too; as we discussed, that there is a looping effect between wrongs 
and ideologies is part of what makes ideologies hard to challenge 
and dislodge.
We will now identify two schemas of harmful ideologies that we 
think are both promoted by honouring and admiring the immoral 
and support, directly or indirectly, various injustices. Note three 
things. First, we do not think these schemas should be character-
ized as essential features of these ideologies – for example, racism 
and supremacism could exist without them. Even so, we think they 
can at least indirectly support these and other harmful ideologies. 
Second, we think these schemas are bad in and of themselves. So 
even if they did not support harmful ideologies, the fact we might 
promote these still gives reasons against honouring and admiring 
the immoral. Third, we do not think honouring and admiring the 
immoral is the only source of these schemas. Indeed, these schemas 
may also at least partially explain why we honour and admire the 
immoral or why we honour and admire them in the ways we of-
ten do. Again, this is to be expected given the looping effects that 
Haslanger outlines. The two schemas we identify are two related 
cultural myths that we mentioned earlier. 
Great Person Myths. One kind of great person myth is related to 
what Manne (2017: 180) calls the “honorable Brutus” problem. The 
idea is that we are presented with a great person and then we are 
presented with the wrongdoing they have committed. Because we 
take the person to be great, this gives us a basis for denying that 
they did anything wrong.15 This myth is another source of epistemic 
power. Another kind of great person myth is that doing something 
great enough either justifies or renders tolerable wrongs a person 
might have committed. This myth is another source of moral power. 
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Both kinds of myth are present in the honouring and admiring of 
certain immoral political figures. For example, Christopher Co-
lumbus is honoured yearly on Columbus Day. He is honoured for 
discovering the Americas for Europeans, but he is thought to have 
brutalized and oppressed many of the indigenous peoples that he 
came across. Despite his animosity towards black South Africans, 
his attitude towards women, and his endorsement of the caste sys-
tem, Mahatma Gandhi is still revered for his role in securing India’s 
independence through peaceful protests (Sen 2015). The honouring 
and admiring of such political figures encourages both myths be-
cause the focus is usually exclusively on the great things that they 
did.16 And when their wrongdoing is brought up, many people ei-
ther do not accept that they did anything wrong, that they must 
have been justified in what they did, or that they think we should 
just accept that they did these things because it was a necessary 
by-product of their greatness. The end result is that we may end up 
understanding other admirable people according to such schemas 
(greatness is incompatible with badness; greatness justifies badness; 
greatness makes badness tolerable) in part because our honouring 
and admiring of such people expresses and supports such myths.
Perpetrator Myths. Audrey Yap (2017) argues that in cases of 
sexual assault that we often rely on certain myths about what per-
petrators of sexual assault are like. She argues that because our 
“standard stories” (i.e., schemas about sexual assault) involve per-
petrators who are either mentally ill or thoroughly vicious and irre-
deemable, we have trouble acknowledging that ordinary people can 
commit sexual assault. She proposes that we expand our stories or 
paradigms about sexual assault to include those that involve sexual 
assault committed by otherwise ordinary people who are neither 
mentally ill nor evil and who are capable of maintaining normal 
relationships with friends and family. Honouring and admiring the 
immoral may feed the myth that perpetrators (of sexual assault and 
other wrongs) are like this by emphasizing the problematic stan-
dard stories that Yap identifies. (Indeed, this is likely an offshoot 
of the great person myths we discussed above.) Perhaps because 
admiration has a tendency to spread, we may come to see those who 
are honoured and admired as wholly admirable and so unable to be 
guilty of terrible crimes. Our current honour and admiration prac-
tices may implicitly encourage the myth that perpetrators must be 
either be mentally ill or thoroughly evil by focusing attention on an 
admirable person’s positive qualities and actions and overlooking 
their negative qualities and actions.
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4 Responding to These Reasons
The general reasons we have identified are present in some but not 
all cases. For example, sometimes honouring and admiring the 
immoral will empower them, but sometimes not. Even when those 
reasons are present in a particular case, they can vary in strength. 
For example, sometimes honouring and admiring the immoral will 
harm the victims but not very much. In this section, we will go 
through certain questions you should ask yourself when trying to 
figure out whether you should, all-things-considered, honour and 
admire the immoral.
First, what is the wrong? Noticeably, many of the points we made 
concern wrongs to victims and wrongs relating existing (structural, 
systemic) injustices. So, certain wrongs will avoid (or largely avoid) 
the reasons against honouring and admiring the immoral. For ex-
ample, the fact that Winona Ryder is a convicted shoplifter does 
not seem to give you much reason not to honour and admire her 
for her acting. In particular, it is not a very significant wrong, and it 
does not seem to perpetuate a bad ideology. You must, then, estab-
lish what the wrong is and whether and to what extent it exacerbates 
the moral dangers we have identified. Take Roman Polanski’s sex-
ual assault on Samantha Geimer. This is a significant crime, so you 
should be concerned about the moral dangers of honouring and 
admiring Polanski.
Second, who are you? That is, are you an individual or an institu-
tion? We have largely spoken about reasons against honouring and 
admiring the immoral regardless of who the honourer or admirer 
is. Yet who the honourer or admirer is does seem to make a differ-
ence to the strength of the moral reasons. There is a stronger reason 
for an institution such as The Academy, which gives out The Oscars, 
not to honour and admire Polanski than there is for an individual. 
Then again, it also depends on who the individual is. A celebrity 
with a lot of influence has a stronger reason against honouring and 
admiring than a mere individual, because a celebrity typically has 
more influence and epistemic power than a mere individual (Archer 
et al. 2020). The influence of the institution also makes a differ-
ence. A local film club has a weaker reason not to give Polanski 
a retrospective than a national film body. You must, then, think 
about who you are and in what capacity you will be honouring and 
admiring a person. If your contribution is particularly small, then 
it is acceptable for you to continue honouring or admiring a partic-
ular immoral person. But if your contribution is large enough, then 
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perhaps you should not honour or admire a particular immoral 
person.
Third, what are other people doing? While you might act as an 
individual, your actions do not occur in a vacuum. Even small acts 
can be unintentionally part of a larger group effort. As we discussed 
earlier, this is a kind of collective action problem that is similar in 
structure to the problem of contributing to climate change. Your 
individual contribution does not seem to make a difference and yet 
every person’s contribution taken as a whole does make a differ-
ence. The important point for us is that even if you are not to blame 
or have no obligation not to make contributions to climate change, 
you can still have moral reasons not to contribute. Likewise, if your 
small act of honouring and admiring an immoral person will con-
tribute to one of the moral dangers, then you may have reason, al-
beit a weak one, not to honour and admire.
Fourth, how are you going to honour and admire? It matters 
what form your honour and admiration takes. Individuals may well 
privately honour and admire an immoral person. Do these moral 
reasons speak against that? Yes, but in many cases the reason will 
not be very strong. For example, it still disrespects Polanski’s victim 
if you privately honour him with a poster in your bedroom. But the 
strength of the reasons against honouring him with a poster seem 
quite weak – especially, as we discuss in the next chapter, if you 
have some deep personal connection with Polanski’s work. If you 
represent an institution that is planning to give a lifetime achieve-
ment award to an immoral person, then the reasons against are go-
ing to be much stronger because this will likely be understood as a 
global endorsement of the awardee. If you are going to give a more 
specific award, the reasons will be weaker, because it is less likely to 
be understood as global endorsement of the person. The strength of 
the reasons will also differ depending how much influence the insti-
tution has. In some cases, though, as we discuss in the next chapter, 
the criteria for the honour will be firm so you will be obliged to 
honour an immoral person.
Fifth, what is the context of your honouring and admiring? 
Noticeably, the reasons against grounded in points about public 
meaning – such as those about empowering the perpetrator – rely 
significantly on the context in which one honours and admires. It 
is worth making clear that these reasons are much stronger if one’s 
honour and admiration condones the immoral person’s behaviour 
through intentional or attitudinal meaning rather than through 
public meaning. One reason we make our points in terms of public 
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meaning is that this shows that even if you do not have bad inten-
tions or attitudes (as some people may claim in defence of why they 
should be fine to honour and admire the immoral) you can still have 
moral reason against honouring and admiring the immoral. If we 
focus just on public meaning, this allows that there are possible and 
actual contexts in which honouring and admiring the immoral will 
not have an adverse public meaning. So, reasons made in terms of 
public meaning are not decisive. We think, though, that if our acts 
of honouring and expressions of admiration have a bad intentional 
or attitudinal meaning, then our reasons based on these meanings 
are much stronger. Even so, it is not clear that these reasons are 
decisive independent of a particular context.
Some might worry that there is no problem with our actions hav-
ing an adverse public meaning. They might think that we should not 
be blamed if others read things into our actions and emotions that 
are not expressive of our own intentions or attitudes. The objection 
is that blame lies with others and not with us. Even though others 
may be blameworthy for reading things into actions and emotions 
that are not expressive of the agent’s intentions or attitudes, we see 
no reason why this precludes people from having a responsibility 
to think about what others might read into their actions. If a come-
dian thinks their ironic racist joke, which they intend to lampoon 
racists, will be used as a slogan by neo-Nazis to galvanize a popu-
lar movement, then this could give them reason not to tell it. It is 
true that the context-sensitive nature of public meaning can make 
it difficult to determine. But even if it is difficult to determine, this 
does not mean we always lack such a reason against honouring and 
admiring. Consider clear cases, such as the giving of awards. Given 
the way that awards are typically given, with all the fanfare and 
celebration of the awardee, they can clearly be perceived as con-
doning the immoral behaviour of the awardee. It is plausible, then, 
that such honourers have a responsibility to consider how others 
will interpret the giving of an award to an immoral person. Again, 
though, the reason is not decisive.
Moreover, we can perhaps still have moral reasons against hon-
ouring and admiring the immoral even when the bad meaning that 
some people will take from a person’s being honoured and admired 
is not justified. In applying several of our points to debates about 
statues of immoral people, Benjamin Rossi (2020), drawing on Dan 
Demetriou and Ajume Wingo (2018), identifies another form of 
public meaning – namely, the meaning that others will take whether 
or not it is justified. For example, some might take a man’s interrup-
tion of a woman to be sexist regardless of whether it is justified to 
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understand the man’s action this way or not. Rossi argues for the 
importance of such meaning in the context of statues of immoral 
or controversial political figures. Sometimes we should take down a 
statue even when the adverse meaning some people find in it is not 
justified. Arguably, though, moral reasons against honouring and 
admiring are much weaker in cases where people will mistakenly 
infer a bad meaning.
Finally, is the proposed target of honour and admiration alive? 
The reasons against honouring and admiring a wrongdoer may lose 
much of their force after their death. For instance, we have little 
reason to worry about effects of empowering a person who is no 
longer alive to use that power. However, the death of an admired 
person does not fully eliminate these worries. By honouring and 
admiring someone after their death we may be empowering their 
supporters, which may in turn harm their victims. For example, 
continuing to honour and admire Michael Jackson after his death 
may aid those who were attempting to silence the voices of those 
making sexual assault allegations against him. In addition, this 
honour and admiration could serve to empower those committing 
similar wrongs by perpetuating a negative ideology that serves to 
underplay the significance of their wrongdoing. So while death may 
influence these reasons, it would be wrong to conclude that the rea-
sons against honouring and admiring an immoral person do not 
apply if that person is dead.
In answering all these questions (and perhaps others), you might 
find that you have decisive reason to abandon honour and admira-
tion for a particular immoral person who is a fitting target of ad-
miration. We think that in some cases there are decisive reasons 
against honouring and admiring. We think statues of immoral po-
litical leaders are a clear case. Even though some (though far from 
all) of those depicted in statues are admirable in some way, we often 
should not depict them in statues. In Chapter 5, we argue that this is 
because statues typically encourage or manifest the vice of global-
ism. But we do not think there is justification for abandoning hon-
our and admiration in all cases. The fact that the reasons against 
honouring and admiring the immoral that we have identified in this 
chapter are not decisive in all cases supports this conclusion. In 
the next chapter, we consider general reasons against abandoning 
admiration – namely, reasons to honour and admire the immoral. 
While these reasons do not establish that we should never abandon 
admiration, they do help to further highlight that we cannot aban-
don admiration in all cases. In other words, sometimes we should, 
all-things-considered, honour and admire the immoral.
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Notes
 1 The concept of epistemic power comes from Geuskens (2018).
 2 For more on condonation and how it differs from forgiveness, see, for 
example, Pettigrove (2004).
 3 Intended meaning is similar to what Grice (1957) calls non-natural 
meaning and has become known as speaker meaning. Since we take in-
tended meaning to go beyond speech acts, we prefer our terminology.
 4 Our use of “attitudinal meaning” is similar to McKenna’s (2012) “agent 
meaning”. Rossi (2020: 51) worries that attitudinal meaning might be 
misunderstood because intentions are a kind of attitude. He therefore 
recommends calling this “implicit meaning”. As we make clear what 
we take attitudinal meaning to cover, we hope that readers will not 
misunderstand our terminology.
 5 Relatedly, a study by Paharia and Deshpandé (2009) found that the 
more people desire to own a product the more likely they are to excuse 
the use of sweatshop labour in its production.
 6 Though Bhattacharjee et al.’s main interest in these studies is in moral 
decoupling, where people separate judgements of performance from 
judgements of morality. We will discuss this in Chapter 5.
 7 For another perspective on this point, see Elicker (forthcoming).
 8 See Medina (2011) for an account of a general link between credibility 
excess and credibility deficit. We identify a more specific link that is 
compatible with Medina’s account.
 9 Quote taken from Zaretsky (2017).
 10 According to Burt (1980: 217), rape myths are “prejudicial, stereo-
typed, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists”. Lonsway 
and Fitzgerald (1994: 135) propose refining this definition such that 
rape myths “are attitudes and beliefs that are generally false but are 
widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male 
sexual aggression against women”. While we agree that rape myths 
most often serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression against 
women, this definition may perpetuate two other rape myths – namely 
that men cannot be victims of rape and that women cannot rape. As 
Curry (2017) points out, these myths help to cover up the sexual vic-
timization of black men in the United States. So, we instead suggest 
that rape myths are attitudes and beliefs that are generally false but 
are widely and persistently held that serve to deny and justify sexual 
aggression.
 11 See Leiter (2018).
 12 For the full letter, see http://www.jacques-derrida.org/Cicerone.html
 13 For more on complicity and collective responsibility, see Kutz (2000) 
and McPherson (2015).
 14 Haslanger (2017b: 16–17) argues that racism is not an ideology but an 
ideological formation. This is because on her view ideology consists of 
cultural techne (tools), whereas racism “is constituted by an intercon-
nected web of unjust social practices that unjustly disadvantage cer-
tain groups, e.g., residential segregation, police brutality, biased hiring 
and wage inequity, educational disadvantage, etc.”. While racism is 
supported by and itself supports racist techne, she holds these should 
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be distinguished. We elide this distinction in what follows as nothing of 
substance hangs on making it.
 15 Yap (2017: 16) makes the same kind of point. Both Yap and Manne are 
more concerned with the effect this myth has on the testimony of those 
who accuse a great person of wronging them.
 16 See Berninger (forthcoming) for a fictionalist account of commemora-
tion that provides a justification for overlooking the commemorated 
person’s immorality.
So far, we have argued that it is possible for the immoral to be 
admirable but that there can also be important moral reasons 
that count against actually honouring and admiring them. Does 
this mean that we should abandon all honour and admiration 
of the immoral? No, because the general reasons we identified 
are not decisive in all cases. There are also important reasons 
that count against abandoning honour and admiration in these 
cases  – namely, reasons to honour and admire the immoral. 
These reasons might also be thought to support a popular claim 
that it would be wrong to abandon our admiration of people on 
the basis of their immoral behaviour. While our focus is on the 
force of these reasons, our discussion also reveals that this claim 
is mistaken because all the reasons we identify are not in general 
decisive.
We focus on four reasons. First, that the admirable deserve 
 honour and admiration and so it would be wrong to deny them this. 
Second, that allowing morality to fully dictate the people we ad-
mire would be a form of overly judgemental moralism. Third, that 
in refusing to admire or honour the immoral we would be shutting 
ourselves off from distinctive contributions and insights into the 
human condition. Finally, that because our admiration for people 
can play an important role in our sense of identity, morality should 
not require us to abandon admiration that has this kind of personal 
value. We will argue that each of these arguments identifies an im-
portant consideration that should inform the ethics of honouring 
and admiring. They identify reasons that you must also consider 
when trying figure out whether you should honour and admire an 
immoral person. As we show that these reasons are not decisive in 
all cases, we also show that the reasons do not support doing noth-
ing as a policy.
4 Against Abandoning 
Admiration
DOI: 10.4324/9780367810153-4
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1 Fittingness, Desert, and Entitlement
In 2011, Roman Polanski travelled to Switzerland to collect a life-
time achievement award from the Zurich Film Festival. The honour 
was originally awarded in 2009, but the Swiss police had arrested 
the director on a warrant relating to the rape of 13-year-old Saman-
tha Geimer in 1977. The decision to give this honour to Polanski 
was unsurprisingly controversial given his crime. However, while 
there were many who criticized the decision to honour Polanski in 
this way, there were also those who defended the decision. Some of 
these defenders sought to downplay the significance of the crime. 
Others accepted the severity of Polanski’s crime but argued that Po-
lanski nevertheless deserved the award. For example, in an op inion 
piece in The Guardian, Hannah Slapper (2011) argued that Polanski 
should be given the award despite the “repulsive” nature of his 
crime. Slapper defended this view in the following way:
In regards to this award, his personal history is entirely 
 irrelevant. […] By rewarding these people for the things they 
have created, they are not forgiving them their crimes. Polanski 
deserves this recognition. He’s contributed greatly to the cause 
of film, and that is all that matters.
(Slapper 2011; emphasis added)
Slapper’s point is that Polanski deserves this honour and that not 
only does this give us reason to award it to him, nothing else counts 
against him receiving this honour.
Similar points are often made in discussions about whether to 
honour and admire the immoral, whether they be artists, intellec-
tuals, or politicians. For example, Andrew Roberts, who wrote a bi-
ography of Winston Churchill, claimed that criticisms of Churchill 
are “unimportant, all of them, compared to the centrality of the 
point of Winston Churchill, which is that he saved [Britain] from 
being invaded by the Nazis” (Adam 2015). Again, the point seems 
to be that whatever else Churchill may have done, he deserves to 
be honoured for this achievement. The underlying thought here is 
that all those who achieve great things deserve to be honoured and 
admired. Call this claim the deservingness of admiration.
Claiming that someone deserves admiration is a stronger claim 
than the claim that admiration is fitting. The fittingness claim is a 
claim about the accuracy of the evaluation involved in admiration. 
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If someone is a fitting target of admiration, then it is accurate to 
view that person as being excellent in some way and meriting positive 
evaluation and wonder. This excellence may be due to their artistic 
talents, their intellectual achievements, their service to their nation, 
or something else entirely. When we say that admiration is fitting 
for someone, we are saying that those who feel admiration for that 
person are representing the world accurately. Saying that someone 
deserves admiration goes beyond this to make a moral claim. From 
the moral point of view, people ought to get what they deserve.1 So 
by making the desert claim we are saying that not only would admi-
ration for this person be a response that accurately  represents the 
world but also that, morally, this person ought to be admired.2
This claim about the deservingness of admiration has two parts. 
There is a claim about the basis of desert (achieving  excellent 
things), and there is a claim about the treatment that is deserved 
(honour and admiration). Both parts of this claim should be ac-
cepted. There are at least two ways to support the claim about the 
basis of desert.3 First, one might argue that the basis for being 
awarded a prize, a paradigmatic form of honouring, is the posses-
sion of a skill (Feinberg 1970: 226). But the mere possession of a 
skill is unlikely to be a sufficient basis for deserving an award. The 
skill must also be manifested in some achievement that will serve 
as the basis of the award. An award for best director, for example, 
awards the director’s skill as it is manifested in a particular film. 
Achieving great things as a result of one’s skills and talents is then a 
plausible basis for deserving honour and admiration.
Second, one might appeal to an institutional desert basis.  According 
to institutional views of desert (e.g. Arnold 1987; C ummiskey 1987), the 
bases on which people are deserving of certain forms of treatment are 
dependent on the goals of the institution providing the form of treat-
ment. If the goal of a film award ceremony is to reward the best film-
makers of the past year, then making the best contribution to cinema is 
the basis for deserving an award. Similarly, if the goal of statues com-
memorating political figures is to acknowledge those who have contrib-
uted to the good of the nation, then having achieved great things for 
one’s country is the basis for deserving a statue in one’s honour.4
Similarly, a plausible case can be made to support the claim about 
deserved treatment. There is good reason to think that the various 
ways in which people can deserve to be treated by others tend to be 
affective in nature (Feinberg 1970: 225). People can deserve to be 
praised or blamed, admired or held in contempt, rewarded or pun-
ished, celebrated or denigrated. These are all affective responses, 
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and, according to Feinberg (1970: 225), if we lacked any affective 
responses such as these, “then there would be no use for the con-
cept of desert”. Even if we do not accept this strong claim, it is un-
deniable that the kinds of treatment that people can deserve are 
often affective in nature. If people can deserve some kind of affec-
tive treatment on the basis of achieving great things, then admira-
tion and honour are the most plausible candidates, as these are the 
affective responses we typically take to be deserved by those who 
have achieved great things.
The deservingness of admiration by itself, though, does not tell 
us anything about what other people should do in relation to this 
deservingness. To support this kind conclusion, we need to add the 
claim that the fact people deserve honour and admiration gives others 
moral reason to honour and admire them. Put in the strongest terms, 
this deservingness is claimed by some to generate a moral require-
ment to admire. Michael Zimmerman puts the point in this way: 
Even if there is no (direct) moral requirement to display any 
of the nonmoral virtues, there is nonetheless, as has been 
 acknowledged, a requirement to admire them when they 
are displayed. What sort of a requirement is this? Surely the 
 answer is: moral. It is morally fitting that one admire all virtues, 
whether or not the virtues themselves are moral. Likewise, it is 
morally fitting that one reprehend all vices, whether or not the 
vices themselves are moral.
(1999: 11; original emphasis)
Zimmerman’s claim is that we have a moral requirement to admire 
those who display non-moral virtue, such as artistic talent or intel-
lectual greatness. We will call this claim the duty to give people what 
they deserve.
If we put together the deservingness of admiration and the duty to 
give people what they deserve, then we can make a simple argument 
for the conclusion that we ought to honour and admire the immoral 
despite their immorality.
Premise 1: All those who achieve great things deserve honour 
and admiration. (Deservingness of Admiration)5
Premise 2: People have a duty to ensure that others get the 
things they deserve. (Duty to give people what they deserve)
Conclusion: People have a duty to ensure that those who 
achieve great things receive honour and admiration.
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Despite there being something to this argument, it should not be 
accepted in its current form. The reason for this is that the idea 
that there is a duty to give people what they deserve should only be 
accepted if it is significantly weakened. As it stands this claim holds 
that people have a duty to ensure others get what they deserve. This 
suggests that desert claims will always win out against other moral 
considerations. This view is implausible for at least three reasons.
First, there can be a conflict between different desert claims. For 
example, in a race the person who crosses the finishing line in first 
place deserves to receive the gold medal. However, it may be the case 
that they did not deserve to win the race. Perhaps the fastest runner 
suffered some bad luck and twisted their ankle 10 meters from the 
finishing line. According to Feinberg (1970: 227), in this kind of case, 
“the person who deserves the prize is not the person who deserves to 
win it”. The claim that people always ought to get what they deserve, 
regardless of the other moral considerations in play, generates very 
odd results in this case. The winner of the race ought, all things con-
sidered, to receive the gold medal because they won the race and so 
deserves the gold medal. However, there is another runner who de-
served to win the race and, if they had got what they deserved, would 
then deserve to receive the gold medal. So giving both runners what 
they deserve in this case would mean giving the gold medal to both of 
them. This is an absurd result and suggests that people do not always 
have a duty to ensure others get what they deserve.
Second, desert claims can also conflict with entitlement claims and 
where they do the entitlement claim should generally take p riority. 
As Feinberg (1970: 231) points out, someone may  deserve a reward 
but not be entitled to one. In other words, it does not automatically 
follow from the fact that someone deserves to be treated in some way 
that they have a right to be treated in that way. Conversely, someone 
may be entitled to a reward they do not deserve. Feldman and Skow 
(2019) give the following example that highlights both points well. 
Suppose a wealthy grandfather has two grandchildren, one who is 
virtuous and devoted and the other who is vicious and disloyal. It is 
reasonable to think that the virtuous grandchild deserves at least 
as much of the inheritance as the vicious grandchild. However, if 
the grandfather leaves all his fortune to the vicious grandchild then 
they are entitled to all of it, and the virtuous grandchild is entitled 
to none of it. In this case, if both grandchildren were to receive what 
they deserve, then the virtuous grandchild would receive more than 
is stipulated in the will and the vicious grandchild would receive 
less. However, the fact that this is what would be deserved does not 
settle the issue of what ought to happen. We might think that even 
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if the virtuous grandchild does deserve some of the inheritance, the 
fact that they are not entitled to it means that all things considered 
they ought not to receive any of it.
Finally, desert claims can also be in conflict with the action that 
would bring about the best consequences. To return to the previous 
example, suppose that the virtuous grandchild is an incredibly tal-
ented research scientist doing important work in developing medi-
cines for currently untreatable disease. Moreover, if they receive the 
share of the inheritance that they deserve they will become lazy and 
give up their job as a researcher, setting back the development of these 
medicines and leading to thousands of lives being lost as a result. It 
is at least an open question whether the grandchild ought, all things 
considered, to receive the inheritance in this case. Again though, if 
we accept the strong interpretation of the deservingness claim then 
there should be no open question here. If the grandchild deserves the 
inheritance then, according to the duty to give others what they de-
serve, others have a duty to ensure the grandchild receives it.
Given these problems with the duty to give others what they 
deserve, we should accept a weaker version of this claim accord-
ing to which people have some moral reason to give others what 
they deserve.6 This means that the claim that Polanski deserves a 
 particular form of recognition does not provide a decisive reason to 
think that he ought to receive it. Rather, it means that he ought to 
receive it unless there are good reasons that count against doing so. 
If such reasons exist, then we will have to do the difficult work of 
deciding which of these reasons win out in this particular case. It is 
also worth noting that this reason to give people what they deserve 
will not apply to everyone. There is, after all, no reason to think 
that those with interest in cinema have any reason to ensure that 
Polanski receives any form of honour or admiration. The revised 
conclusion, then, should read as follows:
Revised Conclusion: Some people have some moral reason to 
ensure that those who achieve great things receive honour and 
admiration.
In the case of honour and admiration, the reasons that count in 
favour of ensuring people get what they deserve will have to be con-
sidered alongside the three broad types of reason that may count 
against honouring and admiring the immoral. For any particular 
case of admiring the immoral, when one or more of these reasons 
exists, we will have to engage in the difficult business of deciding 
which set of reasons is decisive. In order to make this judgement, 
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we should consider several broad considerations that may influence 
the strength of the desert claim. First, desert claims may also be en-
titlement claims. This is not always the case, but where it is the case, 
the reasons in favour of honouring and admiring will be stronger. 
In the case of honours, desert claims governed by formal criteria 
are especially likely to ground entitlement claims. The winner of 
a 100-metre race, for example, is entitled to the gold medal, as this 
award is governed by strict criteria. For other forms of honour, the 
criteria are less clear and so it will also be less clear whether some-
one is entitled to that honour. We can therefore say that when an 
honour is governed by strict formal criteria, it is more likely to be 
the case that the target of the honour not only deserves this honour 
but is also entitled to it.
But while someone can be entitled to an honour, Feinberg argues 
that one cannot be entitled to the admiration of others, even though 
one can deserve it:
Praise and blame, admiration and contempt, applause and 
jeering, and so on, though manifestly responses persons are 
sometimes worthy of, are never treatments people are qualified 
for. Just as the winners in lotteries are entitled to their prizes 
but cannot be said to deserve them, so persons sometimes de-
serve praise or blame but are never entitled to them.
(Feinberg 1970: 232)
The reason Feinberg gives for this is that there are no institu-
tional rules that govern these informal responses. This means 
that there are no criteria the fulfilment of which would entitle 
you to receive admiration from others. At the very least, it is 
reasonable to think that cases where people are entitled to ad-
miration will be far rarer than cases in which they are entitled 
to an honour.
The argument from desert, which is often taken by its propo-
nents to conclusively show that we ought to honour and admire 
those who achieve great things, therefore in fact shows something 
much weaker than its proponents take it to show; namely, that we 
have some reason to do so but that these reasons may well be out-
weighed. These reasons will typically be stronger where the desert 
claim is also an entitlement claim. Honours governed by strict crite-
ria are more likely to generate entitlement claims than other forms 
of honour. Admiration, on the other hand, will rarely, if ever, be 
something to which someone is entitled.
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2 Moralism
There is something to the argument from desert, then, but only if it 
is understood to be a defeasible reason in favour of honouring and 
admiring those who have achieved excellent things but acted im-
morally. However, this raises the issue of whether the moral reasons 
against honour and admiration that we identified in the previous 
chapter could override the desert considerations that count in fa-
vour of honour and admiration. In other words, is the immorality 
of the person who has achieved excellent things the kind of consid-
eration that should stop us from honouring and admiring them?
According to one common response to this question, the answer 
is no. Consider Agnès Poirier’s (2010) claim that those who com-
plain about honouring Polanski with awards are guilty of “prurient 
hounding” and “moralistic prejudices”. Similarly, consider Heather 
MacDonald’s criticism of those who cancelled performances by 
 opera singer Plácido Domingo after a number of allegations of 
 sexual harassment were made against him:
It is a grotesque inversion of the proper hierarchy between pub-
lic accomplishment and private sexual behavior to sacrifice an 
artist of Domingo’s stature for the sake of 20 disgruntled bit 
players, laboriously harvested from thousands of professional 
interactions characterized by graciousness and consideration. 
Put simply, the discomfort of these belated accusers decades 
ago is not worth Domingo’s head. Civilization rests on the 
realm of public achievement in ideas, politics, and art. The pri-
vate realm of Eros should be subordinate to the public realm; 
how someone behaves in or getting to the bedroom is irrelevant 
to his achievements in the public square, absent criminality.
(MacDonald 2019)
In other words, people should continue to honour and admire 
 Domingo because his achievements are more important than his 
moral indiscretions. 
In both of these examples, the behaviour of those who think 
we should not honour and admire artists in the light of morally 
objectionable behaviour is criticized for being overly judgemental 
or moralistic. The message is that we should not allow our moral 
judgements of those who have created great works of art to get in 
the way of our admiration for them. While this argument is usually 
made in relation to artists, similar arguments could be made for 
intellectuals and political figures who have achieved great things. 
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Here too it could be claimed that it would be moralistic to allow 
one’s moral judgements to prevent an appreciation of their talents 
and achievements. In order to evaluate this argument, we need first 
to understand what moralism is and why it is a vice.7
Philosophers working on moralism have proposed various ways 
of understanding it. Craig Taylor (2012: 153) claims that moral-
ism is “a failure to recognize what moral thought or reflection re-
quires (and does not require) of us”. According to Taylor, a purely 
 judgemental response to another’s wrongdoing is often not enough. 
We must also respond sympathetically and in a way that recognizes 
our common humanity. This involves having the correct emotional 
reactions to the person we are judging. Another way in which mor-
alism can present itself according to Taylor (2012: Ch.4) is in allow-
ing moral thought and judgement to extend their influence beyond 
their proper limits in our lives. Similarly, Julia Driver (2006: 37) 
claims that moralism is “the illicit introduction of moral consider-
ations”. In other words, there are some situations in which moral 
judgement is simply inappropriate, and moralism may involve a 
 disposition to make moral judgements in these situations. What 
 underlies both these forms of behaviour is that they involve an in-
flated sense of the extent to which moral criticism is appropriate.
There are at least two ways in which the moral criticism may be 
inappropriate. First, the criticism may not fit the behaviour being 
criticized. This may be because the behaviour being criticized is 
not morally wrong or because the person performing the act had 
an excuse for acting in a way that would otherwise be wrong or be-
cause the criticism is disproportionate to the wrongdoing.8 Alterna-
tively, criticism may be inappropriate due to features of the context 
in which the utterance is made rather than features of the behaviour 
being criticized. For example, to engage in extensive criticism of 
someone while delivering a eulogy may be inappropriate even if the 
criticisms fit the behaviour of the deceased.
What is the most plausible way to interpret the claim that it would 
be moralistic to allow one’s moral judgements to prevent an ap-
preciation of their talents? Different versions of this argument may 
well have different forms of moralism in mind when making this 
criticism. In some cases, the argument may be that moral  criticism 
is inappropriate because the target did nothing wrong. For our pur-
poses, these kinds of argument are less interesting, as we are inter-
ested in the ethics of honouring and admiring the immoral. This 
question does not arise for those who are deemed not to have acted 
immorally.
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More interesting from our point of view are those who appeal
to moralism while accepting that the behaviour itself was wrong
and inexcusable. Those who defend Polanski, for example, tend
not to argue that there is nothing wrong with raping a 13-year-old
girl. Rather, the claim seems to be that allowing this wrongdoing
to affect one’s appreciation of Polanski’s talent and achievements is
inappropriate. In Poirier’s defence of Polanski (2010), for example,
she objects to the continued “hounding” of Polanski for a crime
that took place 33 years ago. Here the claim seems to be that con-
tinuing to hold Polanski’s crime against him is a disproportionate
response to his wrongdoing.
Other defences of Polanski involve the idea that focusing on 
his wrongdoing is inappropriate in certain contexts. For example, 
in defence of the decision to make Polanski the chair of the Cesar 
awards, Aurélie Filippetti, a former French culture minister, said 
that Polanski is a
great director […] who should be allowed to preside over this
ceremony. It’s something that happened 40 years ago. One can-
not bring up this affair every time we talk about him because













Here the claim seems to be both that being influenced by Polanski’s 
immoral behaviour would be both disproportionate to the crime (it 
“happened 40 years ago” after all) and that it would be the inappro-
priate context (“it is just an award ceremony”).
A number of answers have been suggested to the question of why 
moralism should be viewed as a vice. Some see moralism as involv-
ing a violation of our moral requirements to others. For example, 
Robert Fullinwider (2006: 10–11) claims that morality requires 
us to be charitable towards other people’s behaviour. Moralism 
is wrong, then, because it violates this duty to others. Relatedly, 
Kamila Pacovská (2018: 248) has argued that moralism is a failure 
of our duty “to exert an effort to love and accept the world such as it 
is, despite its imperfections”. Others see moralism as damaging the 
moral character of the moralistic agent. C.A.J. Coady (2006: 25), 
for example, claims that moralism “can bring with it crippling psy-
chological attitudes that themselves damage the operation of moral 
judgement”. Finally, one of us (Archer 2018a) has argued that the 
problem with moralism is that it undermines the force of legitimate 
moral criticism.
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We think that there is something to each of these claims about 
why moralism is wrong in general. However, these claims do not 
seem to really capture the moralism objection to letting our moral 
judgements influence how we view those who have achieved great 
things. MacDonald’s defence of Domingo, for example, stresses the 
importance of not allowing public achievement to be undermined by 
the “private realm of Eros” because: “Civilisation rests on the realm 
of public achievement in ideas, politics, and art”. The claim here is 
not that we are violating our moral duties to others, damaging our 
own moral character, or undermining the force of moral criticism. 
Rather, the claim is that we are undermining civilization itself!
While this claim strikes us as overblown, there is a reasonable 
point to be made here. According to Steven Jauss (2008: 255), 
 moralism may deprive people of potentially valuable aesthetic and 
epistemic experiences. In responding in a moralistic way, we may 
close ourselves off to these valuable experiences. Jauss supports 
this claim with some lines from Stephen Dunn’s Moralists in which 
the speaker claims:
Whenever I’ve been one [a moralist], I’ve known the end of 
my thinking in advance, the door shut before it’s opened wide 
enough to let in the ill wind, the rude, spectacular visage, the 
simple truth obstructed in a corner.
(Dunn 1994: 24; cited in Jauss 2008: 255)
This point more closely captures MacDonald’s claims about why 
we should not let our moral judgements cloud our  appreciation 
of Domingo. In doing so, we would put obstacles in the way of 
our  appreciation of valuable aesthetic experiences. A moralis-
tic  approach to Polanski may therefore prevent us from fully 
 appreciating his cinematic achievements. This point is not limited 
to the artistic case. In taking a moralistic approach to an intellec-
tual figure, we also run the risk of blocking an appreciation of their 
valuable intellectual achievements. Similarly, a moralistic approach 
to political figures may also run the risk of making us unable to 
 appreciate the great things they have achieved.
It is not just the value of certain achievements that a moralistic 
attitude may close us off from. Moralism may also close us from 
seeing wrongdoers as fellow members of the moral community. As 
Linda Radzik observes, there is a “disturbing tendency to see the 
wrongdoer as the ‘other’, as a distinct kind of being who is different 
from ourselves, whom we presume to be perfectly responsive to the 
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call of morality” (2009: 12). In doing so, we run the risk of failing 
to take wrongdoers seriously as moral agents and instead seeing 
them as beings “who must be handled in some way” (Radzik 2009: 
3). One problem that may arise from being too quick to withdraw 
admiration in response to wrongdoing is that it may contribute to 
this tendency to see wrongdoers as distinct kinds of beings and in 
doing so fail to treat them seriously as moral agents.
In othering wrongdoers in this way, we may inadvertently help to 
support the great person myths we discussed in the previous  chapter. 
As we explained, we uphold the myth that great people cannot be 
immoral when we hold that someone’s great achievements justify or 
render tolerable the wrongs they might have committed.  However, 
another way to feed this myth is to insist that those who perform 
immoral acts can never achieve great things. Refraining from ever 
honouring or admiring those who have acted immorally may also 
serve to reinforce the myth that those who achieve great things are 
also morally virtuous. If we want to undermine this myth, then it 
would be misguided to always withhold honour and admiration 
from the immoral. 
Relatedly, as Alexis Shotwell (2016) points out, when respond-
ing to systematic forms of wrongdoing in which many people are 
complicit to varying degrees, many people have a tendency to re-
spond by striving for personal purity. There are several problems 
with this response. First, it is unlikely to be achievable and so we 
will always end up disappointed. Second, striving for purity can 
produce “a seemingly satisfying self-righteousness” (Shotwell 2016: 
203). This self-righteousness may get in the way of recognizing our 
own moral failings and our complicity in systematic wrongdoing. It 
may also get in the way of solidarity with others. Finally, as Mary 
Douglas (1966: 4) argues, the goal of purity is often “to impose sys-
tem on an inherently untidy experience”. In striving for purity, we 
therefore run the risk of simplifying a complicated and nuanced 
situation. There is a danger, then, that in striving to avoid honour-
ing and admiring the immoral we may be pursuing a purity project 
that is doomed to failure, that will get in the way of solidarity and 
the recognition of our own failings, and that will lead to an overly 
 simplistic moral outlook.
In summary, being overly judgemental in our approach to 
 admiring and honouring the immoral could interfere with our 
 appreciation of those who achieve great things and contribute to 
a simplistic moral outlook that fails to treat wrongdoers as mem-
bers of the moral community. However, it would be a mistake to 
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conclude from this that we should never respond to the moral rea-
sons considered in the previous chapter by withholding honour and 
 admiration. While we should be reluctant about being too eager to 
engage in moral criticism, this should not prevent us from engaging 
in moral criticism altogether. Being unwilling to ever morally crit-
icize is no more a virtue than being too ready to do so. This would 
be to embody the opposite vice of moral indifference.
As with the argument from desert, the argument from moralism 
is taken by many to show conclusively that we ought to honour and 
admire those who achieve great things. However, what this argu-
ment actually supports is reason to be cautious about the extent 
to which admiration and honour are withheld for moral reasons 
and the wider projects to which this withholding may contribute. 
A major film organization that chooses never to honour or admire 
the immoral will likely miss out on directing people’s attention to-
wards some important and valuable artistic achievements. It may 
also contribute to a process of othering wrongdoers and be, or be 
perceived to be, part of a doomed purity project. However, a film 
organization that pays no attention to the moral reasons considered 
in the previous chapter risks empowering the wrongdoer, harming 
their victims, and perpetuating a damaging ideology. It is right to 
be wary of the dangers of moralism, but this does not justify turn-
ing our backs on morality altogether. In deciding whether or not 
to honour and admire the immoral we must judge whether there 
really are sufficient reasons to withhold honour and admiration or 
whether this would be a moralistic and overly judgemental response.
3 Distinctive Achievements of the Immoral
We have argued that an overly moralistic approach towards those 
who have achieved great things may interfere with our appreciation 
of their achievements. While this is an important worry, by itself 
it does not seem to provide an especially forceful reason to con-
tinue to honour and admire the achievements of the immoral or at 
least to continue to honour and admire them in the way we now do. 
While we may miss out on a full appreciation of great works of art, 
intellectual contributions, or political achievements if we do not ad-
mire the work of the immoral, we are unlikely to be left with a great 
shortage of things to admire. There are more great works of art, 
literature, and philosophy than we can ever hope to engage within 
one lifetime. In the words of Susan Wolf (2010: 47), most philosophy 
and most works of art and literature, even those that are excellent, 
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are such “that it would have been no loss to the world if [they] had 
never been published”. By this Wolf does not mean that these works 
have no value or that it would not be worth our while engaging with 
them. Rather, Wolf’s point is that people would not be worse off 
if they instead engaged with some other equally valuable work.9 
Given this, it is not clear we will be worse off if we choose not to ad-
mire the achievements of those who have acted immorally, as there 
are plenty of other achievements to admire.10
There will be some exceptions to this argument. Some achieve-
ments will be irreplaceable. One way in which achievements may be 
irreplaceable is when they are so exceptionally brilliant that there is 
nothing of comparable value. If Polanski’s Chinatown really is the 
best film of all time, as claimed by The Guardian, then something 
will be lost if someone chooses to admire the achievements of a 
different director instead. Similarly, for opera lovers there may be 
nothing that can compare to the work of Richard Wagner. In these 
cases, there will be something of value that is lost when we miss out 
on a full appreciation of these artists.
Similar arguments can be made about some scientific achieve-
ments. For example, the Pernkopf Anatomy of Man is a classic 
anatomy atlas that has been widely praised for its accuracy and 
detail (Riggs 1998). Other atlases are claimed by some surgeons 
to pale in comparison to Pernkopf’s atlas (Begley 2019). For com-
plex surgical procedures, then, it may be the most useful guide that 
surgeons have to navigating the human body. This atlas, though, 
was created in the 1930s by Viennese medical illustrators who were 
committed Nazis who even included images of swastikas in their 
signatures. Even worse, the drawings may have been based upon 
the bodies of those executed by the Nazi party (Yee et al. 2019). If 
we see the use of this atlas as a way of honouring its creators, albeit 
a rather minor form of honour, then there may be cases where pro-
viding the best medical care will involve honouring these commit-
ted Nazis. Again, then, we will lose something of value if we decide 
not to honour those who have created this work by continuing to 
use it to guide surgical procedures.
Nevertheless, the scope of this argument is necessarily limited. 
While there may be cases where we will miss out on something of 
great value if we do not engage with the works and achievements of 
the immoral, this only applies to works that are exceptional. In all 
other cases, we will not be worse off if we cannot fully appreciate 
the achievements of the immoral, as there will be plenty of other 
equally excellent achievements for us to appreciate.
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There is, though, another way to argue that we would miss 
something important if we do not admire the achievements of the 
 immoral. There may be distinctive contributions to life that can 
only be made by people who are morally flawed. According to 
this argument, we would miss important insights into the human 
 condition if we were unable to fully appreciate these achievements. 
A version of this argument is suggested by Wills and Holt (2017). 
They claim that a capacity for moral imagination is, to some extent 
at least, a different skill from that of being a morally good per-
son. While some degree of moral imagination may be necessary for 
being a good person, it is far from sufficient. Moreover, they even 
suggest that it is possible that an overdeveloped capacity for moral 
imagination may hinder the development of moral virtue. Given 
that moral imagination and moral virtue are separable, an artist 
may produce important works of moral imagination without being 
a virtuous person.
While we agree that this is a possibility, it does not by itself give 
us much by way of response to the claim that being unable to ap-
preciate the achievements of the immoral would not make us worse 
off. Perhaps we would be missing out on some important feats of 
moral imagination, but, so long as there are other equally import-
ant works of moral imagination out there, this does not seem to 
make us any worse off. But there is a related argument that is capa-
ble of providing such a response.
In his book Wagner: The Terrible Man and His Truthful Art, 
Owen Lee attempts to understand how “a hateful, ranting man” 
committed to an “almost pathological anti-Semitism” (1999: 20, 15) 
could produce such extraordinary and indispensable operas. Lee’s 
answer is that there is an important connection between Wagner’s 
immorality and the brilliance of his art. To begin to see this, we 
must first consider what artworks are capable of achieving. Great 
art brings us pleasure, but Lee argues it is also able
[to] deepen our awareness of the things that matter, to enable us 
to accept darkness and pain, to tell us what we might not have 
wanted to know but needed to know, to make us into something 
more than we were before, more human and more compassion-
ate. And, most of all I think, to enable us to see into ourselves.
(Lee 1999: 91)
In Lee’s (1999: 91–92) view, it was Wagner’s own inner conflict, “his 
wounded self”, “demons”, and “conflicting emotions” that made it 
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possible for him to see “deeper into human nature than the rest of 
us are likely to do”. It is for this reason that Lee thinks we need his 
work and the work by similarly troubled and troubling artists “to 
see unerringly into ourselves and so to help us with our lives” (Lee 
1999: 92).
Barbara Leaming makes a related claim about the work of 
 Polanski. According to Leaming (1982: 142), Polanski’s brilliance 
as a director comes from his unique ability to examine the rela-
tionship between identity and self-presentation. His method for 
doing so is to engage in a “blatant theatricalisation of himself on 
screen” and it is this that “gives Polanski his singular but indis-
putable place in film history” (Leaming 1982: 142). Importantly 
for Leaming, Polanski’s films cannot be fully understood with-
out viewing them “against the vivid background of the director’s 
 autobiographical legend” (Leaming 1982: 142). And this legend is 
of a director who has escaped the horrors of the Holocaust and is 
fascinated by “the perspective offered by the chaos of war” and 
seeks to create art that “explores the limits of unbridled violence 
and desire” (Leaming 1982: 143). According to Leaming, it is this 
distinct perspective, unburdened by moral concern, that makes 
Polanski’s work so ground-breaking. This image of amorality was 
one that Polanski was unable to control after his trial for the rape of 
Samantha Geimer, and many of his subsequent films are responses 
to this inability to control his public image.11 In Leaming’s words:
His is a peculiarly modern tale, one possible only in an age of 
mass media and information. Having set out to create an image 
for himself – an artistic identity – he became a public effect, to 
which his art was now pressed to respond.
(Leaming 1982: 144)
Polanski’s films may therefore be important in part for the discom-
fort caused by their amoral perspective. Moreover, the distinct per-
spective offered by Polanski’s later films arises in part from the way 
Polanski’s own immoral behaviour and the public reaction to it has 
shaped his perspective. If you were unable to appreciate Polanski’s 
achievements, and the achievements of other artists whose work is 
informed by an amoral perspective or the artist’s own immorality, 
then you would close yourself off from important insights into the 
human condition.
You therefore have good reason not to turn your back com-
pletely on the works and achievements of the immoral. These may 
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be exceptionally valuable and irreplaceable or offer important in-
sights into the human condition that are only available from their 
perspective. Again, though, this is far from a conclusive reason to 
think that people ought to honour and admire the creator of such 
works. These reasons have to be considered alongside the reasons 
that count against honour and admiration that we explored in the 
previous chapter. In deciding whether the kinds of reasons we have 
identified in this section are present for any particular case, you 
should ask yourself whether the works and achievements are truly 
exceptional or irreplaceable for some other reason. More generally, 
when considering whether or not to abandon admiration for the 
immoral, you should ask whether in refusing to admire those who 
have acted immorally you might be shutting yourself off from dis-
tinctive contributions and insights into the human condition. As we 
argue in the next chapter, even if these works are exceptional, you 
might still be able to appreciate and even honour and admire works 
without honouring and admiring their creators.
4 Personal Value
Michele Wallace (1990: 85) argues that Michael Jackson’s music 
videos provide an important commentary on black American expe-
rience that constitutes a form of “black modernism” that challenges 
“conventional hierarchies of class, race, sexuality, and aesthetic 
mastery”. Against a background of the cultural marginalization of 
black Americans, Wallace (1990: 88) describes how the video for 
Jackson’s song Bad represents a subversive struggle for “aesthetic, 
professional, sexual, and racial independence”. Wallace’s admi-
ration for Jackson was also informed by her relationship with her 
mother, the artist Faith Ringgold, who had created a quilt devoted 
to Jackson’s Bad to be sold at a benefit auction for Bishop Des-
mond Tutu. In Ringgold’s view what Jackson’s song shows is that 
the badness that Jackson is referring to is the “struggle for space” 
that marginalized groups have to fight for in order to achieve any 
kind of cultural representation. The people who are classed as bad, 
according to Ringgold, are those who “defy very destructive forces 
in order to help not only themselves but other people” (cited in Wal-
lace 1990: 89). Wallace’s appreciation for Jackson, then, is informed 
both by the work Jackson has done to open up cultural space for 
black Americans and her relationship with her mother.
Wallace’s essay was written long before allegations of Jackson’s 
sexual abuse of children came to light. Nevertheless, the point 
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she makes here is important for our purposes. Jackson’s work is 
simply not replaceable for Wallace, as her appreciation of it is in-
timately connected to her identity. This includes both her identity 
as a black American and her identity as the daughter of the artist 
Faith Ringgold.
A related point can be found in Maxfield Sparrow’s defence 
of autistic people who continue to define themselves as having 
 Asperger’s syndrome:
While I still don’t personally want to be called an Aspie, I am 
ready to fight on behalf of my Autistic siblings who do connect 
with that identity […] as a cultural marker of their understand-
ing of themselves and the world we live in.
(Sparrow and Silberman 2018)
Sparrow’s point is that the role the labels “Asperger’s syndrome” 
and “Aspie” have played in the lives of some autistic people justifies 
the continued use of these terms. Even though these labels may be 
seen to honour Hans Asperger, a man complicit in the murder of 
autistic children (Sheffer 2018), the importance of these labels to 
the identity of some autistic people means that they should be free 
to continue using them.
A similar concern is also raised against the removal of c onfederate 
statues in the USA. In the words of the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation (2017), these statues “were intended as a celebration 
of white supremacy when they were constructed”. Moreover, “they 
are still being used as symbols and rallying points for such hate 
today”.12 Nevertheless, some who accept that these statues hon-
our and memorialize racist people claim that they should not be 
removed. According to Demetriou and Wingo (2018), the fact that 
these figures are viewed as heroic by a significant group of people 
gives us reason not to remove them. In their words, “Every people 
needs its heroes” (Demetriou and Wingo 2018: 351) and by remov-
ing these statues we would be depriving white southerners of their 
ancestral heroes. They argue that white southerners may admire 
the sacrifices and loyalty of those who fought for the confederacy 
without condoning their entire political outlook (Demetriou and 
Wingo 2018: 352). The fact that these people fought for the group 
they belong to may give white southerners special reason to hon-
our them, as this is a core part of their cultural history. The claim 
that removing statues would be erasing history may be understood 
as expressing a community’s desire to continue to admire and 
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honour their ancestral heroes who have helped to shape their group 
identity.13 
In addition, some people may feel personal attachment to the 
statue as an object rather than to what it represents. Statues often 
serve as meeting points, and someone may have fond memories of 
meeting their partner there on a first date. Others may remember 
walking past the statue every day on their way to work and being 
glad to have something interesting and familiar to look at. In these 
cases, the statue as an object has a value that is not easily replaceable, 
as it comes from the historical connection people have to the object.
The basic thought we can take from all these examples is that the 
role that someone’s actions or achievements has played in shaping 
one’s identity may provide additional reasons to continue to honour 
and admire that person. This means that there will be something lost 
for people who are unable to continue appreciating these achieve-
ments or using these labels, even if other equally valuable work or 
equally useful labels are available. These claims can be  justified by 
appealing to the existence of personal value. According to Gerry Co-
hen (2013: 167–169), our personal connections with particular objects 
can give us reason to value those objects more than we would other 
objects that are just as valuable, or even more so, from an impersonal 
point of view.14 In Cohen’s case, an eraser that he had used through-
out his academic career was far more valuable to him than any other 
eraser could ever be, no matter how much more valuable that eraser 
would be from an impersonal point of view. The reason Cohen (2013: 
168) gives to explain why objects can acquire this kind of value, which 
he calls personal value, is that we have a “need to belong to some-
thing”. We achieve this in part by preserving things that are part of 
our past. We can think of this as a desire to be part of what Edmund 
Burke (1999: 96 cited in Cohen 2013: 168) called the “partnership not 
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born”.
Accepting the existence of personal value provides an additional 
reason to think that at least some people have good reason to con-
tinue to honour and admire the work of the immoral. For those 
whose identities have been shaped in a significant way by Michael 
Jackson’s music, his musical achievements cannot simply be re-
placed by those of other people. Even if the other music is equally 
valuable from an impersonal point of view, it will not have the same 
personal connections as Jackson’s music has for Wallace. It will 
not have played the same important role in her personal biography 
or in shaping the collective identity of black Americans. Similarly, 
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for those whose identity has been significantly shaped by the label 
 Aspie, abandoning this label for one that is equally valuable from 
an impersonal point of view may involve significant loss. Those 
whose lives and identities have been significantly shaped by the 
achievements of the immoral may then have additional reason to 
continuing to admire and honour these achievements.
Again, though, this reason has to be understood as a defeasible 
one. Giving up something of personal value is hard; it is also some-
thing that we can sometimes be morally required to do. For exam-
ple, because confederate statues are upholding and reinforcing a 
white supremacist ideology, in many cases they should be removed, 
even though these statues have personal value for some people. Of 
course, some may disagree about our judgement in this case; the 
 important point for our argument here is that the mere fact that 
some people have reason to continue to honour and admire the 
work or actions of the immoral does not provide a decisive reason 
to honour and admire them. Rather, it is a reason that may be out-
weighed by the reasons that count against honour and admiration.
5 How to Respond?
In Chapters 1 and 2, we argued that the immoral can be admira-
ble. So, we can have (fittingness) reasons to honour and admire the 
 immoral. In Chapter 3, we considered three general reasons against 
honouring and admiring the immoral. In this chapter, we have out-
lined four general reasons in favour of honouring and admiring 
the immoral. Importantly, we have argued that none of the reasons 
we have considered are in general decisive. This allows that they 
may be decisive in particular cases, but the particular details of 
each case must typically be considered to figure that out. Once you 
have established a person is a fitting target of admiration, and then 
 considered the weight of the reasons against, you must then weigh 
these against the reasons for honouring and admiring the immoral.
First, you must ask: does the person deserve to be admired? 
Those who create great artworks, make ground-breaking contribu-
tions to intellectual life, or shape a society’s history in positive ways 
generally deserve to be honoured and admired. As a result, there 
is generally good reason to honour and admire them. The fact the 
person deserves admiration gives you a stronger reason to admire 
them than if they were just a fitting target of admiration. 
Second, is the immoral person entitled to an honour or admira-
tion? If an award has clear and precise criteria governing who should 
78 Against Abandoning Admiration
receive it, then the person who meets these criteria is likely to be enti-
tled to the award. For example, in a 100-metre sprint race, the winner 
is the person who crosses the finish line first without breaking any of 
the relevant rules. This is a clear case where someone is entitled to the 
prize, which means that they have a right to it. An entitlement claim 
then generally provides a stronger reason to ensure someone receives 
an honour than a desert claim.  However, even these claims might be 
overridden in exceptional circumstances. There may even be occa-
sions when someone is entitled to feelings of admiration.
Third, do you have any responsibility to ensure an immoral per-
son gets the honour and admiration they deserve or are entitled 
to? Recall that the fact that someone deserves honour and admi-
ration does not mean that it is your responsibility to ensure that 
they receive this; nor does the fact that a person is entitled to an 
honour mean that you must give it to them. Those with no interest 
in cinema may have little or no reason to ensure that Polanski is 
admired for his talents as a filmmaker. Similarly, those left cold 
by opera have little reason to ensure that Wagner is honoured and 
admired. On the other hand, an awards committee deciding who 
should receive the best director award has a far greater responsi-
bility to ensure that filmmakers receive the honour and admiration 
they deserve. If it is your responsibility to ensure someone gets the 
honour and admiration they deserve or are entitled to, then you will 
have a much stronger reason to honour and admire them.
Fourth, are you giving too much weight to moral reasons or 
 responding in a way that is disproportional to the wrongdoing? In 
other words, are you being moralistic? The most relevant charge 
of moralism in this context is that being moralistic leads to people 
closing themselves off from valuable experiences. So, when con-
sidering a particular case of honouring or admiring someone who 
has acted immorally, people should consider whether they may be 
operating with an inflated sense of the appropriateness of moral 
criticism and are losing out on valuable experiences as a result. We 
should also consider if we are engaging in a misguided search for 
moral purity. This is unlikely to be an easy question to answer, as 
there is no simple way to determine whether one is giving too much 
weight to moral concerns or responding in a way that is dispro-
portional to the wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it is important to bear 
in mind that moral reasons are not the only reasons to consider 
when deciding how to respond to any particular case. We should 
also consider the aesthetic and epistemic reasons we may have to 
admire great artists, intellectuals, and historical figures.
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Fifth, are the person’s achievements truly exceptional? While 
there are many achievements that can be replaced, there are some 
works that cannot be replaced with other achievements. For exam-
ple, you might have to honour and admire Einstein for his discov-
eries in physics because you cannot have a good understanding of 
contemporary physics without doing so.
Finally, has an immoral person and their achievements played an 
important role in shaping your identity? If so, then this might jus-
tify your continuing to honour and admire that person even when 
there are good moral reasons that count against doing so. Of course, 
there are times when this will not be the case. Sometimes you will 
have to take the damage to your identity that ceasing to honour and 
admire would imply. Even so, it is still a relevant consideration in 
favour of honouring and admiring an immoral person.
Having identified all the relevant reasons, you must then weigh up 
what you should actually do. You might find that you have decisive 
reasons against. Or you might find that you have decisive reasons 
in favour of honouring and admiring. While there can be decisive 
reasons in favour of either abandoning admiration or doing noth-
ing and continuing to honour and admire the immoral, the fact the 
reasons we have identified are not decisive in all cases undermines 
any attempt to give a general policy on how we ought to respond to 
these figures. This may make the decision-making process messier 
than some might hope for. There will often not be clear reasons in 
favour of either abandoning or doing nothing. Sometimes you will 
have to try a middle-ground approach. Sometimes you will have to 
try to honour and admire while avoiding the moral dangers we have 
identified. In the next chapter, we consider various ways we might 
focus admiration so that we can avoid these dangers.
Notes
 1 The idea that people ought to get what they deserve is a popular idea, at 
least according to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics Book V), who claims 
that “all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according 
to desert in some sense”. Similarly, David Schmidtz (2002: 774) claims 
that this idea is one that “most people believe”, even if “philosophers 
often say otherwise”.
 2 For relevant debate about the relationship between fittingness and 
 desert, see, for example, Carlsson (2017) and Macnamara (2020).
 3 See Olsaretti (2003: 4–8) for a helpful overview of theories of the bases 
of desert.
 4 There may be other emotional bases for commemorative statues. For 
example, gratitude for someone’s service. As Feinberg (1970: 228–229) 
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points out, gratitude can also be the emotional basis for deserving an 
award.
 5 We might understand this claim as holding a prima facie duty to ensure 
people get what they deserve. This way of understanding the claim will 
be in line with the weakened version of the claim we offer below.
 6 Another way to support this claim would be to argue, as Olsaretti 
(2003: 8) does, that the force of desert is not always deontic but rather 
sometimes telic and sometimes deontic. If we accept this view of 
 desert, then the fact that someone deserves something does not imply 
that  anyone else has an obligation to bring it about that they receive 
what they deserve.
 7 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Archer (2018a).
 8 See Archer (2018a: 343–344) for a more extensive explanation of the 
possibilities here.
 9 Similar points are made by Archer and Matheson (2019b: 18) and Liao 
(2017).
 10 This point should not be confused with the claim that we should only 
admire the works and achievements of the morally perfect. As Wolf 
(1982) points out elsewhere, the traits required to be morally perfect 
are likely in tension with those required to dedicate oneself to creating 
great works of art, literature, or, indeed, any non-moral achievement.
 11 In an interview about his 2019 film J’Accuse (English title: An Officer 
and a Spy) about the wrongful conviction of Alfred Dreyfus, Polanski 
claimed that he drew on his own experience of being the subject of 
public scorn in making the film. He claimed: “I am familiar with many 
of the workings of the apparatus of persecution shown in the film, and 
that has clearly inspired me” (Bradley 2019).
 12 See Burch-Brown (2017) for further discussion of the way in which 
 statues can be used to uphold white supremacist ideology. See also 
Burch-Brown (forthcoming).
 13 Alternatively, as Daniel Abrahams (forthcoming) argues, we may 
 understand this claim that taking down statues amounts to erasing 
 history as the view that the subject of the statue was objectively import-
ant to the shaping of a group identity. On this view, the defence of these 
statues is not about defending the character of the person depicted but 
rather about defending a particular view of the group’s identity.
 14 As Camil Golub (2019: 79) argues, accepting this kind of approach to 
valuing particular objects or past decisions, relationships, or projects 
can be thought of as an extension of the view that we can value certain 
things in a privileged way because of our relationship to them.
We have identified reasons for and against honouring and admiring 
the immoral. Neither set of reasons supports a general policy, but it 
is sometimes appropriate to do nothing and sometimes appropriate 
to abandon admiration. But what should you do if you determine 
that you cannot do nothing and cannot abandon admiration? In 
this chapter, we outline three approaches that become options once 
doing nothing and abandoning are off the table.
Before we consider these approaches, we first identify a reason 
why both approaches fail as general policies and then use this  reason 
to guide the subsequent approaches that we outline in this chapter. 
In Section 1, we will argue that they fail as policies because they 
both encourage or manifest the vice of globalism – that is, they both 
involve conceiving of people in simplistic and reductive ways that 
are both inaccurate and morally dangerous. So, other approaches 
ought to avoid encouraging or manifesting this vice.
In Section 2, we outline the focused-admiration approach. This 
involves honouring and admiring immoral people by focusing on 
their admirable traits and achievements and in ways that do not 
imply they are thoroughly admirable people. We then consider a 
narrower version of the focused admiration approach in Section 3. 
When we cannot admire the person’s traits, perhaps we should just 
honour and admire their achievements. In other words, we should 
separate the achievement from the person. We discuss when and 
why this approach is not an appropriate option – in particular, when 
we cannot in principle or in practice separate the achievement from 
the person. We then consider an option that applies when all other 
options seem impermissible – namely, the ambiguity approach. In 
contrast with the focused-admiration approach (in its general and 
separating forms), the ambiguity approach places greater empha-
sis on the person’s immorality and acknowledges the difficulty of 




This has a moral benefit: you can gain insight into the workings of 
immorality. However, it also has moral drawbacks.
1 The Vice of Globalism
Recall that we earlier rejected globalism about admiration, the view 
that admiration involves an implicit assessment of the whole per-
son. We did not go into detail about the forms that this  assessment 
can take because we argued that there is no good reason to endorse 
globalism about admiration. However, there are two conceptions of 
globalism that are relevant here.
Perhaps the strongest form of globalism about admiration holds 
that it involves judging that the person is purely admirable. This 
precludes the admirable also being immoral. Another form of glo-
balism about admiration holds that admiration involves judging 
that a person’s admirable achievements and traits are more import-
ant than their immoral behaviour and non-admirable traits (Bell 
2011). While we think that the latter kind of view is more plausible 
than the former kind, we do not think that either view is  particularly 
plausible. As we argued in Chapter 2, there are no good arguments 
in favour of admiration being globalist.
We do not raise these views here to assess them, but rather to 
suggest that these two kinds of global assessment are in fact forms 
of a moral-epistemic vice. We manifest this vice when we conceive 
of people in simplistic and reductive ways. For example, when we 
identify a person with or reduce a person to a trait or an action of 
theirs. We in effect treat the person as if they are just the i mmoral 
trait or action. Note that making a global assessment of a person 
is not vicious. Our point is that those who manifest the vice of
 globalism will mistakenly exclusively focus, or place greater impor-
tance, on one side of a person. In effect, those who manifest this 
vice globalize an aspect of a person. This can involve taking the 
person’s immorality to render everything else about them irrelevant 
or non-existent.
 
The vice of globalism is not just manifested when a person’s 
 immorality is treated this way. It is manifested whenever a trait or 
action has this automatically dominating effect in our assessment 
of a person. For example, we might take a great artist’s aesthetic 
traits and achievements to automatically dominate our assessment 
of them. They will be identified with or reduced to these aestheti-
cally virtuous traits and excellent achievements. Notice that this is 
related to what we earlier called great person myths. One of these 
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myths is that a person’s greatness is incompatible with their be-
ing immoral. The great artist, then, cannot be immoral. Another 
of these myths is that a person’s greatness is more important than 
their immorality. Notice that both forms of this myth are manifes-
tations of the vice of globalism. In both cases, we reduce a person 
to, or identify a person with, a particular trait or achievement.
The tendency to think of people in this way is wrong in part 
 because it is generally inaccurate. People are not in general reduc-
ible to or identifiable with a particular trait or action. Rather, they 
possess many traits and perform many different actions. To put it 
more casually, we are a messy mix of good and bad traits, of egoism 
and altruism, of caring and uncaring. We are rarely just one thing.1 
There may be times when it is justified to reduce a person to a par-
ticular action – for example, when the action is so extraordinarily 
wrong. But globalizing should only be done in exceptional cases. 
We manifest the vice when we globalize beyond exceptional cases, 
and we manifest it to a greater degree the more we globalize in our 
evaluations of people.
The problem for both the do-nothing approach and the aban-
doning approach as general policies is that they manifest the vice 
of globalism and so support great person myths, albeit from differ-
ent directions. If everyone always did nothing, no one would ever 
 respond to any of the moral reasons against honouring and admir-
ing the immoral. Among other things, this would at least implicitly 
support the idea that greatness at least outweighs – that is, is more 
important than – immorality. It may even at times explicitly support 
the idea that greatness is incompatible with immorality. According 
to this way of thinking, there are no admirable yet immoral people, 
because such people’s greatness makes what would otherwise be 
immoral not immoral. While you might sometimes be justified in 
doing nothing, doing nothing as a general policy is impermissible 
because it supports the idea that greatness is incompatible with im-
morality or that the person’s greatness is more important than their 
immorality.
It might seem that abandoning admiration does not support 
great person myths because it explicitly advocates not honouring 
and admiring those great people who are also immoral. The prob-
lem is that never honouring and admiring such immoral people still 
implicitly supports great person myths.
First, it can support the myth that greatness is incompatible with 
immorality. As we discussed in Chapter 4, Kate Manne objects 
to the conditional: if a person is great, then they are not immoral. 
84 Refocusing Admiration
Manne (2017: 180) suggests we should reverse this reasoning: a 
 person is immoral, so they are not great. Unlike Manne, we think 
that the conditional itself is the problem. It manifests the vice of 
globalism and upholds a great person myth. So, rather than reverse 
this conditional, we should instead get comfortable with the messy 
reality that great people are sometimes immoral and the immoral 
are sometimes great people. Thinking that greatness and immo-
rality are incompatible manifests the vice of globalism because it 
supports a simplistic conception of a person as just one aspect of 
themselves (e.g. their greatness, their immorality) or reducible to 
one aspect of themselves (e.g. their greatness, their immorality).
Second, abandoning admiration can support the myth that a 
person’s immorality is always more important than their greatness. 
This does seem like a less objectionable idea than the claim that a 
person’s greatness is more important than their immorality. How-
ever, it is still objectionable because it also supports a simplistic view 
of people. People may not be literally identified or reduced to one 
aspect of themselves, but they will always be tarred by their immo-
rality. Nothing they can do will ever be valued because of the wrong 
things they have done. We may of course point to cases where this 
should be the case. Sometimes a person’s immorality does outweigh 
anything great they have done. But the fact we sometimes should do 
this does not mean we always or even typically should.
It is not only generally inaccurate to globalize but also mor-
ally dangerous. It might seem justifiable to replace one inaccurate 
view of people (e.g. great people cannot be immoral; great people’s 
greatness is more important than their immorality) with another 
(e.g. the immoral cannot be great; a person’s immorality is more 
important than her greatness). However, we have not destroyed 
great person myths by turning them on their heads. We are simply 
finding new ways to approach it. Great person myths rely, we sub-
mit, on what we have called the vice of globalism: the pernicious 
tendency to think of people in simplistic and reductive ways. Just as 
great person myths support harmful ideologies, the inverted great 
person myths also do so. Both reinforce a simplistic and reductive 
way of thinking about people, a way of thinking which seems to 
support harmful ideologies. If the inverted great person myths were 
to become the dominant social script of how we understand and en-
gage with great but immoral people, then we would systematically 
discount the achievements of the immoral. Our minds might only 
imagine that the worst immoral people will be globalized and dis-
counted, but it does not seem that the inverted great person myths 
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are sensitive to this. Indeed, most of us are immoral to some extent 
so it risks that our wrongs end up being globalized and becoming 
what defines each of us as a person. And even with the worst peo-
ple, you should still be open to the possibility that they can redeem 
themselves, or even just open to the possibility that they are not 
thoroughly bad people. Again, we do think there are exceptional 
cases in which we can permissibly globalize. But these should be 
exceptional cases and not something built into our social scripts or 
schemas.
Even though they are sometimes permissible options, both doi ng 
nothing and abandoning admiration are not good general policies. 
As policies, they encourage and manifest the vice of globalism and 
in so doing support the related great person myths. In short, these 
policies support a simplistic and morally dangerous view of people 
that ultimately involves the idea that people should be identified 
with or reduced to either their greatness or their immorality. In the 
rest of the chapter, we will consider approaches that aim to avoid 
manifesting the vice of globalism.
2 Focused Admiration
Suppose you find that you should not abandon honouring and 
admiring an immoral person, and you also find that should not 
maintain the status quo of honouring and admiring as we currently 
do (i.e. do nothing). What should you do? One option that we will 
outline in this section is that you should consider whether you can 
focus your admiration on the person in a way that avoids the moral 
dangers of doing nothing and abandoning admiration. A source 
of inspiration for this approach comes from Earl Spurgin’s (2012) 
claim that we should not see role models as general exemplars – 
that is, as people all of whose behaviour should be emulated – but 
rather as exemplars for particular qualities. For example, we should 
only consider athletes to be athletic exemplars and not also moral 
exemplars. Athletes are good at sport and should be role models for 
sporting performance and nothing else. Role models, then, should 
only be emulated for their behaviour and traits in particular roles. 
The focused-admiration approach builds on a suggestion implicit in 
Spurgin’s claim: you should make extremely clear that you honour 
and admire people for their admirable traits and achievements, and 
nothing else. The immoral should therefore not be honoured and 
admired in ways that imply honour and admiration for, or could 
be understood as honouring and admiring, their immoral traits or 
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behaviour. Extra effort must be made, then, to avoid admiration 
spreading.
Another way of putting this proposal is to say that if we want to 
continue to admire the immoral then we need to engage in moral 
decoupling. This is what Bhattacharjee et al. (2013: 1169) call the 
process by which people separate their judgements about a  person’s 
immoral behaviour from their judgements about their non-moral 
performance. In a series of lab studies, they investigated how 
 participants responded to vignettes about high-performing  public 
figures who had acted immorally. They found that some partici-
pants responded to these vignettes by condoning actions they 
might normally condemn (moral rationalization strategies) but 
that others responded by separating their evaluation of the person’s 
performance from their evaluation of their moral conduct (moral 
decoupling). Moreover, they found that it was possible to influence 
how participants responded to these vignettes by asking them to 
read statements encouraging one of these approaches (Bhattachar-
jee et al. 2013: 1171–1172). This suggests that this kind of focused ad-
miration is possible and that it is possible to encourage it in others.
As we discussed earlier, many do take certain honours to be 
merely about particular admirable traits and achievements. The 
Oscars, for example, seems to be merely about aesthetic traits and 
achievements. There are two points to consider here. First, not all 
forms of honouring are so specific. Second, even specific forms of 
honouring can have adverse public meanings.
Consider statues that are placed on pedestals in prominent 
 locations. Such statues honour the person who is depicted. In doing 
so, they pick out the person as admirable. As discussed in Chapter 
3, this is partly because prominent locations are of high value and 
so they are prioritized for those deemed worthy of the attention of 
many people. As a result, it seems that the person is picked out as 
globally admirable. It is hard to identify the particular wrongs that a 
person has done if you also choose to create a glorifying permanent 
display of them in a place where many people will see them. The 
attention that will be drawn to the person is hard to understand as 
anything other than a global endorsement of the person. Even if a 
plaque is installed in an attempt to contextualize the statue, others 
will still see the person more prominently than the plaque.2 Even 
if the plaque helps to show that the person has behaved immorally 
and this is taken seriously, it still suggests that the person’s great-
ness is at least more important than their immorality. Either way, it 
seems that such statues manifest the vice of globalism and support 
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great person myths. So, such statues do not seem to be acceptable 
forms of focused admiration.
This does not mean that statues are always impermissible. First, 
following Rossi (2020), we can distinguish between the ethics of 
putting statues in place and the ethics of taking down statues. 
Perhaps bad statues should be kept for reasons of social cohesion 
(Demetriou and Wingo 2018). Perhaps we can build statues depict-
ing scenes because they can better focus admiration on a depicted 
person’s admirable qualities (perhaps because they can better de-
pict a more complicated narrative). As statues of people will often 
encourage or manifest the vice of globalism because they do not 
easily permit focused admiration, we think that statues will more 
often be the wrong way to honour a person.
Lifetime achievement awards are another type of honour that 
seem to involve a global endorsement of the person. Even so, such 
awards have an easier time adding nuance and de-globalizing 
 contextual detail than a statue. A lifetime achievement award for 
an immoral filmmaker, for example, might include a discussion of 
the person’s wrongs. This will be more justifiable if the person has 
redeemed themselves and apologized for what they did. But it may 
still be possible if the immoral person has not done this. Of course, 
though, an immoral person might not agree to receive such an 
award if it involves acknowledging wrongs they had not themselves 
acknowledged through regret, apology, and redemption.3 Even so, 
setting aside legal challenges, this way of giving this kind of award 
might be a promising one. It would make clear that the person has 
done important things (whether in sport, art, politics, science, or 
elsewhere), but that their wrongs must also be commented upon – 
and indeed the person ought to be blamed for these wrongs.
More specific awards – such as an award for best director – do 
not seem to involve a global endorsement of the person. A  person is 
 being awarded for a specific thing – such as being the best  director 
for a film released in the past year – rather than the award comment-
ing on the importance or value of them as a person. Of course, such 
awards are currently given in a such a way that might be  justifiably 
understood as – that is, having the public meaning of – giving a 
global endorsement of the person. Given that this is a problem of 
public meaning, it is something that can arguably be changed by 
changing how such awards are given.
One idea is to suspend the giving of an award to a person if 
there are outstanding allegations of serious wrongdoing against 
the  winner, as the British Academy of Film and Television Arts 
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(BAFTA) did in 2019 with Bohemian Rhapsody director Bryan 
Singer. While his film remained nominated, Singer was not among 
the makers of the film that were cited on the nomination. The rea-
sons they gave for doing so were “recent very serious allegations” 
of behaviour that BAFTA considers “completely unacceptable and 
incompatible with its values” (BAFTA 2019). By suspending this 
award, BAFTA both acknowledged the seriousness of the allega-
tions and highlighted that one can deserve to win an award and yet 
be an immoral person. There remain worries about how such an 
award will be interpreted more widely and whether award-giving 
bodies might be accused of paying only superficial attention to the 
(alleged) wrongdoings of the awardee. Even so, we think that such 
awards can be given if award-giving bodies work hard to focus on 
the ways an awardee is being picked out as admirable.
Other honours might instead focus on the input of other people 
in bringing about an admirable achievement. A film award might 
draw more attention to all the people involved in the making of 
the film. After all, films are a collective effort involving hundreds 
and sometimes thousands of people. Even films with a single cred-
ited director often have other directors for different filming units. 
Even when a single person is credited with writing a film, they have 
 often received input from others. In recognizing a great film such 
as  Polanski’s Chinatown you might seek to spread your admiration 
 beyond the director and leading actors towards the hundreds of 
other people who worked on it. From the producers, scriptwriters, 
and editors to the runners, researchers, and accountants. Similarly, 
in recognizing someone’s scientific achievements you could tell a 
story that focuses less on a single genius and more on the social 
context in which the discovery was made and the lab assistants, 
collaborators, and support staff who helped to bring about the dis-
covery. Moving the admiration away from individuals and towards 
groups may also help to reduce the risk of admiration becoming a 
globalized response to an individual and instead a response to the 
qualities that helped to contribute to an outstanding achievement.
Political honours might do something similar. While Winston 
Churchill deserves to be admired for his role in defeating the 
Nazis, we should perhaps also focus on the importance of other 
people in this effort. Of course, political honours sometimes take 
the form of statues that focus on a particular individual, which we 
argued above was objectionable as they typically manifest the vice 
of  globalism. Other political honours do not fare better: Churchill 
is featured on British pound notes. For a figure that is already very 
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well known, he is granted the honour of being a feature of many 
cash transactions. Depiction on currency might be an  appropriate 
 honour for lesser-known figures so that others may learn about 
them.  However, because Churchill is already so well known, de-
picting him on banknotes further supports a global assessment of 
him as  admirable. Political honours may then need to be less per-
manent in order to properly focus admiration. Churchill, for exam-
ple, could be honoured during remembrance ceremonies, and such 
ceremonies could discuss both his achievements and his wrongs 
during the war.4 Such ceremonies could emphasize the efforts of 
everyone in defeating in the Nazis, as well as all the unjustified (or 
at least morally questionable) actions that occurred during the Sec-
ond World War on each side. For example, the firebombing of Dres-
den, the Bengal famine, the dropping of multiple nuclear bombs on 
major Japanese cities should also be acknowledged alongside the 
bombing of Pearl  Harbour, the Holocaust, and so-called comfort 
women forced into sexual slavery.
A general source of resistance to focused admiration is that it 
cuts against our honouring and admiring practices. According to 
Daniel Boorstin (1961: 43), a key element of celebrity culture is treat-
ing celebrities as heroes to be worshipped. While Boorstin (1961) 
claims that this is a new phenomenon and that in the past people 
celebrated real heroes, this strikes us as questionable. Celebrities 
are people whose ways of life capture our interest and attention not 
just for their skills or achievements but also for who they are (van 
Krieken 2012: 10). A culture of celebrity encourages a global form 
of admiration for those who become famous. Earlier forms of “hero 
culture” seem to be rudimentary forms of celebratory culture. Such 
hero and celebrity cultures seem quite engrained, so while we think 
that focusing admiration is one way to improve these practices, we 
should not dismiss the difficulty we will have in improving these 
practices. Indeed, there are powerful interests that are served by 
these cultures. Once someone is a celebrity their name can be used 
to sell products, to generate interest, and to direct attention (Rein 
et al. 1997: 15). Moreover, when a person is considered a hero, they 
can be used to support particular causes. The person can even be-
come an embodiment of the cause. This presents an obstacle for at-
tempts to encourage more focused forms of admiration, because any 
attempt to do so is likely to clash with those who have an interest in 
maintaining hero and celebrity culture. This is especially likely to 
be a problem in relation to art, sport, and entertainment. However, 
celebrity culture also plays a significant role in politics (Street 2004; 
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Archer et al. 2020) and academia (Walsh and Lehmann 2019). We 
suspect that for this approach to be fully successful there would 
need to be a wider societal change in the way people respond to 
fame and celebrity. We return to this point in the conclusion.
The focused-admiration approach will be especially difficult in 
cases where the admired person’s talents are closely connected to 
their immoral behaviour. For example, it may be that Gauguin’s 
artistic talents are tightly related to his immoral traits and actions 
(even if they are in principle separable). It might then be hard to 
separate honour and admiration for Gauguin with honour and ad-
miration for his immorality. This is supported by Bhattacharjee 
et al.’s (2013) research on moral decoupling. They found that it is 
more difficult for people to separate their moral judgements about 
a person from their evaluation of that person’s performance when 
the wrongdoing was closely related to their high performance. In 
fact, later research by Lee and Kwak (2016) found that participants 
often engage in what they call moral coupling in such cases – that 
is, people integrate their judgements of a person’s moral conduct 
with their judgements of their performance. However, even in cases 
where the immoral behaviour is unrelated to the performance, such 
as a high-performing athlete who evades his taxes, people could 
be prompted to engage in moral coupling by reading statements 
encouraging this approach (Lee and Kwak 2016: 104–105). This 
suggests that the extent to which people are likely to separate some-
one’s achievements from their immorality is influenced both by the 
connection between the achievement and the immorality and on 
whether or not they are encouraged to view these as separable.
In the next section, we consider the prospects of another form 
of the focused-admiration approach. Rather than focusing on 
the  person’s admirable traits and achievements, we focus instead 
 entirely on their achievements. In so doing, we aim to separate the 
achievement from the person.
3 The Separating Approach
Can you instead simply focus on an immoral person’s achieve-
ments? In the case of artworks, this suggestion is often put in terms 
of separating the art from the artist. You can also ask the following. 
Can we separate the athletic feat from the athlete? Can we separate 
the political view from the politician? Can we separate the scien-
tific discovery from the scientist? These are more specific versions 
of the general suggestion that we can separate the achievement 
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from the person. Whenever you face an immoral person who has 
achieved something excellent, you can ask: can we honour and ad-
mire the achievement without honouring and admiring the person? 
We  outline when this approach is possible in principle and identify 
challenges to it in practice.
This approach presupposes that an achievement is a distinct 
 entity from the person responsible for it (Wills and Holt 2017). 
One immediate problem for this way of supporting the separating 
 approach is that achievements and those responsible for them are 
not always distinct entities. Performance art pieces feature the art-
ist as part of the performance (Nannicelli 2020: 51). Athletic feats 
necessarily involve the athlete. And so on. Because the person is an 
essential part of the achievement, it may be that you cannot honour 
and admire the achievement without honouring and admiring the 
person responsible for it. However, when we honour and admire 
these kinds of achievement, we at best honour and admire the per-
son as a feature of the achievement. This is arguably quite different 
from honouring and admiring them as a person (for this achieve-
ment). It remains to be seen whether this line of argument is suc-
cessful. If it is not, then the separating approach is not an option in 
cases where the person is part of their achievement.
Even in cases where the person is not part of their achievement, 
there are three kinds of link between a person and their achievement 
that may pose a problem for the separating approach. The first is that 
there is a responsibility link between a person and their achievement. 
This means that even if a person and their achievement are distinct 
entities, the person is still connected to their achievement in virtue 
of being responsible for it. This may pose a problem for focusing on 
the achievement alone because it may seem that by honouring and 
admiring an achievement you are still honouring and admiring the 
person responsible for it. However, it is not clear whether such indi-
rect honour and admiration will have the moral dangers that directly 
honouring and admiring an immoral person has. If you honour and 
admire the theory of relativity, this would not carry the same moral 
dangers as it would if you honour and admire Albert Einstein: he, 
it has been claimed, harboured sexist and racist attitudes at least at 
some points in his life (Phillips 2018).
One reason why the theory of relativity can be honoured and ad-
mired without being morally dangerous is that it does not manifest 
any of Einstein’s morally bad attitudes. We might therefore face 
moral dangers when there is an attitude link between an immoral per-
son and an achievement of theirs. However, as with honouring and 
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admiring achievements that feature the immoral person (e.g. perfor-
mances), whether honouring and admiring an achievement is mor-
ally dangerous depends on what aspects of the achievement are being 
honoured and admired. While it may have an adverse public meaning 
to honour and admire an achievement that manifests, for example, 
racist attitudes, there is no reason to think we must  honour and ad-
mire the racist attitude when we honour and admire the achievement.
Instead, it matters what the attitudes do. Perhaps attitudes 
 contribute to an achievement through having an objectionable 
meaning. For example, when we learn that the Marquis de Sade 
likely acted out the brutality he depicts in Justine and 120 Days of 
Sodom, this affects what those works mean. And you might worry 
that when you admire those works, you are honouring and admiring 
Sade’s immorality. But it is not the meaning of these works that we 
think results in its never being possible to separate those artworks 
from the artist. If you endorse a strong view of artwork meaning 
such that it is up to each person to decide what an artwork means to 
them (e.g. Barthes 1967; though see Grady 2019), then the meaning 
you give an immoral artist’s work can be completely unconnected 
to their real-life immorality – for example, you might find a femi-
nist message in de Sade’s work. Instead, we propose that separation 
is not possible when achievements (which include artworks) have 
a dubious moral function – namely, that of justifying, excusing, or 
condoning the wrongs of the immoral person responsible for them.5 
When an achievement has this function, it is not possible to sepa-
rate the achievement from the person’s immorality.
Wills and Holt (2017) allude to this view when they write that 
the Marquis de Sade’s Justine and 120 Days of Sodom acted as “an 
implicit apology for his own brutishness”. We take it that they mean 
“apology” in the sense of justifying one’s actions rather than in the 
sense of expressing guilt and expressing a desire to make amends 
for one’s crimes. Because it acts as a justification, it is connected to 
Sade’s crimes. At least intellectual works may also serve such a moral 
function. Martin Heidegger’s work, for instance, has been claimed 
to have anti-Semitism at its core. Given this, Heidegger’s work 
seems to take on the moral function of justifying his anti- Semitism. 
We might also make a similar case for other  philosophical works, 
such as the work of Immanuel Kant. He expressed profoundly rac-
ist views in his work. We might wonder whether other aspects of his 
work serve to excuse or justify his racism.
When an achievement has such a moral function, we cannot in 
principle separate the achievement from the person’s immorality. 
It is, in a sense, an extension of that immorality. While we may be 
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able to separate other achievements from the person in principle, 
it does not follow that we can do so in practice. And it is often and 
perhaps typically much more important what you can and cannot 
do in practice. There are two factors we wish to highlight that affect 
the practical separation of achievement and person: public mean-
ing and personal connection.
Consider first cases where the person is part of the achievement. 
Suppose that Cristiano Ronaldo is to be given an honour for his ex-
cellent goals just after having accepted a large fine for tax evasion. To 
give him an honour for his goals just after he has been convicted may 
justifiably seem to be condoning his crime, in part because it is given 
just as people have become aware of his wrongdoing. It could well be 
that those who give him the honour do condone his crime. However, 
our point is that even if they do not, it may still be reasonable for oth-
ers to infer that they (the honourers) do condone his crime.
Something similar seems true in cases where there is only a re-
sponsibility link. Suppose we have a party to celebrate the film Chi-
natown. Polanski’s film bears no obvious relation to his crime and 
is even critical of those who sexually harm children. Even so, Chi-
natown is Polanski’s film. He is responsible for it (though of course 
many other people bear responsibility for it too, as filmmaking is a 
group endeavour). Because it is Polanski’s film, by honouring and 
admiring that film – while it would not, strictly speaking, honour 
and admire him – there are many contexts in which it would rea-
sonably appear to honour and admire him. Of course, we can say 
and do many things to avoid this public meaning. We can perhaps 
try to celebrate Chinatown while acknowledging that what Polanski 
did was wrong and so on. The point is not that we cannot honour 
and admire Chinatown without honouring and admiring Polanski. 
Rather, the point is that you sometimes have to do more than 
just focus on the achievement. When you just focus on Polanski’s 
achievement, you may seem to be saying that you do not care about 
his crime, you do not care about his victim (Samantha Geimer), and 
you do not care about victims of similar crimes.
Finally, note the wider societal context in which honour and 
admiration currently take place. As we said in the previous sec-
tion, there is currently a celebrity/hero culture that benefits and en-
courages us to globalize a person’s achievements. While we think 
 separating can help change this culture, this societal backdrop may 
often make such separation hard in practice.
There are also people who cannot practically separate because 
they bear some personal connection to the wrongs of the immoral 
person. Such people might either be victims of the immoral, relatives 
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of victims of the immoral, or victims of similar crimes. It is under-
standable that such people might not be able to set aside their feel-
ings and focus only on the achievement of such an immoral person.
We think it is plausible to understand this as a kind of volitional 
necessity, practical necessity, or moral incapacity, as discussed by 
philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt (1988) and Bernard Williams 
(1981, 1993).6 The core of their respective ideas is that sometimes a 
person is simply unable to act in particular ways due to features of 
their character or past experiences.
While there are nuances to their respective views that we will not 
get into here, we think it is plausible to hold that the kind of resis-
tance that some will have to honouring and admiring the immoral 
is like a volitional necessity. Because of their personal connection 
to the wrong, some people are not only psychologically unable to 
appreciate the excellence in a particular immoral person’s achieve-
ment, but they also have an incapacity that is deeply expressive of 
their moral character. Of course, just because they have this inca-
pacity, it does not mean that the person’s achievement is not excel-
lent.7 While it is not only victims, relatives of victims, and victims 
of similar crimes who might have such an inability or resistance, it 
is most understandable in the case of such people. When such an 
incapacity is understandable, no one can expect those with such an 
incapacity to honour and admire achievements of particular im-
moral people. Importantly, those with such volitional necessities 
will be more prone – and perhaps justifiably so – to take an adverse 
public meaning from instances of honouring and admiring.
Even though you can focus on the achievement in many cases 
and this will not necessarily carry the moral dangers that can result 
from honouring and admiring the immoral, it often will have those 
moral dangers in practice – unless you take steps to avoid an ad-
verse public meaning especially for those who have understandable 
volitional necessities against honouring and admiring the immoral. 
You cannot simply avoid moral dangers by pointing out that those 
dangers can be avoided in principle. You have to think about the 
moral dangers in any given context of honouring and admiring an 
immoral person. While the separating approach can sometimes be 
taken, it needs to be taken with great care.
4 The Ambiguity Approach
When it is not feasible to focus on the immoral person’s achieve-
ments or on their admirable traits, you might still have sufficient 
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reasons to admire them. Their work might be of such importance 
that you simply cannot ignore it. They might have made a great 
discovery in science and so you have to discuss their contribution 
in light of that achievement. And it might be that their immorality 
is tied up with their achievement or traits to such an extent that you 
cannot plausibly focus on only their achievement or traits without 
that at least having the public meaning of honouring and admir-
ing their immoral traits and behaviour. As we argued in Chapter 
2, this does not mean you would be honouring and admiring their 
immorality in virtue of being immoral, but their immorality might 
be honoured and admired nevertheless.
If you cannot honour and admire without some of this spreading 
over onto a person’s immoral traits and immoral aspects of their 
achievements, then the final approach we will consider is that you 
simply accept that and use this as a kind of educational opportunity. 
In his discussion of Kant’s racism, Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra 
(2018) argues that there is reason to approach Kant’s work with a 
stance of deep acknowledgement. He writes:
What I mean by deep acknowledgment is a recognition of 
Kant’s racial theory in a way that 1) it reflects on Kant’s char-
acter, 2) Kant is held accountable for it and 3) one considers the 
possibility that it is not only consistent with, but also affects 
his traditional moral philosophy in significant ways so that one 
must revise their interpretation of Kant’s moral theory.
(Abundez-Guerra 2018: 126)
To properly understand Kant, then, we have to understand the racist 
element to his views and their relation to his otherwise egalitarian 
ethics. Deeply acknowledging Kant’s work, according to Abundez- 
Guerra, involves examining whether Kant’s racial views affect the 
rest of his philosophy, particularly his views on cosmopolitan rights, 
human dignity, and personhood. For example, Charles Mills (2017: 
Ch.6) takes this approach to Kant’s philosophy and argues that 
Kant’s views on rationality and personhood have to be understood 
alongside his views on irrationality and sub-personhood. According 
to Mills, this shows that Kant’s moral philosophy cannot be sepa-
rated from his views on race. Whether or not we agree with Mills’ 
conclusion, the point Abundez-Guerra stresses is that we should be 
asking these kinds of questions when discussing Kant’s work.
One option, then, is to approach certain artistic works with a 
stance of deep acknowledgement. As we discussed in Chapter 3, 
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according to some critics there is an important connection between 
the ethical shortcomings of both Richard Wagner and Roman 
 Polanski and the brilliance of their artistic creations. According to 
Lee (1999), Wagner’s inner conflict allowed him to see more deeply 
into the troubling aspects of human nature. Similarly, Leaming 
(1982) claims that Polanski’s films are important partly because of 
his amoral perspective. Given this, there is good reason to think 
that a true appreciation of the work requires a deep acknowledge-
ment of their ethical shortcomings. We should not, then, seek to 
set the immorality of these artists to one side in appreciating their 
work. Rather, we should investigate the links between their ethical 
failings and their artistic achievements.
It might seem that this will be harder to achieve for p ublic  honours 
than the cases of private appreciation of someone’s work consid-
ered so far. However, for cases of public honours we might seek to 
highlight this ambiguity through re-contextualizing these  honours. 
Demetriou and Wingo (2018: 351) describe how in post-apartheid 
South Africa Nelson Mandela sought to steer his government away 
from completely destroying monuments that commemorate white 
colonizers: “the South African solution has been to remove the 
most offensive monuments of lesser importance, yes, but for the 
most part to add new monuments or reframe old ones”. For exam-
ple, a statue of Mandela was erected outside the Union Buildings 
in Pretoria, close to an old statue commemorating South Africa’s 
first prime minister, Louis Botha. Similarly, the Voortrekker mon-
ument, a celebration of colonialization, has now been accompanied 
by a museum of Afrikaner culture and history that hires black tour 
guides and is connected to Freedom Park by Reconciliation Road. 
Demetriou and Wingo (2018: 351–352) argue that this approach pro-
vides a way of removing many of the harmful effects of these monu-
ments without causing unnecessary social division which they claim 
will ultimately undermine antiracist goals. Rossi (2020: 76) also 
endorses this kind of approach, claiming that rather than remove 
statues of historically important but morally troubling fi gures, we 
should re-contextualize them in a way that no longer encourages 
unqualified admiration. While (as we discussed in Section 2) we 
are sceptical at minor efforts at re-contextualizing (such as a small 
plaque), we think that these more significant re- contextualization 
efforts are more promising.
While the focusing approach tries to use a person’s immorality 
to ensure that focus remains on their admirable traits and achieve-
ments, the ambiguity approach emphasizes a person’s immoral 
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aspects. In both approaches, there is an implicit aim to emphasize a 
messy and complex – and indeed, more accurate – picture of a person. 
The focusing approach puts more emphasis on the admirable traits 
and achievements, whereas the ambiguity approach puts somewhat 
more emphasis on the immorality. However, both try to emphasize a 
more complete picture of a person. The reason for the difference in 
emphasis between these approaches is that the ambiguity approach 
most clearly becomes an appropriate option only when other options 
do not seem permissible. Doing nothing does not seem appropriate, 
but neither does abandoning admiration. Focusing – whether just on 
the work or on the person’s admirable traits – does not seem to avoid 
the moral dangers of honouring and admiring. Because we cannot 
avoid honouring and admiring – perhaps for reasons of social cohe-
sion, perhaps because the achievements are so important that they 
cannot be ignored, and so on – honouring and admiring the immoral 
then becomes an educational opportunity, an opportunity to expose 
ourselves to the dark sides of life, to realize that even wicked people 
can do things of excellence and great beauty.
Both the focusing approach and the ambiguity approach face the 
objection that they involve experiencing or expressing two conflict-
ing emotions towards one person and that this is not possible. How-
ever, we think this is not only possible but quite common. Consider 
the mother whose love for her teenage daughter turns to anger when 
she stays out past her curfew. This is obvious insofar as one can be 
said to have an emotion when one is disposed to feeling in certain 
ways – for example, love and anger towards the same person when 
exposed to different stimuli. Yet one can also have conflicting feel-
ings at the same time. While we have argued there may be a problem 
when we prioritize admiration over (say) indignation with respect to 
the admirable yet immoral, we are not always forced to make such a 
prioritization. We can instead express both simultaneously.
This might be thought to be a best-of-both-worlds approach. We 
can continue to honour and admire the admirable without promot-
ing a wholly positive picture of them. In doing so, we respect both 
the reasons for and the reasons against honour and admiration. 
In particular, we may reduce the risk of othering wrongdoers and 
engaging in a misguided pursuit of purity. By continuing to cele-
brate the achievements of those who have acted immorally, we can 
send the message that these people remain members of the moral 
 community, albeit members who have violated our moral norms.
Moreover, in comparison with the form of focused admiration 
considered above, this approach is one that may make more sense 
98 Refocusing Admiration
as a response to those whose admirable qualities and achievements 
cannot be separated from their immorality. This approach calls on 
people to attend to both these aspects of the person being admired 
and to consider the interrelations between the two. There is no 
need, then, to be able to separate the immoral from the admirable 
in order for this approach to work. While this approach offers a 
global assessment of the admired person, it is likely to be a more 
accurate global assessment. The admired qualities will be present 
alongside the flaws. It thus avoids the vice of globalism.
The ambiguous approach will often not be appropriate. It is most 
clearly appropriate when all other approaches seem impermissible and 
yet there are still strong reasons to honour and admire a  particular 
achievement or person. However, there are many cases where the ex-
tent and the severity of the wrongdoing will make anything short of 
abandoning admiration inappropriate. For example, when revelations 
about Jimmy Savile’s long history of sexual abuse emerged, a statue 
to  Savile that had stood outside Scotstoun Leisure Centre in Glasgow 
was quickly removed. Charities with facilities named after Savile 
acted quickly to rename them. As someone who worked for one such 
charity points out, “There wasn’t a single complaint” (McColl 2020). 
In cases like Savile’s where someone’s immoral behaviour erases any-
thing else they may have done, re-contextualizing will not be desirable 
or effective. It is unreasonable to expect victims of child abuse to have 
to walk past a statue to Savile whenever they want to use their local 
swimming pool, no matter how this statue is re-contextualized.
While some statues might warrant being re-contextualized, we 
think that these will be exceptional cases – in particular, cases 
where re-contextualization is the best way to maintain social co-
hesion. Even important historical figures do not need a statue to 
be remembered. For example, statues commemorating figures like 
Edward Colston strike us as ones where re-contextualization is in-
appropriate. Colston was a major investor, manager, and deputy 
governor for the Royal African Company, a company that trans-
ported 84,500 enslaved Africans in conditions so unsanitary that 
19,300 are estimated to have died in transit. Keeping statues of 
someone responsible for such horrific moral wrongs in prominent 
places is, in our view, completely inappropriate. While we could 
possibly re- contextualize his statues and his other public honours, 
it is not clear why this is necessary. Presenting a figure like Colston 
as an ambiguous figure who was admirable despite his involvement 
in the slave trade strikes us as an approach that significantly down-
plays the extent and significance of his actions, especially given that 
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the things he may be admirable for – for example, his philanthropy, 
his courage, his daring – are hardly unique to him. If inspiration is 
needed for such things there are plenty of other people who could 
be honoured instead. Because it does not strike us as necessary with 
Colston, we think the ambiguous approach with respect to statues 
of him is inappropriate. Some readers may disagree with our assess-
ment of this case. We hope that the general point is still clear.
While the ambiguity approach has a best-of-both-worlds feel to 
it, we think that it is not without its problems. For it to work, it 
must be clear that one is taking this approach. We think it may be 
easy for people to say that they are taking this approach – and say 
they are re-contextualizing something – but then not go to much 
effort to make this clear. The honour, then, might then still appear 
to be making a reductive global assessment of the person as purely 
admirable. There may also be those that focus too much on a per-
son’s wrongs. It may be that they are better served mentioning these 
wrongs and so drawing more attention to the person’s admirable 
traits and achievements. As with the focusing and separating ap-
proaches, the ambiguity approach also faces problems with respect 
to our present celebrity/hero culture. Indeed, taking an ambiguous 
approach might also run the risk of glamourizing the immoral. As a 
result, when we have to honour and admire the immoral in this am-
biguous way, we seem to be put into what Claudia Card (2002) calls 
a grey zone.8 By this she means the further wrong of the immoral 
when they implicate us, to some extent, in their immorality. In other 
words, the ambiguous approach is not a morally clean option. We 
do unfortunately take on some of the taint of a person’s immorality 
when we honour and admire them in this ambiguous way.
Again, let us emphasize that we think that the ambiguous 
 approach is most obviously appropriate when all other approaches 
do not seem to be appropriate. It might be that after considering 
all the other approaches you find that abandoning admiration is 
the best option, after all. It might be, though, that the ambiguous 
approach is better in a particular case even though all the other op-
tions have not been exhausted. While we have presented the discus-
sion so far as a kind of step-by-step guide, we do not want to convey 
that you have to match exactly this process. What is important, 
though, is to ask yourself the kinds of questions we have suggested 
throughout this book. This allows that there may be other relevant 
questions that we have missed. As we said in the Introduction, we 
hope to start a conversation by guiding people through an ethical 
puzzle that many of us encounter in daily life.
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Notes
 1 For more on the idea that we have mixed characters, see, for example, 
Miller (2014) and Hartman and Matheson (manuscript).
 2 See also Smith (2021). Her research shows that people often overlook 
contextualizing information found on plaques added to controver-
sial monuments. This supports our point that such plaques are fairly 
 ineffective at contextualizing.
 3 For more on these issues, see, for example, Matheson (2017a), P ettigrove 
(2004), and Radzik (2009).
 4 Indeed, as Fabre (2016) argues, a problem with commemoration 
 practices is that they are often partisan. This seems to make one side 
“the good guys” and the other side “the bad guys”. In other words, it 
also seems to manifest the vice of globalism. Focusing on the good 
and bad actions of your own country during a war is one way that 
 commemorative practices could avoid this, and so it is one way to 
 morally improve commemorative practices.
 5 The worry is distinct from that found in the longstanding debate about 
immoral art. It may be well that we have independent reason not to 
honour and admire an immoral artwork because it is less aestheti-
cally valuable due to some of its features – for example, the artwork 
endorses immoral attitudes (e.g. Carroll 1996; Gaut 2007; Bartel 2019). 
See Chapter 2 for discussion. Our current concern is rather whether 
we have reason not to honour and admire achievements (including 
 artworks) because they have a bad moral function.
 6 See also Archer (2015) and Matheson (2017b).
 7 There is a connection here with discussions of imaginative resistance (e.g. 
Gendler 2000). This is the idea that certain features of artworks or narra-
tives are jarring such that we cannot or will not fully imagine them – for 
example, we cannot imagine that certain moral truths are false. Some, 
such as Eva Dadlez (2005), argue that features of immoral artworks give 
rise to imaginative resistance and that this decreases the aesthetic value 
of the work. Others, such as Jacobson (1997), hold that imaginative resis-
tance blocks us from seeing the value rather than undermining its values 
and, thus, is a problem with the viewer of the art rather than the artwork. 
One way to understand what is happening in these cases is that there is 
a kind of moral incapacity: not only can we not act in particular ways, 
sometimes we cannot even imagine in particular ways.
 8 Card takes this term from Primo Levi (1988: Ch.2)
How should you respond to an immoral yet admirable person? 
Should you honour and admire such a person? Should you instead 
blame and shun them? Throughout this book we have outlined a 
number of factors that affect what decision you should make. We 
have not given a precise formula for working out the best response, 
as we have aimed to provide a guide to thinking about the ethical 
puzzle of how we should treat immoral yet admirable people. How-
ever, we do recommend asking the following general questions.
1 Is the Person Really a Fitting Target of Admiration?
You should first establish that you are dealing with an instance of 
the puzzle. This requires that you have a person who is a fitting tar-
get of admiration and who is immoral. As we argued in  Chapter 1, 
to be a fitting target of admiration a person must be, or have 
achieved, something extraordinarily excellent. As we explained 
in Chapter 2, there are at least three ways someone’s immoral be-
haviour may prevent them from being a fitting target of admiration. 
First, it may serve as an epistemic defeater, one that undermines 
the reasons people have for thinking that the person acted in ways 
that are worthy of admiration. As the case of Jimmy Savile illus-
trated, someone may appear to have acted admirably (at least to 
some people), when in fact these acts were all performed in order 
to facilitate appalling acts of abuse. Second, it might be that their 
immorality affects the value of their work. For example, learning 
about Marquis de Sade’s real-life immorality might make you think 
that his work is not as excellent as you previously thought. Third, a 
person’s immoral behaviour may prevent that person from remain-
ing admirable for some earlier action. For example, Aung San Suu 
Kyi may no longer be a fitting target of admiration for the acts that 




out against the war crimes committed by her country’s military. If 
it turns out that a person is a not a fitting target of admiration (for 
any reason), you have an easy answer: you should not honour and 
admire this person.
But sometimes a person is both admirable and immoral. We 
think this is true of Roman Polanski. He remains a fitting target of 
admiration for his aesthetic talents and achievements despite hav-
ing committed a horrific act of sexual assault on a child. While you 
might disagree about the example, we take it that there are many 
cases where someone is a fitting target of admiration despite their 
immoral behaviour. In cases like this, the fact that someone is a 
fitting target of admiration provides some reason to admire them. 
But this is merely the start of the deliberative process, as the fact 
that someone is a fitting target of admiration provides, at most, a 
defeasible reason to admire that person.
Importantly, you might start this deliberative process even in 
cases where we are not completely certain a person is either admi-
rable or immoral. You might have good evidence that someone has 
acted immorally and yet not be completely certain about this. You 
might have good evidence and be open to being proven wrong. You 
will often have to make a decision about whether you will honour 
and admire a person without having certainty. You will not often 
have the liberty to wait until all the facts come and are indisputable 
before deciding what to do. This is one factor that makes real eth-
ical decision-making difficult. Sometimes you will have to decide 
on the basis of your evidence, and sometimes you will get it wrong. 
The harms related to being wrong about the facts will have to be 
weighed against the moral dangers of honouring and admiring or 
refraining from honouring and admiring.
2  Are There Moral Reasons That Count against 
Honour and Admiration in This Case?
First, you should ask whether your honour or admiration might 
empower the wrongdoer. If there is a risk that it will be interpreted 
as condoning the immoral behaviour, picking the wrongdoer out 
as an exemplar, enhancing their credibility, or providing them with 
normative support, then it may empower them. If so, then there is 
reason not to honour and admire them.
Second, you must ask whether the honouring and admiring of the 
wrongdoer risks harming the wrongdoer’s victims. In answering this 
question, we must ask whether in honouring and admiring a wrong-
doer you may be disrespecting their victims. One important way 
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to investigate this issue is to consider what victims themselves say 
about whether it would be disrespectful to honour and admire their 
wrongdoer. Of course, this may not generate any clear answers, as 
victims may disagree on this issue. Even where they agree, that is no 
guarantee that they are right to feel that honouring and admiring 
their wrongdoer would disrespect them. Nevertheless, this seems like 
a worthwhile place to start, both because victims are likely to have 
important insights on this issue and because the act of listening to 
victims is itself a clear way to show that they are respected. Even if 
you are not contributing to harm yourself, you must also ask whether 
in honouring and admiring a wrongdoer you are making yourself 
complicit in their wrongdoing. You must also ask if there is a risk that 
honouring and admiring a wrongdoer would silence their victims. 
An important question to consider here is whether those victims are 
in danger of being ignored. For instance, public discussions of the 
wrongdoing may focus entirely on the wrongdoer’s side of the story. 
The wrongdoer may be an especially powerful person who is capa-
ble of mobilizing significant support for their side of the story. The 
victim may be a member of a marginalized group and so especially 
vulnerable to being ignored. In addition, the wrongdoing in question 
may be the kind of wrong in which victims’ stories are systematically 
downplayed or ignored, such as with rape and domestic violence.
Third, you must ask if through honouring and admiring the 
wrongdoer, you are perpetuating wrongdoing, either by encourag-
ing others to emulate the wrongdoer or by supporting a harmful 
ideology. This reason will not be present in all cases. There will 
sometimes be little danger of the honour and admiration being 
interpreted in a way that would present someone as an exemplar. 
Moreover, in some cases honouring and admiring a wrongdoer will 
not support any harmful ideologies.
If none of these reasons against honour and admiration are pres-
ent, then we may have a simple solution to the question of what to 
do. In this case, we may be able to honour and admire without any 
problems at all, though of course there may also be other reasons 
not to do so that we have not considered. If one or more of these 
reasons are present, then we should consider the next question.
3  Are There Reasons That Count in Favour of 
Honour and Admiration?
The first question to ask here is whether in addition to being a fitting 
target of admiration, the person also deserves to be admired. Those 
who create great artworks, make ground-breaking contributions 
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to intellectual life, or shape a society’s history in positive ways 
 generally deserve to be honoured and admired. There are stronger 
reasons to give people what they deserve than to give them what is 
fitting. Even so, as we emphasized in Chapter 3, the reasons that 
desert gives are still defeasible. There may be reasons against hon-
ouring and admiring someone who deserves admiration that mean 
that, all-things-considered, we should not admire them.
Moreover, the fact that someone deserves honour and admira-
tion does not mean that it is any particular individual’s responsibil-
ity to ensure that they receive this. Those with no interest in cinema 
may have little or no reason to ensure that Polanski is admired for 
his talents as a filmmaker. Similarly, those left cold by opera have 
little reason to ensure that Wagner is honoured and admired. On 
the other hand, an awards committee deciding who should receive 
the best director award have a far greater responsibility to ensure 
that filmmakers receive the honour and admiration they deserve. 
In addition to asking yourself whether someone deserves honour 
and admiration, you should also consider whether you have any 
responsibility to ensure that they get what they deserve. If it is your 
responsibility to ensure someone gets the honour and admiration 
they deserve, then you will have a much stronger reason to honour 
and admire them.
In addition to asking whether someone deserves an honour or 
 admiration, you should also ask whether they are entitled to it. Even 
if they are only entitled to an honour, they may be entitled to forms 
of honour that encourage admiration, such as a prize, a medal, or 
some other form of award. If an award has clear and  precise criteria 
governing who should receive it then the person who meets these 
criteria is likely to be entitled to the award. A clear case of this is 
a 100-metre sprint race: the winner is the person who crosses the 
finish line first without breaking any of the relevant rules and they 
seem entitled to the prize, which means that they have a right to it. 
An entitlement claim, then, generally provides a stronger reason to 
ensure someone receives an honour than a desert claim, though even 
these claims might be overridden in exceptional circumstances. As 
with desert, so with entitlement: it does not follow that you or any 
particular person has a duty to admire or honour.
The next question to ask when seeking to identify which  reasons 
are in play concerns the issue of moralism. As we argued in 
 Chapter 3, the most relevant charge of moralism in this context is 
that a  moralistic approach leads to people closing themselves off 
from valuable experiences. When considering a particular case of 
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honouring or admiring someone who has acted immorally, you 
should consider whether you may be operating with an inflated 
sense of the appropriateness of moral criticism and are losing out 
on valuable experiences as a result. This is unlikely to be an easy 
question to answer, as there is no simple way to determine whether 
one is giving too much weight to moral concerns. Indeed, you must 
be careful not to manifest the opposing vice of moral indifference. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that moral reasons 
are not the only reasons to consider when deciding how to respond 
to any particular case. You should also consider the aesthetic and 
epistemic reasons you may have to admire great artists, intellectu-
als, and historical figures. In considering any particular case, you 
should ask whether their works and achievements are truly excep-
tional. More generally, you should ask whether in refusing to admire 
those who have acted immorally you might be shutting yourself off 
from distinctive contributions and insights into the human condi-
tion. Finally, you should consider whether someone’s achievements 
have played an important role in shaping your identity. If so, then 
this might justify continuing to honour and admire that person 
even when there are good moral reasons that count against doing 
so. Of course, sometimes you will have to accept the damage to 
your identity and cease honouring and admiring someone.
If none of these considerations seem relevant, then it may be clear 
how you should act. If there are forceful reasons against honour and 
admiration and nothing counting in its favour, then abandoning 
honour and admiration is likely to be the best response. However, 
things will often be more complicated, and you will face a range of 
reasons counting both in favour of and against honour and admira-
tion. Here, you should consider whether one of these sets of reasons 
is clearly more forceful than the other set, including considering the 
strength of evidence in favour of these reasons. If there is still not a 
clear winner, then you should consider the following question.
4  Would a Focused Form of Honour and Admiration 
Be the Best Approach?
The first focused approach is to ensure that honour and admiration 
does not spread beyond a person’s admirable traits and achieve-
ments. This approach has the advantage of allowing these admira-
ble qualities to be celebrated while avoiding or at least reducing the 
moral problems that may arise from doing so. Importantly, it helps 
to avoid an overly simplistic view of people as merely good or bad 
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that we argued arises from the vice of globalism, which involves 
globalizing a feature of a person so that it comes to be seen as the 
entirety of who they are.
The second focused approach instead concentrates only on the 
achievements of an immoral person. This approach separates the 
achievements from the person. Again, this approach may offer a 
way to celebrate the admirable achievements without celebrating 
the person. However, this may also be difficult to achieve when 
someone’s work and achievements are difficult to separate from 
their immorality. Care should be taken that this focused form of 
honour and admiration will be understood to be only about a per-
son’s admirable traits and achievements and as a global endorse-
ment of the person.
Finally, we might seek to honour and admire someone in a way 
that recognizes and engages with their immorality – what we called 
the ambiguity approach. This approach is particularly well suited 
for cases where someone’s admirable qualities and achievements 
cannot be separated from their immorality. It also seems to be a 
way of responding to someone’s ethical failings without othering 
that person or engaging in a misguided purity project. Moreover, 
it allows us to investigate the links between their achievements and 
their ethical failings. However, this response may not be appro-
priate in all cases. There are cases where someone’s wrongdoings 
are too severe to make ambiguous representations appropriate. It 
is most appropriate when all other approaches seem inappropri-
ate and yet you find you still need to honour and admire a person 
in some way. There are also cases where the wrongdoings are too 
 minor to justify an ambiguous response.
One of the last three approaches may be the most appropriate 
response when a person has been accused of immorality but it is not 
clear whether the accusations are true. Each of these approaches, 
after all, aims to promote a broader, more complicated under-
standing of who people are. This complicated understanding might 
include the fact that we do not know everything about them and 
that there are questions that remain about whether they have done 
something immoral. Such an understanding may be supported by 
a tentative act of blame or protest at the wrongdoer which could 
draw attention to the accusation of serious wrongdoing. For exam-
ple, when Casey Affleck was awarded the Oscar for Best Actor in 
2017, Brie Larson, the award’s presenter, refused to applaud him. 
Speaking after the ceremony, Larson, a vocal advocate for victims 
of sexual assault, said her behaviour “Spoke for itself” (Chi 2017). 
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By refusing to applaud Affleck, Larson expressed a soft condemna-
tion of Affleck to accompany the admiration being expressed and 
encouraged by the award. We are thereby given a picture of him as 
someone who is not just admirable but also someone who might 
have acted wrongly.
Not only must you consider the strength of the evidence that you 
have for a person’s immorality and admirability and the strength 
of those reasons, but you must also consider how other people are 
reacting to the person. As we discussed, the appropriateness of 
 actions and feelings can be affected by what others are doing. If 
everyone is blaming a particular person, you might have no need to. 
Indeed, you might have good reason not to. Each person’s blame, 
taken together, may be disproportionate and thus a manifestation 
of moralism. Likewise, if many people are honouring and admiring 
a particular person, then you might have no need to. Everyone’s 
honour and admiration, taken together, might manifest the vice of 
moral indifference. If others are not honouring and admiring in 
appropriate ways, you might, however, have good reason to step in 
and set an example about a more appropriate way to honour and 
admire – such as ensuring that honour and admiration is focused 
and does not spread over onto their immoral traits and actions.
***
While we have offered a number of questions that might be asked 
to try and determine how to respond to a particular case, we offer 
no general formula for deciding which reasons we should priori-
tize in any particular case. This may seem disappointing to those 
looking for clear guidance about how to act. However, we believe 
that any attempt to provide such a formula is misguided. Moral 
conflicts often involve difficult decisions calling for fine-grained, 
contextual judgements which we should not seek to solve through 
discovering a general, systematic formula. As Aristotle (350 B.C.E 
[2009] Bk. 1 Ch.3) points out, a discussion should only be as pre-
cise as its subject matter allows: we believe that the field of ethics 
does not  allow for the precision of a systematic formula. Moreover, 
as Sophie Grace Chappell (2014: Ch.1) points out, the absence of 
any systematic formulae for ethical decision-making does not mean 
that there is no such thing as a good ethical decision.
The absence of a simple manual means that having answered 
each of the above questions we must then reflect carefully on 
whether honour and admiration are appropriate in this case. 
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These decisions will not be easy, and there are likely to be cases 
where whatever we decide will involve acting against important rea-
sons that count against this course of action.
There may even be more than one option that is morally permis-
sible. There may be cases where the reasons counting in favour and 
against honour and admiration are of roughly equal strength and 
so neither option is better than the other. Perhaps more likely, there 
may be cases where one of these options is preferable from the moral 
point of view but is not morally required. It is widely accepted that 
some acts are beyond the call of duty (i.e. supererogatory).1 These 
are acts that are morally better than some other permissible form 
of action but that are not morally required. Risking one’s own life 
to save that of another, for example, will often be morally better 
than making no effort to save that person’s life but will often not 
be required. However, supererogatory acts need not be so extreme. 
Helping a neighbour home with their shopping may also be good, 
but doing so may go beyond any duty you owe to your neighbour. 
What this shows is that even if we have identified the act that would 
be morally best, we may still face the question of whether it is mor-
ally required. Perhaps the personal sacrifice involved in abandon-
ing our admiration would be so great that we are not required to 
make it, even though it would be the morally preferable option.2
We have focused on how individuals or organizations may 
 respond to these issues. It is important to note that one of the main 
barriers to the focused forms of admiration discussed in C hapter 5 
is a celebrity culture that treats great artists, sports people, 
 intellectuals, scientists, and politicians as heroes to be worshipped. 
This encourages global admiration of those who are honoured and 
admired, as well as encouraging us to overlook other people who 
have been involved in bringing about the achievements of people 
who are honoured and admired. It is important for individuals to 
take this culture into account when deciding whether to honour 
and admire the immoral, as it will influence how their honouring 
and admiration is interpreted by others.
We think that the culture that seeks to turn people into  celebrities 
is open to challenge. We see this book as one small step towards 
challenging this culture. If in future we generally honour and  admire 
people in focused ways, we may avoid manifesting or  encouraging 
the vice of globalism, which we think is a key part of this culture. 
There are, though, many more critical questions to be investigated 
as part of this process. How should people respond when others 
choose to honour and admire those who in their view should not 
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be honoured and admired? How should we assess the responsibili-
ties of fans in sustaining celebrity culture? What responsibility do 
celebrities themselves have to challenge this culture? While some 
of these questions have been investigated by those working in ce-
lebrity studies, we think it is important for philosophers to start to 
take these questions seriously too.3
What is called for here is not just more philosophical attention to 
these issues but a wider societal challenge to celebrity culture. The 
history of the American film industry shows the contingent nature 
of celebrity culture. At the beginning of the twentieth century, The 
Edison Trust had a monopoly of the industry and sought to prevent 
actors from acquiring celebrity status by prohibiting artistic credits 
and refusing licences for films featuring star-making performances. 
They were largely successful in doing so until a group of indepen-
dent filmmakers started a rival film industry in Hollywood, which 
was more open turning actors into stars (Wu 2010: 61–73). So, celeb-
rity culture is not inevitable. Indeed, people sustain celebrity cul-
ture by paying attention to celebrities (van Krieken 2012: 73). If this 
attention were withdrawn, then this culture would be very difficult 
to sustain. Given a widespread collective effort, then, it would be 
possible to challenge this celebrity culture.
While any individual’s ability to influence this culture is likely to 
be limited, it will also be impossible to change this culture unless 
there are individual efforts to resist it. You should seek to avoid 
encouraging and manifesting the vice of globalism by recognizing 
that great talents may exist alongside deep moral flaws. By taking 
such a stance towards those you admire, you can play some small 
part in resisting the damaging tendency to think of people in sim-
plistic and reductive ways. People’s flaws need not define who they 
are but nor should these flaws be ignored, downplayed, justified, 
or excused simply because of someone’s talents and achievements.
Notes
 1 However, some deny their existence. For a summary of this debate, see 
Archer (2018b).
 2 Many hold that the level of sacrifice involved is always what prevents 
an act of supererogation from being obligatory (e.g. Benn 2018). Even 
those who deny this (e.g. Archer 2015, 2016) accept that the level of sac-
rifice is often what prevents the morally best act from being obligatory.
 3 Philosophers have already begun to explore this issue in relation to 
statues commemorating those implicated in racism and slavery – see 
Lim (2020) and Ten-Herng Lai (2020) – but these questions have not 
been explored in relation to other cases of admiring the immoral.
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